Martter v. Potter

Full title: GRAHAM MARTTER APPELLANT v. HON. SAM POTTER, JUDGE, WARREN DISTRICT COURT…

Court: Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals

Date published: Jun 9, 2017

NO. 2016-CA-000810-MR (Ky. Ct. App. Jun. 9, 2017)

Opinion

NO. 2016-CA-000810-MR

06-09-2017

GRAHAM MARTTER APPELLANT v. HON. SAM POTTER, JUDGE, WARREN DISTRICT COURT; AND COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEES

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: Matthew J. Baker Bowling Green, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: Andy Beshear Attorney General of Kentucky Jamie L. Spinks Special Assistant Attorney General Bowling Green, Kentucky

DIXON, JUDGE

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED APPEAL FROM WARREN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOHN R. GRISE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 14-CI-00587 OPINION
AFFIRMING

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BEFORE: DIXON, J. LAMBERT, AND STUMBO, JUDGES. DIXON, JUDGE: Graham Martter appeals the Warren Circuit Court's order granting a writ of prohibition of the district court's order suppressing statements he made prior to his arrest for driving under the influence. Finding no error, we affirm.

In July 2013, Martter was arrested for DUI by Warren County Deputy Sheriff Brandon Johnson. Martter filed a motion to suppress all statements he made to the deputy prior to his arrest, alleging he was subjected to a custodial interrogation without being Mirandized. The district court held a suppression hearing and heard testimony from Deputy Johnson. Johnson testified he responded to the scene of a truck versus tree collision at 1:45 a.m. The vehicle had been abandoned, and Johnson called in the license plate number to learn the address of the registered owner. Johnson then drove to 3425 Bristow Road, the owner's address, and knocked on the front door of the residence. Martter answered the door and stepped out onto the porch. Johnson asked Martter about the abandoned vehicle, and Martter admitted he had been driving at the time of the collision. Martter told the deputy he was not paying attention and ran off the road. While speaking with Martter, Johnson noticed a very strong odor of alcohol. Johnson asked Martter to step over to the driveway to perform field sobriety tests, which Martter failed. At approximately 2:18 a.m., Johnson placed Martter under arrest for DUI.

At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, Martter argued he was "in custody" from the moment he answered the door and that his statements were the result of an un-Mirandized custodial interrogation. The district court granted the motion to suppress, relying on United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 100 S. Ct. 1870, 64 L. Ed. 2d 497 (1980). The court concluded a Miranda warning was required because, upon Johnson's arrival at the residence, Martter was in custody and not free to leave. Thereafter, the Commonwealth filed a petition for a writ of prohibition in the circuit court. The circuit court granted the writ, concluding Martter was not "in custody" for purposes of Miranda until he was handcuffed and placed under arrest for DUI; accordingly, the court found the statements made by Martter prior to his arrest were admissible. Martter now appeals.

In Commonwealth v. Peters, 353 S.W.3d 592 (Ky. 2011), the Kentucky Supreme Court explained:

Writ cases are divided into two classes, which are distinguished by whether the inferior court allegedly is (1) acting without jurisdiction (which includes beyond its jurisdiction), or (2) acting erroneously within its jurisdiction." When, as here, the petitioner alleges that the trial court is acting erroneously, though within its jurisdiction, a writ will only be granted when two threshold requirements are satisfied: there exists no adequate remedy by appeal or otherwise; and the petitioner will suffer great and irreparable harm.

Id. at 595 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Here, if the suppression order was erroneous, the Commonwealth would have suffered great harm and would have had no remedy by appeal because, without Martter's statement he was driving, the Commonwealth could not prove the offense of DUI. We agree with the circuit court that the Commonwealth met the threshold requirements to seek a writ of prohibition. The Peters Court also addressed the appellate standard of review, stating:

Whether to grant or deny a writ of prohibition is within the sound discretion of the court with which the petition is filed. Thus, this decision is ultimately reviewed by an appellate court for abuse of discretion. However, if the

basis for the grant or denial involves a question of law, the appellate court reviews this conclusion de novo. If the court with which the petition is filed bases its ruling on a factual determination, this finding of fact is reviewed for clear error.

Id. (internal citations omitted).

Martter contends the circuit court improperly disturbed the district court's factual findings and reweighed the evidence to support its conclusion Martter was not in custody when the statements were made. We disagree.

In Commonwealth v. Lucas, 195 S.W.3d 403, 405-06 (Ky. 2006), the Kentucky Supreme Court explained:

Miranda warnings are required only where there has been such a restriction on the freedom of an individual as to render him in custody. . . . Custody does not occur until police, by some form of physical force or show of authority, have restrained the liberty of an individual. The test is whether, considering the surrounding circumstances, a reasonable person would have believed he or she was free to leave. Some of the factors that demonstrate a seizure or custody have occurred are the threatening presence of several officers, physical touching of the person, or use of a tone or language that might compel compliance with the request of the police. . . .
It has been held that whether a person is in custody depends on the objective circumstances of the interrogation. The subjective view of the officer and the person being questioned are not the focus of the question.

Id. (internal citations omitted).

It is undisputed Deputy Johnson was investigating the wrecked automobile registered to Martter's address. Johnson was the only officer present, and he lawfully approached the front door of the residence. See Quintana v. Commonwealth, 276 S.W.3d 753, 758 (Ky. 2008) ("[T]he officer who approaches the main entrance of a house has a right to be there, just as any member of the public might have."). Martter answered the door and stepped outside. When Johnson asked Martter about the wrecked vehicle, he admitted being the driver and hitting the tree. During this exchange, Johnson smelled the odor of alcohol on Martter and suspected him of driving under the influence; consequently, Johnson then asked Martter to perform field sobriety tests.

We have carefully reviewed the record, and there was simply no evidence of physical intimidation, coercion, threatening behavior, or restraint of movement indicating a reasonable person would have believed he was not free to leave. See Lucas, 195 S.W.3d at 405-06. Based on the totality of the circumstances, we agree with the circuit court that Martter was not in custody during the encounter on the porch; accordingly, a Miranda warning was not required. The circuit court properly rendered an order granting the writ of prohibition.

For the reasons stated herein, the order of the Warren Circuit Court is affirmed.

STUMBO, JUDGE, CONCURS.

LAMBERT, J., JUDGE, DISSENTS AND WILL NOT FILE SEPARATE OPINION. BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: Matthew J. Baker
Bowling Green, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: Andy Beshear
Attorney General of Kentucky Jamie L. Spinks
Special Assistant Attorney General
Bowling Green, Kentucky