Marx v. P.P. Co.

6 Citing cases

  1. Crane v. Bennett

    177 N.Y. 106 (N.Y. 1904)   Cited 53 times

    But testimony was adduced on the part of the defendant, tending to prove the absence of actual malice on its part towards the plaintiff, which taken in connection with the evidence of malice which the law imputed when the falsity of the libel was established, presented a question of fact whether malice existed in the publication. If found to exist, then, in their discretion, the jury could award exemplary damages." That case was also cited with approval and followed in Marx v. Press P. Co. ( 134 N.Y. 561, 563); Van Ingen v. Star Co. ( 1 App. Div. 429; affirmed on opinion below, 157 N.Y. 695), and McFadden v. Morning Journal Assn. ( 28 App. Div. 508, 517). In Gray v. Sampers ( 35 App. Div. 270) the rule stated was that in an action of libel, proof by the plaintiff tending to establish the falsity of the alleged libelous article is evidence of malice, and where it is given a question is presented for the jury whether the malice is of such a character as to call for exemplary or punitive damages, and this question is not taken from the jury because the defendant gives evidence which tends to show that there was in fact no actual malice.

  2. Walling v. Commercial Advertiser Association

    173 App. Div. 491 (N.Y. App. Div. 1916)   Cited 1 times

    Under such circumstances, the court would not have committed reversible error if it had submitted the repetition of the plea for the consideration of the jury upon the question of exemplary damages. ( Marx v. P.P. Co., 134 N.Y. 561, 563.) But, as I have said, the court specifically instructed that the repetition was germane to the question of compensatory damages.

  3. Collier v. Postum Cereal Co., Limited

    149 A.D. 143 (N.Y. App. Div. 1912)   Cited 3 times

    Error cannot be assigned on account of the omission of the court to state in this charge that damages could not be awarded if defendant proved the truth in justification, for the jury were elsewhere in the charge instructed that there could be no recovery if the article was true or even substantially true. It was held Klinck v. Colby ( supra) that, where a communication is privileged, a plea of justification, even without proof to sustain it, may not be considered as evidence of malice and in aggravation of damages, for the reason that "The jury may not look for the actual malice which shall nullify the privilege, in the fact that the defendant has put upon the record a justification which he has not attempted to sustain;" but in Youmans v. Paine (86 Hun, 479), which was a case of a privileged communication, the court, citing Marx v. Press Publishing Co. ( 134 N.Y. 561), held that the jury had the right to determine as a question of fact whether the justification of the article was set up in good faith. Moreover, the court was here charging not with respect to plaintiff's right to recover, but with respect to the amount of damages if he was entitled to recover.

  4. Willard v. Press Publishing Co.

    52 App. Div. 448 (N.Y. App. Div. 1900)   Cited 7 times

    Judge EARL, delivering the opinion of the court, in which all of the other members concurred, said: "The judge charged the jury, in substance, that if the defendant failed to establish the justification of the libel set up in the answer, they could determine whether it was set up in good or bad faith, and that if they found it was set up in bad faith they could take that into consideration in estimating the damages to be awarded by them; and in this portion of his charge there was no error." But it is said that this question has been substantially passed upon adversely to the contention of the appellant in Marx v. Press Publishing Co. ( 134 N.Y. 562). We do not so understand the decision in that case.

  5. Palmer v. Bailey Co.

    12 App. Div. 6 (N.Y. App. Div. 1896)

    We have made careful examination to discover, if possible, any evidence which can fairly be regarded as sustaining the plea of justification, but we find none, save that furnished by the witness White, and this, we think, is hardly sufficient for that purpose. That it was clearly incompetent, we entertain no doubt, for, at most, it was merely hearsay, and did not in any way tend to connect the plaintiff with the matters testified to. It might possibly have been admissible as bearing upon the good faith of the defendant in interposing the defense of justification ( Youmans v. Paine, 86 Hun, 479; Marx v. The Press Pub. Co., 134 N.Y. 561) had it been limited to that object; but it will be seen by reference to the charge that the learned court instructed the jury that there was evidence in the case for them to consider upon the question of justification, and as this was the only evidence which had even a remote relation to that subject, it follows that improper use was made of the same. It is urged by the defendant's counsel that the exceptions which we have considered furnish no ground for reversal, for the reason that the jury were instructed by the learned trial court that, if justification was established to their satisfaction, their verdict should be for the defendant; and that, since the verdict rendered was for the sum of twenty-five dollars only, it amounts to a demonstration that they did not regard that defense with favor.

  6. Bresslin v. Star Co.

    85 Misc. 609 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1914)

    Had the defendant not sought to establish the truth of the libel upon this trial by pleading justification and giving evidence thereof, there would be more reason for setting the verdict aside as one arrived at in anger or prejudice. Indeed, it is highly probable that, had the charge been retracted rather than deliberately repeated and maintained by the defendant, the jury itself would have awarded far less damages than it gave, because the jurors in this case seemed more than ordinarily discriminating and intelligent, and they were instructed that the question of good faith in the attempted justification was for them to consider. Marx v. Press Pub. Co., 134 N.Y. 561. In view of these considerations should the court interfere with this verdict?