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Martinez v. Thornell

United States District Court, District of Arizona
Apr 15, 2024
CV-23-01240-PHX-ROS (ASB) (D. Ariz. Apr. 15, 2024)

Opinion

CV-23-01240-PHX-ROS (ASB)

04-15-2024

Joe Paul Martinez, Petitioner, v. Ryan Thornell, et al., Respondents.


TO THE HONORABLE ROSLYN O. SILVER, SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Honorable Alison S. Bachus, United States Magistrate Judge.

Petitioner Joe Paul Martinez (“Petitioner”), who is confined in the Arizona State Prison Complex - Kingman, has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 1). Petitioner is represented by counsel in the instant habeas proceedings. For the reasons that follow, the Court recommends that the Petition be denied and dismissed.

Citation to the record indicates documents as they are displayed in the District of Arizona's official Court electronic document filing system under Case No. CV-23-01240-PHX-ROS (ASB).

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

I. State Proceedings

A. Facts

The Arizona Superior Court found the following facts and procedural history as true:

The superior court's recitation of the facts is presumed correct. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), (e)(1).

On August 30, 2016, the Defendant was charged with 31 counts of sexually related offenses with three minor victims. On May 21, 2019, the Defendant pled guilty to Count 9 as amended, Molestation of a Child, a class 2 felony and Dangerous Crime Against Children; Count 10 as amended, Attempted Molestation of a Child, a class 3 felony and
Dangerous Crime Against Children; Count 12 as amended, Attempted Molestation of a Child, a class 3 felony and Dangerous Crime Against Children; Count 14, Sexual Conduct With a Minor, a class 6 felony; Count 18, Sexual Abuse, a class 3 felony and Dangerous Crime Against Children; and Count 19 Molestation of a Child, a class 3 felony and Dangerous Crime Against Children. The plea agreement provided that the Defendant would be sentenced to 12 calendar years in the Department of Corrections for Count 9 and from 12 to 15 calendar years consecutively for Count 19. The plea provided that the Defendant would then be placed on Supervised Probation for Counts 10, 12, 14, and 18.
The Defendant was sentenced on June 26, 2019 to 12 calendar years in the Department of Corrections for Count 9, 15 calendar years consecutive for Count 19, three years of probation for Count 14, and lifetime probation for Counts 10, 12, and 18. Among other requirements, the terms of probation included all sex offender and computer usage terms and house arrest. The house arrest requirement was to be re-examined at the end of five years to determine whether necessary for continued protection of the public.
(Doc. 8-4 at 209-10.)

B. Post-Conviction Relief Proceedings

On January 23, 2020, Petitioner, through counsel, filed a petition for post-conviction relief (“PCR”) in which he presented three issues:

I. The imposition of lifetime probation for Count 12 resulted in an illegal sentence because lifetime probation was not authorized by A.R.S. § 13-902(E) for a preparatory sex
offense during a portion of the time frame within which Count 12 was committed, in violation of the Arizona Supreme Court's ruling in State v. Peek, 210 Ariz. 182 (Ariz. 2008).
II. The imposition of house arrest as a term and condition of probation that cannot be modified for a minimum of five years for Counts 10, 12, and 18 exceeded the court's statutory authority because it violated Rule 27.3(b) and (c)(2) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure.
III. Mr. Martinez was deprived of his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel, guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, and Article 2, Section 4 and 24 of the Arizona Constitution.
(Doc. 8-4, Exh. I.)

On May 29, 2020, the superior court granted the PCR petition in part and denied in part. (Doc. 8-4, Exh. L.) That court agreed that lifetime probation for Count 12 was not permitted under Arizona law and modified the terms of probation for Count 12 to a term of five years. (Id.) The superior court ordered that the house arrest term be reviewed five years after the start of probation and found Petitioner failed to establish a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. (Id.)

On May 10, 2021, Petitioner filed a notice of a second petition for post-conviction relief. (Doc. 8-5, Exh. M.) Following that notice, on May 24, 2021, Petitioner filed a second notice of PCR. (Doc. 8-5, Exh. N.) In an order dated July 8, 2021, the superior court found both notices to be untimely under Arizona law and dismissed them. (Doc. 8-5, Exh. O.) On August 12, 2021, Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal attempting to appeal the superior court's final decision in Petitioner's post-conviction relief proceeding. (Doc. 8-5, Exh. P.) On August 23, 2021, the appeals court dismissed the appeal, finding that the “superior court's final decision in a post-conviction relief proceeding is not an appealable order. See A.R.S. § 13-4033.” (Doc. 8-5, Exh. Q.)

Following the court of appeals' dismissal, Petitioner filed a petition for review on March 23, 2022. (Doc. 8-5, Exh. R.) On review, Petitioner presented two issues:

I. Does the now provable information that Victim C was several years older than what is alleged on Count 19 constitute newly discovered evidence?
II. Is the DCAC applicable to Mr. Martinez's sentence as to Count 19 now that it is known that Victim C was actually a teenager, and not a prepubescent?
(Doc. 8-5, Exh. R.) On March 25, 2022, the appeals court stated, “[this case] was closed on September 30, 2021 and any physical record was returned to the trial court. On March 23, 2022 an untimely Petition for Review was filed with the Arizona Supreme Court. On the [c]ourt's own motion, it is ordered reinstating this appeal for the purpose of transferring documents requested by the Arizona Supreme Court for review.” (Doc. 8-5, Exh. S.) On July 5, 2022, the Arizona Supreme Court denied the petition for review. (Doc. 8-5, Exh. T.)

The Arizona Supreme Court denied review on July 1, 2022, but the decision was not published until July 5, 2022. (See Doc. 8-5, Exh. T.) Accordingly, the Court uses July 5, 2022, as the date on which the decision became final.

II. Federal Proceedings

A. Petitioner's Habeas Petition

On July 5, 2023, Petitioner, through counsel, filed the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 1.) In his Petition, Petitioner asserts one ground for relief:

GROUND ONE: Petitioner was sentenced to an impermissible enhancement of his sentence as to Count 19 in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments based on newly discovered evidence.
(Doc. 1 at 3.)

In response, Respondents argue Petitioner's habeas Petition is untimely, and his only ground is procedurally defaulted from review. (Doc. 8.) Petitioner filed a Reply, arguing his Petition is subject to equitable tolling and that his claim is not procedurally defaulted. (Doc. 9.)

ANALYSIS

I. Applicable Law

The writ of habeas corpus affords relief to persons in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(3), 2254(a). Petitions for Habeas Corpus are governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). 28 U.S.C. § 2244.

A. Timeliness

The AEDPA imposes a one-year limitation period on state prisoners filing habeas corpus petitions in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The limitation period generally runs from the latest of the following:

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).

On June 26, 2019, the trial court sentenced Petitioner. (Doc. 8-2, Exh. F.) Petitioner then initiated his of-right review, which concluded on May 29, 2020, when the superior court granted in part and denied in part Petitioner's PCR petition. (Doc. 8-4, Exh. L.) Thus, Petitioner's convictions became final for purposes of the AEDPA on June 28, 2020, upon the expiration of his time for seeking review. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 33.16(a)(1) (“No later than 30 days after the entry of the trial court's final decision on a petition or a motion for rehearing, or the dismissal of a notice, an aggrieved party may petition the appropriate appellate court for review of the decision.”). The AEDPA's one-year statute of limitations therefore began running on June 29, 2020, and expired one year later on June 29, 2021. Petitioner filed the instant Petition on July 5, 2023, more than two years after the one-year limitation period had expired.

For purposes of counting time for a federal statute of limitations, the standards in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(a) apply. Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001). Thus, the one-year statute of limitations began running the day after Petitioner's convictions became final for purposes of the AEDPA. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a)(1)(A) (“[E]xclude the day of the event that triggers the period”).

In response to the timeliness of the Petition and why the one-year statute of limitations should not bar consideration of his Petition, Petitioner argues he would not have been able to discover the new evidence through reasonable diligence, as neither he nor his attorneys knew the record existed at the time of trial. (Doc. 9 at 2.) Petitioner presented a similar argument when he initiated his untimely notices of post-conviction relief. (Doc. 85, Exhs. M, N.) In those pleadings, Petitioner argued that after years of trying to obtain the rental agreement for the house in which the crimes occurred, he was able to “obtain newly discovered evidence” from the City of Tempe Human Services Department. (Doc. 8-5 at 12-13.) Petitioner suggested that the record from the City of Tempe showed that he lived in the house on different dates than those originally asserted by the victim, which would mean the victim was older than the parties assumed at the time of the offense. (Id.) Petitioner therefore argued he was wrongfully sentenced under A.R.S. § 13-705, a Dangerous Crime Against Children, due to an element of the crime being that the victim must be under the age of fifteen. (Id.)

The superior court dismissed the Rule 33 proceedings and ruled that the rental agreement was not new for purposes of presenting newly discovered material facts in support of an untimely PCR petition. (Doc. 8-5, Exh. O.) Specifically, that court stated, “[Petitioner] states that he told his counsel to subpoena the rental agreement for the residence in which the victim said the sexual act occurred. Therefore, [Petitioner] and counsel were both aware of the issue of timing yet [Petitioner] nevertheless opted to plead guilty.” (Id.) The AEDPA's one-year limitation period is tolled for the time period “during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Thus, Petitioner's two untimely PCR notices did not toll the limitation period. See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 414 (2005) (“When a postconviction petition is untimely under state law, ‘that [is] the end of the matter' for purposes of § 2244(d)(2).”).

To the extent that Petitioner is arguing his Petition is not barred under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D), as he only recently obtained the City of Tempe Housing record, the argument is unavailing. The statute holds that the one-year limitation period starts running from “the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D). Assuming for the sake of argument that Petitioner could have only discovered the record on the date it was emailed from the City of Tempe, his Petition is still untimely. The email containing the housing record was sent on December 9, 2020. (See Doc. 8-5 at 16.) If the limitation period started running from that date, the period would have expired on December 10, 2021. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D). Petitioner's habeas Petition is therefore still untimely under this calculation. Based on this analysis, Petitioner's habeas Petition is untimely unless equitable or statutory tolling applies.

B. Equitable Tolling

The one-year limitation period may be subject to equitable tolling in “appropriate cases.” Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645 (2010); Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating “the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under AEDPA] is very high.”). In the Ninth Circuit, a petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling only if he shows: “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing.” Holland, 560 U.S. at 649 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Petitioner bears the burden of establishing that equitable tolling is warranted. Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1153 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Our precedent permits equitable tolling of the one-year statute of limitations on habeas petitions, but the petitioner bears the burden of showing that equitable tolling is appropriate.”).

Regarding the first prong, a petitioner must demonstrate that “he has been reasonably diligent in pursuing his rights not only while an impediment to filing caused by an extraordinary circumstance existed, but before and after as well, up to the time of filing his claim in federal court.” Smith v. Davis, 953 F.3d 582, 598-99 (9th Cir. 2020). The second prong is met “only when an extraordinary circumstance prevented a petitioner acting with reasonable diligence from making a timely filing[.]” Id. at 600; see also Stillman v. LaMarque, 319 F.3d 1199, 1203 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding a prisoner must show that the “extraordinary circumstances” were the cause of his untimeliness). In evaluating whether an “extraordinary circumstance” exists, the Court “must decide the issue based on all the circumstances of the case before it.” Smith, 953 F.3d at 600 (internal quotations and citations omitted). “The grounds for equitable tolling are highly fact-dependent.” Grant v. Swarthout, 862 F.3d 914, 918 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Sossa v. Diaz, 729 F.3d 1225, 1237 (9th Cir. 2013)). Notably, a petitioner's pro se status, ignorance of the law, or lack of legal sophistication does not constitute extraordinary circumstances justifying equitable tolling. See Rasberry, 448 F.3d at 1154 (holding a pro se petitioner's ignorance of the law or lack of legal sophistication is not, by itself, an extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling).

Here, equitable tolling is not appropriate. Petitioner argues he has satisfied both elements of the test set forth in Holland. First, he asserts the record establishes he has been diligently pursuing his rights both in the discovery of the rental agreement and in the Arizona state courts trying to reverse the trial court's denial of his PCR notices. (Doc. 9 at 4.) Petitioner additionally argues he has satisfied the extraordinary circumstance test. (Id.) He contends the “trial court's error” in misunderstanding and misinterpreting the newly discovered evidence is the extraordinary circumstance that prevented his PCR notices from being considered timely, thus rendering the instant Petition untimely. (Id.)

In the untimely PCR notices, Petitioner asserted he was wrongfully sentenced under A.R.S. § 13-705. He specifically argued: (1) he recently obtained a record from the City of Tempe Human Services Department showing he lived at the house where the crimes occurred on different dates than those originally understood by the parties, (2) he discovered a 911 call log confirming those dates, and (3) his attorneys were ineffective in their investigation of his case. (Doc. 8-5 at 12-13.) The superior court found the notices to be untimely and dismissed the proceeding, stating:

Defendant contends that newly obtained documents indicate that his Count 12 offense actually occurred between December 31, 2001 and August 11, 2002, not between October 1999 and October 2000. He bases this argument on rental agreement records and the record of a call to police dispatch from April 5, 2002, both of which support a later time frame. According to Defendant, the victim in Count 12 was actually older than the parties assumed at the time of the offense. The rental agreement and dispatch call information are not new, however. Defendant states that he told his counsel to subpoena the rental agreement for the residence in which the victim said the sexual act occurred. Therefore, Defendant and counsel were both aware of the issue of timing yet Defendant nevertheless opted to plead guilty. Likewise, defense counsel either had access to the police record or could have obtained it through the exercise of reasonable diligence. Furthermore, Defendant fails to adequately explain why he could not have obtained the evidence earlier through the exercise of reasonable diligence during the nearly two years that have elapsed since sentencing. Moreover, Defendant never explains how exactly the different time frame for Count 12 would have affected his punishment.
In sum, Defendant has failed to state a claim for which Rule 33 may provide relief in this untimely proceeding. He must assert substantial claims and adequately explain the reasons for their untimely assertion. Defendant has failed to meet this standard.
(Doc. 8-5 at 34) (internal citations omitted).

Petitioner faces the same deficiencies here. The record shows the superior court considered the record, including Petitioner's two untimely PCR notices (Doc. 8-5, Exhs. M, N), his three-page letter (Doc. 8-5 at 12-14), the City of Tempe housing record (Id. at 16-17), records from the Tempe Police Department (Id. at 19-21), Petitioner's inmate legal request forms (Id. at 23-28), and a subpoena from November 9, 2018, to Rentals Tempe from Petitioner's counsel (Id. at 30). In listing exhibits it had considered in its analysis of Petitioner's second PCR petition, the superior court referred to the housing record as “rental agreement records.” (Id. at 34.) The record shows that Petitioner claimed in his PCR petition that his trial attorneys had either unsuccessfully sought the rental agreement or had failed to request the rental agreement. (Id. at 12-13.) Subsequently, Petitioner obtained the housing record from the City of Tempe. He attached the housing record, which was dated December 9, 2020, as Exhibit A to his second PCR petition, which was filed on May 24, 2021. (Id. at 8, 15-17.) The PCR court referred to those “newly obtained documents” when analyzing Petitioner's argument that he had obtained evidence the victim was older than fifteen years old. The superior court correctly noted that Petitioner was “aware of the issue of timing” and Petitioner nevertheless opted to plead guilty. (Id. at 34.)

Based on the PCR court's review, that court determined Petitioner failed to state a claim for which Rule 33 may provide relief. (Doc. 8-5 at 34.) This Court agrees that Petitioner plead guilty despite his awareness of the timing issue, as is evidenced by counsel's attempt to subpoena the rental agreement from Rentals Tempe prior to Petitioner's sentencing. (Id. at 30.) Further, Petitioner fails to explain the five-month delay between obtaining the City of Tempe housing record and the filing of his PCR notices. Petitioner additionally fails to provide any explanation as to why neither he nor his various attorneys were aware of the Tempe housing record. What is more, Petitioner waited one year after his PCR proceedings became final before seeking relief in federal court. Such delay and lack of diligence precludes equitable tolling. See Pace, 544 U.S. at 419 (finding because petitioner waited years before filing his PCR petition and waited five more months after his PCR proceedings became final before seeking relief in federal court, equitable tolling was precluded); Guillory v. Roe, 329 F.3d 1015, 1018 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[Petitioner] took twenty-seven months to present the relevant claims to the California Supreme Court, and seven months after that court's decision to return to federal court. Given his lack of diligence in exhausting his claims, [petitioner] is not entitled to equitable tolling.”); Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063, 1071 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that “thirty days is sufficient time for a petitioner to return to federal court following final action by the state courts.”) (overruled on other grounds); Smith, 953 F.3d at 595.

Even if these circumstances could be deemed extraordinary and the cause of the delay, Petitioner must “show that he remained diligent through filing,” even though the extraordinary circumstances had ended. Luna v. Kernan, 784 F.3d 650, 652 (9th Cir. 2015). Here, the Arizona Supreme Court denied review on July 5, 2022. (Doc. 8-5, Exh. T.) Petitioner fails to provide the Court with sufficient explanation as to why he did not promptly file his federal habeas petition, and instead delayed filing for an additional twelve months, until July 5, 2023. (Doc. 1.)

Petitioner cannot argue it was his need to first exhaust his state remedies. The Supreme Court in Pace analyzed the issue between the habeas limitations period and the exhaustion requirement. Specifically, the issue may arise where a state petitioner has filed a state post-conviction relief proceeding which may ultimately be deemed untimely and resulting in the expiration of his habeas limitations period. “A prisoner seeking state postconviction relief might avoid this predicament, however, by filing a ‘protective' petition in federal court and asking the federal court to stay and abey the federal habeas proceedings until state remedies are exhausted.” Pace, 544 U.S. at 416. Petitioner offers no explanation as to why he chose not to follow that course.

Accordingly, Petitioner fails to show that he is entitled to equitable tolling.

C. Statutory Tolling

The AEDPA also provides for statutory tolling during the time “a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Because Petitioner's PCR notices were deemed untimely by the superior court, statutory tolling does not apply. See Pace, 544 U.S. at 417 (holding “[b]ecause the state court rejected petitioner's [PCR] petition as untimely, it was not ‘properly filed,' and he is not entitled to statutory tolling under § 2244(d)(2).”).

D. Actual Innocence

A time-barred federal habeas petition may also be considered by this Court if a petitioner can make a showing of “actual innocence.” See McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 391-96 (2013) (holding that the “actual innocence gateway” extends to petitions that are time-barred under the AEDPA); see also Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995) (applying an “actual innocence gateway” to federal habeas procedural bars); Lee v. Lampert, 653 F.3d 929, 932 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[A] claim of actual innocence constitutes an equitable exception to AEDPA's limitations period, and a petitioner who makes such a showing may pass through the Schlup gateway and have his otherwise time-barred claims heard on the merits.”). Under Schlup, a petitioner seeking federal habeas review under the actual innocence gateway must establish his factual innocence and not mere legal insufficiency. See Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998). A petitioner “must show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of the new evidence.” McQuiggin, 569 U.S. at 399 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327).

Petitioner does not claim, much less make a showing of, his actual innocence. Petitioner accepted a plea deal and plead guilty in the state courts. (Doc. 8-1, Exh. D.) He attested his plea was voluntary and not the result of force, threat, or promises other than those contained in the plea agreement. (Doc. 8-1 at 59.) In the state courts, Petitioner did not argue he was innocent of his convictions, but rather argued the Tempe housing record established he was wrongfully sentenced under A.R.S. § 13-705. (Doc. 8-5 at 13.)

Similarly, in the instant Petition, Petitioner does not claim innocence, but contends he was sentenced to an “impermissible enhancement of his sentence” based on newly discovered evidence. (Doc. 1.) Accordingly, Petitioner cannot pass through the actual innocence gateway to excuse the untimeliness of his federal habeas Petition.

CONCLUSION

The Court concludes Petitioner's federal habeas Petition was untimely filed and neither equitable tolling, statutory tolling, nor the actual innocence gateway apply to render the filing of the Petition as timely. The record is sufficiently developed, and the Court does not find that an evidentiary hearing is necessary for resolution of this matter. See Rhoades v. Henry, 638 F.3d 1027, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011). Accordingly, IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because Petitioner has not shown jurists of reason would not find the procedural ruling debatable, and because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.

This Report and Recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District Court's judgment. The parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this Report and Recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days within which to file a response to the objections.

Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the District Court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party's right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order of judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72.


Summaries of

Martinez v. Thornell

United States District Court, District of Arizona
Apr 15, 2024
CV-23-01240-PHX-ROS (ASB) (D. Ariz. Apr. 15, 2024)
Case details for

Martinez v. Thornell

Case Details

Full title:Joe Paul Martinez, Petitioner, v. Ryan Thornell, et al., Respondents.

Court:United States District Court, District of Arizona

Date published: Apr 15, 2024

Citations

CV-23-01240-PHX-ROS (ASB) (D. Ariz. Apr. 15, 2024)