Opinion
C. A. 9:24-00132-TMC-MHC
02-16-2024
Tyrease Sherrod Martinez, Petitioner, v. Sheriff Chuck Wright, Respondent.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Molly H. Cherry United States Magistrate Judge
Tyrease Sherrod Martinez, a pro se pretrial detainee, seeks habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), pretrial proceedings in this action have been referred to the assigned United States Magistrate Judge.
I. BACKGROUND
Petitioner, a pretrial detainee at the Spartanburg County Detention Center, is challenging pending state criminal charges. Records from Spartanburg County indicate that Petitioner has pending criminal charges for murder (case number 2022A4210100445) and possession of a weapon during a violent crime (2022A210100446). His charges were true-bill indicted on January 18, 2023 (indictment numbers 2023GS4200241 and 2023GS4200241A). Plaintiff is represented by counsel. See Spartanburg County Seventh Judicial Circuit Public Index, https://publicindex.sc courts.org/Spartanburg/PublicIndex/PISearch.aspx (search by case numbers listed above) (last visited Feb. 14, 2024).
A federal court may take judicial notice of the contents of its own records, as well as those records of other courts. See Aloe Creme Labs., Inc. v. Francine Co., 425 F.2d 1295, 1296 (5th Cir. 1970); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) (noting that courts may take judicial notice of other courts' records and proceedings).
Petitioner's grounds for relief are (1) Fifth Amendment right to “grand jury indictment for an infamous crime, capital crime[”], (2) true bill indictment (billa vera) subject matter jurisdiction, (3) unfair and deceptive practices, and (4) Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. ECF No. 1 at 6-9. As his request for relief, Petitioner wrote:
Petitioner files (habeas writ) motion to get a Fifth Amendment which is assured by the Sixth Amendment which has been incorporated into the “Due Process” Clause of Fourteenth Amendment. Petitioner claims prove that a failure to indict constitutes dismissal in the absence of any “true bill” stamp or transcripts from an “actual” hearing.Id. at 10.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A pro se habeas petition is reviewed pursuant to the procedural provisions of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Proceedings in the United States District Court, 28 U.S.C. § 2254; the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996; and in light of the following precedents: Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); and Todd v. Baskerville, 712 F.2d 70 (4th Cir.1983). The Court is charged with screening Petitioner's lawsuit to determine “[i]f it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court[.]” Rule 4 of Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts.
The Rules Governing Section 2254 are applicable to habeas actions brought under § 2241. See Rule 1(b), Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C.A. foll. § 2254.
Pro se petitions are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys, and a court is charged with liberally construing a petition filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). However, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for “all civil actions”).
III. DISCUSSION
Ordinarily, federal habeas corpus relief for a state prisoner is only available postconviction. However, pretrial petitions for habeas corpus may be brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, “which applies to persons in custody regardless of whether final judgment has been rendered and regardless of the present status of the case pending against him.” United States v. Tootle, 65 F.3d 381, 383 (4th Cir. 1995) (quoting Dickerson v. Louisiana, 816 F.2d 220, 224 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 956 (1987)). Generally, however, “‘[a]n attempt to dismiss an indictment or otherwise prevent a prosecution'” is not attainable through federal habeas corpus. Dickerson, 816 F.2d at 226 (quoting Brown v. Estelle, 530 F.2d 1280, 1283 (5th Cir. 1976).
This Petition is subject to dismissal on abstention grounds. In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the United States Supreme Court held that a federal court should not equitably interfere with state criminal proceedings “except in the most narrow and extraordinary of circumstances.” Gilliam v. Foster, 75 F.3d 881, 903 (4th Cir. 1996). Specifically, the Younger Court noted that courts of equity should not act unless the moving party has no adequate remedy at law and will suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief. Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-44. From Younger and its progeny, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has culled the following test to determine when abstention is appropriate: “(1) there are ongoing state judicial proceedings; (2) the proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) there is an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims in the state proceedings.” Martin Marietta Corp. v. Md. Comm'n on Human Relations, 38 F.3d 1392, 1396 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm'n v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)).
Petitioner is currently detained and awaiting trial on a pending state criminal charges, thus satisfying the first prong of the abstention test. See Boyd v. South Carolina, No. 1:11-cv-02981-TMC-SVH, 2012 WL 786341, at *2 (D.S.C. Feb. 10, 2012), report and recommendation adopted, 2012 WL 786356 (D.S.C. Mar. 9, 2012) (noting the first prong of the abstention test is satisfied where the petitioner “is currently awaiting trial in an ongoing state criminal proceeding”). The second criterion has been addressed by the Supreme Court's holding that “the States' interest in administering their criminal justice systems free from federal interference is one of the most powerful of the considerations that should influence a court considering equitable types of relief[,]” Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49 (1986). Here, the State of South Carolina has a significant interest in Petitioner's cases as he has been alleged to have violated South Carolina state law. In addressing the third criterion, the Supreme Court has noted that “ordinarily a pending state prosecution provides the accused a fair and sufficient opportunity for vindication of federal constitutional rights.” Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 124 (1975).
Therefore, this case meets all criteria for abstention under Younger, and federal habeas relief is available under § 2241 only if “special circumstances” justify the provision of federal review. Dickerson, 816 F.2d at 224-226 ; see also Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484, 489-90 (1973). While “special circumstances” lacks any precise, technical meaning, courts have essentially looked to whether procedures exist which would protect a petitioner's constitutional rights without pre-trial intervention; thus, where a threat to the petitioner's rights may be remedied by an assertion of an appropriate defense in state court, no special circumstance is shown. Moore v. DeYoung, 515 F.2d 437, 449 (3d Cir. 1975); cf. Drayton v. Hayes, 589 F.2d 117, 121 (2d Cir. 1979) (double jeopardy claim entitled to pretrial habeas intervention because the “very constitutional right claimed ... would be violated” if petitioner were forced to go to trial). Further, where the right may be adequately preserved by orderly post-trial relief, special circumstances are likewise nonexistent. Moore, 515 F.2d at 449. In Moore, the court concluded that the federal court should abstain from considering a speedy trial claim at the pretrial stage because the claim could be raised at trial and on direct appeal. Id.; see generally United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850 (1978); Dickerson, 816 F.2d at 226-227.
In the present action, Petitioner may raise claims related to his pending criminal charges in state court. Petitioner does not allege any extraordinary circumstances to show that pretrial intervention would be appropriate. As Petitioner can pursue his claims in state court both during and after trial, he fails to demonstrate “special circumstances,” or to show that he has no adequate remedy at law and will suffer irreparable injury if denied his requested relief. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-44; see also Holmes v. Grant, No. 4:22-cv-3459-MGL-TER, 2022 WL 19331394, at *1-2 (D.S.C. Nov. 2, 2022) (finding no extraordinary circumstances where petitioner argued that his criminal proceedings were not being conducted in a timely manner), report and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 2717362 (D.S.C. Mar. 30, 2023); Westpoint v. Al Cannon, No. 9:17-cv-2137-RMG-BM, 2017 WL 5004812, at *2 (D.S.C. Oct. 6, 2017) (dismissing habeas petition pursuant to Younger because detainee was able to raise claims of excessive bond and procedural delays during state court proceedings), report and recommendation adopted, 2017 WL 5027497 (D.S.C. Oct. 30, 2017); Bennekin v. Baugh, No. 4:14-cv-4004, 2014 WL 6909017, at *3 (D.S.C. Dec. 8, 2014) (finding that plaintiff in action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was not foreclosed from raising delayed indictment claim and having it ruled on “by the state court judge in his ongoing state criminal prosecution”). Petitioner is therefore precluded from federal habeas relief at this time, and his Petition is subject to summary dismissal.
IV. RECOMMENDATION
Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that the Petition in this action be DISMISSED without prejudice and without requiring Respondent to file a return.
Petitioner's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk United States District Court Post Office Box 835 Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).