In Marubeni America Corp. v. United States ( Marubeni II ), we considered the proper classification of Nissan’s Pathfinder vehicle, examining the same two headings as the present appeal, and affirmed the CIT’s conclusion that the subject merchandise was properly classified under HTSUS Heading 8703, as opposed to HTSUS Heading 8704. See 35 F.3d 530, 532 (Fed. Cir. 1994). In interpreting HTSUS Heading 8703, Marubeni II explained that the relevant dictionary definitions from Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English Language (1986) define " ‘principally’ as ‘in the chief place, chiefly[ ]’ and ... ‘designed’ as ‘done by design or purposefully opposed to accidental or inadvertent; intended, planned.’ "
The term "not designed for use with" does not appear anywhere else in the tariff schedule and has not been interpreted by this court. The closest corollary to this provision is the term "principally designed for" as interpreted by this court in Marubeni America Corp. v. United States, 35 F.3d 530 (Fed. Cir. 1994). In Marubeni, this court reviewed the classification of certain sport utility vehicles.
To do so would be to stipulate oneself out of court. Strictly embracing the characterization would entail that the parties would never stipulate to a crucial material fact and the Court would be logically prevented from rendering summary judgment. This line of decisions includes: Intel Singapore Ltd. v. United States, 14 Fed. Cir. (T) ___, 83 F.3d 1416 (1996); Medline Industries, Inc. v. United States, 13 Fed. Cir. (T) ___, 62 F.3d 1407 (1995); Marubeni America Corp. v. United States, 12 Fed. Cir. (T) ___, 35 F.3d 530 (1994); Marcel Watch Co. v. United States, 12 Fed. Cir. (T) ___, 11 F.3d 1054 (1993); Lynteq, Inc. v. United States, 10 Fed. Cir. (T) ___, 976 F.2d 693 (1992); W.R. Filbin Co., Inc. v. United States, 9 Fed. Cir (T) 155, 945 F.2d 390 (1991); Digital Equipment Corp. v. United States, 8 Fed. Cir. (T) 5, 889 F.2d 267 (1989); Simod America Corp. v. United States, 7 Fed. Cir. (T) 82, 872 F.2d 1572 (1989); Stewart-Warner Corp. v. United States, 3 Fed. Cir. (T) 20, 748 F.2d 663 (1984); Childcraft Education Corp. v. United States, 2 Fed. Cir. (T) 121, 742 F.2d 1413 (1984); Daw Industries, Inc. v. United States, 1 Fed. Cir. (T) 146, 714 F.2d 1140 (1983). The "two-step" process originated from a classification case involving "prosthetic socks", where the court ruled that:
the tariff classification terms is denominated a question of law, see id., while the second step is, under the usual iteration of the rule, referred to as a factual inquiry, see id. The trial court viewed this characterization of the two-step process as raising a logical and practical dilemma when deciding classification cases on summary judgment, because the second step seemed to overlap with the ultimate question of whether the merchandise was correctly classified under the statute. This line of decisions includes: SGI, Inc. v. United States, 122 F.3d 1468 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Midwest of Cannon Falls, Inc. v. United States, 122 F.3d 1423 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Universal Elecs., Inc. v. United States, 112 F.3d 488 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Intel Singapore Ltd. v. United States, 83 F.3d 1416 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Casio, Inc. v. United States, 73 F.3d 1095 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Nidec Corp. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Medline Indus., Inc. v. United States, 62 F.3d 1407 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Marubeni Am. Corp. v. United States, 35 F.3d 530 (Fed. Cir. 1994); National Advanced Sys. v. United States, 26 F.3d 1107 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Sports Graphics, Inc. v. United States, 24 F.3d 1390 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Marcel Watch Co. v. United States, 11 F.3d 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Lyntec, Inc. v. United States, 976 F.2d 693 (Fed. Cir. 1992); W.R. Filbin Co. v. United States, 945 F.2d 390 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Digital Equip. Corp. v. United States, 889 F.2d 267 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Simod Am. Corp. v. United States, 872 F.2d 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Stewart-Warner Corp. v. United States, 748 F.2d 663 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Childcraft Educ. Corp. v. United States, 742 F.2d 1413 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Daw Indus., Inc. v. United States, 714 F.2d 1140 (Fed. Cir. 1983). The ultimate question in a classification case is whether the merchandise is properly classified under one or another classification heading.
Customs responds that long-standing precedent of this court and its predecessor court makes clear that the statutory presumption of correctness applies to the ultimate classification "decision," and not merely to the underlying factual issue. See, e.g., Marubeni Am. Corp. v. United States, 35 F.3d 530, 536 (Fed. Cir. 1994); United States v. New York Merchandise Co., 435 F.2d 1315, 1318 (CCPA 1970). Therefore, Customs argues, the presumption of correctness is always at play.
Explanatory Notes, while not binding or dispositive, may be instructive. Marubeni America Corp. v. United States, 35 F.3d 530, 535 n. 3 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Moreover, nothing in the notes to Chapter 48 would eliminate the subject merchandise from that chapter.
For example, in Sports Industries, Inc. v. United States, 65 Cust.Ct. 470, 473, C.D. 4125, 1970 WL 15475 (1970), the court held that whether an article is "specially designed" or "specially constructed" for a particular purpose may be determined by an examination of the article itself, its capabilities, as well as its actual use or uses, citing United States v. Air-Sea Forwarders, 54 C.C.P.A. 67, C.A.D. 907, 1967 WL 8905 (1967), Marshall Field Co. v. United States, 20 C.C.P.A. 225, T.D. 46037, 1932 WL 2102 (1932), and Lionel Trading Co. v. United States, 15 Ct. Cust.Appls. 365, T.D. 42562 (1928). In Marubeni America Corp. v. United States, 35 F.3d 530, 535 (Fed. Cir. 1994), a case focusing on whether a motor vehicle was principally designed for the transport of persons or of goods, the court opined that, to answer the question, "one must look at both the structural and auxiliary design features, as neither by itself is determinative." That is, even if an object has a primary or principal design, it is not automatically controlling.
Brookside Veneers, Ltd., 847 F.2d at 789. See also Marubeni Am. Corp. v. United States, 35 F.3d 530 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Where a tariff term has various definitions or meanings and has broad and narrow interpretations, the court must determine which definition best invokes the legislative intent.
Int'l Trade 1999) ("In determining the common meaning of a term, courts may and do consult dictionaries, scientific authorities, and other reliable sources of information including testimony of record." (citation omitted)); see also Meridian Prods. , 851 F.3d at 1381 n.7 (adopting dictionary definition of "unambiguous" as the standard for determining whether the scope terms of an antidumping or countervailing duty order are unambiguous); cf. Medline Indus., Inc. v. United States , 62 F.3d 1407, 1409 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (explaining, in the tariff classification context, that "[t]ariff terms are construed in accordance with their common and popular meaning, and in construing such terms the court may rely upon its own understanding, dictionaries and other reliable sources.") (citing Marubeni Am. Corp. v. United States , 35 F.3d 530 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ); Mita Copystar Am. v. United States , 21 F.3d 1079, 1082 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ("A court may rely upon its own understanding of terms used, and may consult standard lexicographic and scientific authorities, to determine the common meaning of a tariff term." (citations omitted)).
The provisions interpreted by the Associated Consumers court are not identical to those at issue here, and thus that opinion carries limited persuasive weight. See Marubeni Am. Corp. v. United States , 35 F.3d 530, 533 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Moreover, Associated Consumers emphasized the twisting function of wrenches, in contrast to pliers, and that distinction is consistent with the Trade Court’s decision in this case and our affirmance of that decision.