Moreover, all three answers were general denials, which are “available to a party acting in good faith only in the most exceptional cases.” Mary Kay, Inc. v. Dunlap, No. 3:12-CV-0029-D, 2012 WL 2358082, at *7 (N.D. Tex. June 21, 2012) (Fitzwater, C.J.) (quoting 5 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1265, at 549 (3d ed. 2004) (hereinafter “Wright & Miller”); Dkt. No. 18 at 2-3. Accordingly, the Court struck all three answers and ordered the defendants to file new ones by February 5.
See, e.g., SEC v. Cuban, 798 F.Supp.2d 783, 795 n.13 (N.D. Tex. 2011) (Fitzwater, C.J.). To adequately plead an affirmative defense, there must be enough factual particularity to give the plaintiff “fair notice of the nature of the affirmative defense and prevent unfair surprise.” Mary Kay, Inc. v. Dunlap, 2012 WL 2358082, at *8 (N.D. Tex. June 21, 2012) (Fitzwater, C.J.) (quoting Cuban, 798 F.Supp.2d at 795 n.13).
See, e.g., SEC v. Cuban, 798 F.Supp.2d 783, 795 n.13 (N.D. Tex. 2011) (Fitzwater, C.J.). To adequately plead an affirmative defense, there must be enough factual particularity to give the plaintiff “fair notice of the nature of the affirmative defense and prevent unfair surprise.” Mary Kay, Inc. v. Dunlap, 2012 WL 2358082, at *8 (N.D. Tex. June 21, 2012) (Fitzwater, C.J.) (quoting Cuban, 798 F.Supp.2d at 795 n.13). “Although . . . in some instances merely pleading the name of the affirmative defense may be sufficient, a ‘fact-specific inquiry' is required to determine whether the pleadings set forth the
And a judge on this Court recognized an absolute right to assign claims under the UCC, explaining that, “[t]o the extent that [defendant] relies on the absolute right under § 2.210(b) to assign damages for breach of contract, [defendant] does not assert a breach of contract claim against [plaintiff], and this absolute right does not apply.” Mary Kay, Inc. v. Dunlap, No. 3:12-cv-29-D, 2012 WL 2358082, at *9 n.11 (N.D. Tex. June 21, 2012); see also PPG Indus., Inc. v. JMB/Houston Centers Partners Ltd. P'ship, 146 S.W.3d 79, 84 (Tex. 2004) (“the UCC expressly provides that warranty claims are assignable”).
Woodfield, 193 F.3d at 362. See Mary Kay, Inc. v. Dunlap, No. 3:12-CV-0029-D, 2012 WL 2358082, at *9 (N.D. Tex. June 21, 2012) (Fitzwater, J.) (striking affirmative defenses of estoppel, ratification and waiver because Defendant “ha[d] not pleaded the ‘minimum particulars' that are necessary to provide fair notice.”); Software Publishers Ass'n v. Scott & Scott, LLP, No. 3:06-CV-0949-G, 2007 WL 2325585, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 15, 2007) (Fish, J.) (striking affirmative defenses of waiver, estoppel, ratification, laches, and unclean hands where mere labels did not provide plaintiff fair notice of defenses being advanced).
See R. Doc. 9, pp. 2-4 citing Supplemental Rule G(1) and a line of cases wherein federal courts have stricken answers that improperly assert general denials in violation of Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(b). See id., citing, e.g., Mary Kay, Inc. v. Dunlap, No. 3:12-CV-0029-D, 2012 WL 2358082, at *8 (N.D. Tex. June 21, 2012). As a result of the deficient Answer, the USA contended that Hebert lacked statutory standing to file the Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Supplemental Rule G(8)(b)(i), which provides that “[a] claimant who establishes standing to contest forfeiture may move to dismiss the action under Rule 12(b).”
FDIC v. Niblo, 821 F. Supp. 441, 449 (N.D. Tex. 1993) (Cummings, J.) (citing Augustus v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction of Escambia Cnty., Fla., 206 F.2d 862, 868 (5th Cir. 1962)). When deciding whether an affirmative defense is an "insufficient defense," the court does not apply the pleading standards set forth in Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, and Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662. See Klein v. Fed. Ins. Co., 2014 WL 4476556, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 11, 2014) (Fitzwater, C.J.) (citing Mary Kay, Inc. v. Dunlap, 2012 WL 2358082, at *8 (N.D. Tex. June 21, 2012) (Fitzwater, C.J.); SEC v. Cuban, 798 F.Supp.2d 783, 795 n.13 (N.D. Tex. 2011) (Fitzwater, C.J.); EEOC v. Courtesy Bldg. Servs., Inc., 2011 WL 208408, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 21, 2011) (Fitzwater, C.J.)). Instead, the court applies the "fair notice" pleading standard for affirmative defenses set forth in Woodfield v. Bowman, 193 F.3d 354, 362 (5th Cir. 1999).
"'Although ... in some instances merely pleading the name of the affirmative defense may be sufficient, a 'fact-specific inquiry' is required to determine whether the pleadings set forth the 'minimum particulars' needed to ensure the plaintiff is not the victim of unfair surprise.'" J&J Sports Productions, Inc. v. Willie Ray's Private Room, Inc., No. 3:16-cv-1206-D, 2017 WL 514422, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 8, 2017) (quoting Mary Kay, Inc. v. Dunlap, No. 3:12-cv-29-D, 2012 WL 2358082, at *8 (N.D. Tex. June 21, 2012) (quoting Woodfield, 193 F.3d at 362)).
When deciding whether an affirmative defense is an "insufficient defense," the court does not apply the pleading standards set forth in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). See Klein v. Fed. Ins. Co., 2014 WL 4476556, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 11, 2014) (Fitzwater, C.J.) (citing Mary Kay, Inc. v. Dunlap, 2012 WL 2358082, at *8 (N.D. Tex. June 21, 2012) (Fitzwater, C.J.); SEC v. Cuban, 798 F.Supp.2d 783, 795 n.13 (N.D. Tex. 2011) (Fitzwater, C.J.); EEOC v. Courtesy Bldg. Servs., Inc., 2011 WL 208408, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 21, 2011) (Fitzwater, C.J.)). Instead, the court applies the "fair notice" pleading standard for affirmative defenses set forth in Woodfield v. Bowman, 193 F.3d 354, 362 (5th Cir. 1999).
This court has held, however, that when a party moves to dismiss an affirmative defense, the court does not apply the pleading standards set forth in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). See Klein v. Fed. Ins. Co., 2014 WL 4476556, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 11, 2014) (Fitzwater, C.J.) (citing Mary Kay, Inc. v. Dunlap, 2012 WL 2358082, at *8 (N.D. Tex. June 21, 2012) (Fitzwater, C.J.); SEC v. Cuban, 798 F.Supp.2d 783, 795 n.13 (N.D. Tex. 2011) (Fitzwater, C.J.); EEOC v. Courtesy Bldg. Servs., Inc., 2011 WL 208408, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 21, 2011) (Fitzwater, C.J.)). Instead, the court applies the "fair notice" pleading standard for affirmative defenses set forth in Woodfield v. Bowman, 193 F.3d 354, 362 (5th Cir. 1999).