Opinion
Civil Action 22-139
04-25-2024
OSCAR MARTINEZ, Petitioner, v. SUPERINTENDENT PATRICIA THOMPSON, et al. Respondents.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
HON. JOSE RAUL ARTEAGA UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Oscar Martinez is serving a sentence of 12 ½ to 25 years of imprisonment at SCI Albion in Erie County, Pennsylvania for convictions for rape and corruption of minors.He petitions this Court pro se for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Martinez raises two claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel and one sufficiency of evidence claim. Because the state courts reasonably resolved each of his claims, I respectfully recommend dismissing his petition with prejudice and without a hearing.
Judge Eduardo C. Robreno referred Martinez's habeas petition to Magistrate Judge David R. Strawbridge for a Report and Recommendation in September 2022. (ECF 10.) This matter was reassigned to Judge Chad F. Kenney when Judge Robreno retired. (ECF 22.) After Judge Strawbridge retired, Martinez's petition was referred to me for a Report and Recommendation. (ECF 26.)
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. Instant Offense, Bench Trial, and Sentencing.
On May 11, 2012, following a one-day bench trial in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, Judge William J. Mazzola found Oscar Martinez guilty of the crimes of rape and corruption of minors. Attorney Stephen Bruce Jarrett represented Martinez prior to and at the trial.
Martinez's convictions stem from crimes committed between approximately 2005 and 2009. They involved two minor victims who were sisters. J.O., the younger sister testified first. She was fourteen during the trial and was eleven when the underlying incident occurred in 2009. (N.T. 5/11/12 at 14, 16.) J.O. explained that she met Martinez because he was married to her grandmother. (Id. at 16.) She referred to Martinez as “grand pop” and had a grandfather-granddaughter relationship with him. (Id.) J.O. testified that she would see him often, both at her grandmother's house, and at the home where she lived with her stepfather, mother, and sister. (Id. at 18.) J.O. stated that Martinez would frequently visit her and her older sister S.O. at their family home, both separately and together, while their parents were at work. (Id.) On the occasion involving J.O. that eventually led to criminal charges, Martinez was visiting her at home and told her that they were going to play a game. (Id. at 18-19.) J.O. went to her room to choose a board game and Martinez followed her, closed the door, and said that they were going to play a different type of game. (Id.) He subsequently put her on the floor, took off her clothes and raped her. (Id. at 19-20.) J.O. testified that she did not see Martinez often following this incident as she “tried to avoid seeing him [so] it wouldn't happen again.” (Id. at 22.) According to J.O., the incident was not repeated. (Id.) On cross-examination, J.O. reported she was “scared to tell any adult” about her encounter with Martinez because she “didn't know if they was going to believe [her] or not” due to the fact that she “was only 11 and he's a grown man.” (Id. at 29-30.)
Initials are used to refer to witnesses to protect the privacy of the minor victims in the underlying criminal proceeding in alignment with the Pennsylvania Superior Court's suggested redaction policies for protecting the privacy of victims in sexual assault cases. See Commonwealth v. Martinez, No. 1735 EDA 2016, 2017 WL 2275091, at *5 n.15 (Pa. Super. Ct. May 24, 2017).
J.O. testified that her back started to hurt after the incident and she noticed an odor coming from her vagina, symptoms she reported to her mother. (Id. at 22.) Her mother took her to a doctor, who conducted a urinalysis and diagnosed her with a urinary tract infection. (Id. at 23-24.) Approximately one year later, in May 2010, J.O. said she was still experiencing symptoms, leading her mother to take her to a hospital near their new home in New Jersey. (Id.) There, J.O. was given a urinalysis and gynecological exam and was diagnosed with trichomoniasis, (which J.O. referred to as “trich”) a disease that can only be transmitted sexually. (Id. at 25.) She was prescribed an antibiotic. (Id.) Following her diagnosis, J.O. reported her sexual contact with Martinez to the doctor, who subsequently told her mother about it. (Id. at 26.) J.O. testified that she was required to go back to a doctor “a couple of times” to follow-up on her treatment. (Id.)
J.O.'s older sister S.O., who was eighteen at the time of trial, testified next. (Id. at 36.) She also knew Oscar Martinez in a grandfather-granddaughter capacity. (Id. at 3637.) S.O. testified that Martinez habitually sexually abused her. (Id. at 43-44, 53.) She was around eleven or twelve on the day of the first encounter in or around 2005. S.O. remained at home when J.O. went to deliver their stepfather dinner at work. (Id. at 40.) After J.O. left, Martinez told S.O. to go into her bedroom. (Id.) S.O. testified that Martinez walked in behind her, closed the door, and told her not to say anything. He took off his clothes and had non-consensual intercourse with her. (Id. at 40-41.) According to S.O., Martinez came over at least twice a week and the sexual abuse happened every time he visited until her freshman year of high school in 2008 or 2009. (Id. at 40, 43.) She noted that almost every incident of sexual contact occurred at her family home aside from two encounters in her grandmother's bedroom when she and Martinez were watching television. (Id. at 44-45.)
S.O. went to the hospital for back pain and cramping in May 2010, on the same day as her sister. (Id. at 47.) She was questioned about her own interactions with Martinez after J.O. told doctors Martinez had sexually assaulted her. S.O. told them and her mother about the numerous incidents of sexual contact between her and Martinez. (Id.) S.O.'s back pain was determined to be unrelated to her contact with Martinez, but S.O's disclosure prompted further medical involvement, including a visit to Dr. Cindy Delgado, a pediatrician at the Child Abuse Research Education and Service Institute (“CARES”). (Id. at 48-49, 76-77.)
Other evidence admitted during the prosecution's case included an agreed-upon stipulation of fact from Dr. Cindy Delgado, MD, MPH, who examined S.O on June 24, 2010 for diagnosis and treatment of any residual findings of sexual abuse. (Id. at 76-77.) Dr. Delgado reported that during the exam, S.O. stated that she did not have a boyfriend, had never engaged in consensual sexual intercourse, and did not have a history of accidental genital trauma. (Id. at 77.) S.O. reported that her mother's stepfather (Martinez) began abusing her when she was almost twelve years old and that she thought it was “not right when he started touching her.” (Id.) She also reported pain and blood following some of the incidents with Martinez. (Id.) Based on a gynecological examination and S.O.'s reported history, Dr. Delgado found evidence of forced sexual intercourse. (Id. at 77-78.)
C.S., the victims' mother, also further corroborated their testimony. She testified that when she saw her children after Martinez visited while she was at work, J.O. was upset “most of the time” and “many times [she] saw [J.O.] crying.” (Id. at 85.) She testified that follow-up counseling was recommended for S.O. (Id. at 94.) She also confirmed her daughters' recollections of reporting pain and substantiated her involvement in the hospital visits. (Id. at 80-83.)
After the prosecution rested, the defense called one witness, M.S.P., who referred to herself as Martinez's “lover.” (Id. at 96.) She testified that she was sexually active with Martinez from approximately 2006 until 2009 and that she would frequently get tested for sexually transmitted diseases, including trichomoniasis. (Id. at 97-98.) She reported that she was last tested for sexually transmitted diseases on June 30, 2010, and that she never tested positive for trichomoniasis. (Id. at 99.) The defense also offered a stipulation stating that “there were three character witnesses including [Martinez's] ex-wife . . . [and] stepdaughter . . . [who would testify] that [Martinez] is a person of good character of peacefulness, honesty, law-abiding.” (Id. at 103.)
At the end of the one-day non-jury trial, the Court found Martinez guilty of two counts of rape and two counts of corruption of minors. (Id. at 104.) Martinez was acquitted on two counts of unlawful contact with a minor and two counts of sexual assault. (Id.)
B. Direct Appeal.
After Martinez's conviction, Jarrett filed his counseled post-sentence motion on November 6, 2012. It was denied by operation of law on March 7, 2013. Jarrett did not file an appeal on Martinez's behalf.
On July 22, 2013, Martinez filed a pro se petition for relief under Pennsylvania's Post-Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa. C.S. § 9541. He noted that his petition was “being utilized solely to obtain nunc pro tunc restoration of Direct Appeal rights which were abandoned by counsel.” J. Matthew Wolfe was appointed as PCRA counsel and filed an amended petition on June 27, 2014 that reiterated the request to reinstate Martinez's direct appellate rights and requested the opportunity to file post-sentence motions. Martinez withdrew the latter on February 22, 2016, after Wolfe received the notes of testimony. With the Commonwealth's agreement, the PCRA Court reinstated Martinez's appellate rights nunc pro tunc.
Martinez filed a direct appeal on June 1, 2016. On June 21, 2016, the court ordered him to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa. R.A.P. 1925(b). Martinez filed his statement on July 12, 2016, claiming that his convictions were not supported by sufficient evidence because specific times and dates of the assaults on J.O. and S.O. were never established. Judge Mazzola filed an opinion explaining his reasoning for Martinez's verdict on July 29, 2016, consistent with the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Pa. R.A.P. 1925(a). The Pennsylvania Superior Court then affirmed Martinez's convictions, holding that the prosecution had established the dates of the assaults on J.O. and S.O. with reasonable certainty. Commonwealth v. Martinez, No. 1735 EDA 2016, 2017 WL 2275091, at *3-5 (Pa. Super. Ct. May 24, 2017). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied allocatur on December 20, 2017. Commonwealth v. Martinez, 176 A.3d 851 (Pa. 2017) (Table).
C. PCRA Petition and Appeal.
Martinez filed a timely pro se PCRA petition on July 3, 2018. It was treated as his initial petition, since his 2013 PCRA petition was filed only to restore his direct appellate rights. Angelo Leroy Cameron was appointed as PCRA counsel and Martinez filed a counseled amended PCRA petition on November 9, 2018, seeking a new trial or vacatur of his convictions and sentence. Martinez alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective for: (1) failing to call fact and character witnesses, (2) stipulating to the admittance of a medical report, and (3) advising him to elect a bench trial.
The Commonwealth moved to dismiss Martinez's PCRA petition on September 30, 2019. On January 28, 2020, the PCRA Court notified Martinez that it would dismiss his petition for lack of merit in accordance with 234 Pa. Code § 907. Martinez did not respond. On March 4, 2020, after reviewing the record, the Court dismissed Martinez's petition without a hearing for lack of merit. Martinez filed a notice of appeal one week later. After he filed his statement of the matters complained of on appeal, the PCRA Court issued an opinion explaining the dismissal without a hearing as proper. See Commonwealth v. Martinez, No. 885 EDA 2020, slip op. (Pa. Super. Ct. June 30, 2020) (unpublished) (See ECF 12 (state court record).). See also Pa. R.A.P. 1925. The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the PCRA Court's decision on March 22, 2021. Commonwealth v. Martinez, 251 A.3d 1255 (Table), No. 885 EDA 2020, No. 886 EDA 2020, 2021 WL 1087298 (Pa. Super. Ct. Mar. 22, 2021). (See ECF 7 at ECF p. 29-41.)
D. This Federal Habeas Proceeding.
On September 17, 2021, Martinez filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Western District of Pennsylvania, which was transferred to this Court. See Martinez v. Oliver, Civ. A. No. 21-4916 (E.D. Pa.) He elected to withdraw this petition, and the Court dismissed it without prejudice.
On December 21, 2021, Martinez then filed a timely Petition for Habeas Corpus under this caption. (ECF 1, ECF 7.) He asserts three properly exhausted grounds for relief. First, he claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for not calling two fact witnesses on his behalf. Second, he claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for not calling character witnesses on his behalf. Finally, he contends that there was insufficient evidence to support the guilty verdict.
“[D]istrict courts are permitted, but not obliged, to consider, sua sponte, the timeliness of a state prisoner's habeas petition.” Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 209 (2006). To be timely, Martinez's claims for habeas relief must have been filed within one year from the time his underlying conviction was final, excluding the time during which any properly filed state post-conviction petition was pending. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). His habeas clock began to run on March 20, 2018, or ninety days after the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's December 20, 2017 denial of his petition for allowance of appeal. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A); U.S. S.Ct. Rule 13 (allowing ninety days to file a petition for writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court); Swartz v. Meyers, 204 F.3d 417, 419 (3d Cir. 2000) (judgment of sentence becomes final at conclusion of direct review or expiration of time for seeking such review). It then ran for 103 days until he filed his July 1, 2018 PCRA petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (d)(2). The clock started again thirty days after the Pennsylvania Superior Court's March 22, 2021 denial of his PRCA appeal upon the expiration of his time to seek further review in the Pennsylvania Supreme Courti.e., on April 21, 2021. See Pa. R.A.P. 903(a) (providing that a defendant may file an appeal within thirty days from the date of the entry of the order from which the appeal is taken). Martinez's habeas limitations period would have expired on January 8, 2022-262 days later (i.e., 365 minus 103). Under the prisoner mailbox rule, Martinez's petition is deemed filed as of when he gave it to prison authorities for mailing. See Burns v. Morton, 134 F.3d 109, 113 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266 (1988)). The Commonwealth does not contest timeliness, explaining that “[a]lthough Martinez's petition . . . is undated, his letter to the clerk's office indicates that it was written on December 21, 2021, and the Commonwealth accepts that as the date of filing ....” (ECF 19 at ECF p. 5.)
ECF 1 and ECF 7 are nearly identical Petitions for Writ of Habeas Corpus. ECF 1, docketed on January 10, 2022, was unsigned and did not attach the instructions and warnings that are contained in this Court's standard habeas corpus form. So, on March 8, 2022, Judge Robreno entered an order directing Martinez to sign his Petition and return the Notice of Election form acknowledging the instructions and warnings present on the standard habeas form and indicating his election to have his petition construed, and ruled on, as filed. (See ECF 5 at ECF p. 2-3). Martinez returned the signed document, and it was docketed as ECF 7 on April 5, 2022.
As Respondents note, Martinez frames his ineffective assistance of counsel claims as complaints about the PCRA Court's failure to hold a hearing regarding his trial counsel. (See ECF 19 at 6 n.5.) But framed this way, his claims are not cognizable in a federal habeas proceeding. The PCRA Court's discretion to hold a hearing is a state law question and alleged state law violations do not form a basis for habeas relief. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991); see also Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41 (1984) (“A federal court may not issue the [habeas] writ on the basis of a perceived error of state law.”). However, Martinez is a pro se petitioner, and the Court is required to construe his filings liberally. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). The Court thus construes Martinez's petition to raise the underlying claims regarding the effectiveness of his trial counsel's representation based on the failure to call alleged fact and character witnesses on Martinez's behalf at trial. These claims are cognizable in habeas law and are the claims to which the Commonwealth responds. (See ECF 19 at 6 n.5.)
II. DISCUSSION
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2254, establishes a deferential standard that provides for habeas relief only if (1) the state court's adjudication of a claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the” United States Supreme Court; or (2) “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2). The Commonwealth contends Martinez is not entitled to habeas relief because each of his claims lack merit. I agree and recommend denying his petition for the following reasons.
A. Martinez's Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims Do Not Provide a Basis for Habeas Relief.
1. Legal Standard Governing Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims.
The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants “the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for [their] defence.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. Strickland v. Washington specifically dictates that the right to counsel includes “effective assistance.” 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). To obtain habeas relief based on alleged ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland, Martinez must demonstrate that (1) “counsel's performance was deficient, in that it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness;” and (2) he “suffered prejudice as a result of the deficiency.” Blystone v. Horn, 664 F.3d 397, 418 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). “[B]oth the performance and prejudice components of the ineffectiveness inquiry are mixed questions of law and fact.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 698.
There exists a “strong presumption” that counsel's performance was not deficient. Id. at 689. And when a state court has already decided “that counsel performed adequately,” the Court must be “doubly deferential,” giving “both the state court and the defense attorney the benefit of the doubt.” Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 15 (2013); see also Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 6 (2003). “The proper measure of attorney performance remains simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. Whether counsel's representation was reasonable must be determined based on the particular facts of Martinez's case viewed as of the time of the challenged conduct. Id. at 689. And importantly, defense counsel is not required “to pursue every claim or defense, regardless of its merit, viability, or realistic chance for success.” Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009).
To establish prejudice, Martinez must show “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694. “The likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just conceivable.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 112 (2011). Martinez must show “counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive [him] of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable” and that he or she “was not functioning as the ‘counsel' guaranteed” to the petitioner by the Sixth Amendment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. The Court must consider the totality of the evidence. Id. at 695.
Martinez's ineffective assistance of counsel claims cannot proceed if he fails to demonstrate either prong. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. This is a high bar to surpass. “[I]f a fairminded jurist could agree with either [the state court's] deficiency or prejudice holding, the reasonableness of the other is beside the point.” Shinn v. Kayer, 592 U.S. 111, 120 (2020).
i. Martinez Has Not Shown Relief Is Required Based on Counsel's Failure to Call Two Fact Witnesses.
First, Martinez maintains he is due relief on the grounds that his trial counsel failed to call two fact witnesses of his behalf. (ECF 7 at ECF p. 5.) Martinez asserts that Carmen Pacheco and Javier Negron, would have offered exculpatory evidence at trial. Id. He maintains that Negron, Martinez's stepson, would have testified and “established that petitioner was never [seen] alone with the victims and that [Martinez's] work schedule was incompatible with the claims against him.” Id. Martinez states that Pacheco, his previous spouse, “would have testified that [Martinez] was always with her at work and she did not believe these crimes were committed.” Id.
Although Martinez contends that Negron and Pacheco's testimony would have made a difference to his defense, the state courts rejected this claim. The PCRA Court assessed Martinez's claim that Jarrett was ineffective for failing to call Negron and Pacheco and held that Martinez “was not prejudiced by counsel's decision.” See Commonwealth v. Martinez, No. 885 EDA 2020, slip op. at 5 (Pa. Super. Ct. June 30, 2020) (unpublished) (See ECF 12 (state court record).). It explained that because Pacheco and Negron were Martinez's wife and stepson (respectively), the likelihood was high that “the Commonwealth would have impeached both witnesses for being both interested and biased.” Id. It held that even if Pacheo and Negron were not impeached, any testimony from them that Martinez “was not present . . . on many occasions of the alleged abuse” would have been “of little moment.” because J.O. and S.O. did not provide specific dates for the incidents, “as is often the case in descriptions of repeated sexual abuse” and because “the victims [were] young and the abuse took place several years before trial.” Id. The PCRA Court explained that S.O. “described repeated rapes over a period of three-years, not naming specific dates.” Id. Without those specifics, any testimony from Negron or Pacheo that Martinez was always at work or that they had never seen him alone with the victims would not be enough to rebut his presence during the sexual assaults. Id. The PCRA Court concluded that their potential “testimony that [Martinez] was not at the scene of the crime on many occasions [wa]s benign, inexact, and carrie[d] no evidentiary weight.” Id. at 6. It held that there was “no reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been at all different” if Negron and Pacheco's testimony were included, and thus Martinez's ineffective assistance of counsel claim “fail[ed] for lack of prejudice ....” Id. The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed. Martinez, 2021 WL 1087298.
Because the state courts already rejected Martinez's claim of ineffectiveness based on the failure to call Negron and Pacheco, the claim is subject to “doubly” deferential review here, so as “to afford both the state court and the defense attorney the benefit of the doubt.” Woods v. Donald, 575 U.S. 312, 316 (2015) (citation and internal quotation omitted). The reviewing court must make “every effort . . . to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.
The Third Circuit has already held that Pennsylvania's ineffectiveness test is not contrary to the Supreme Court's Strickland standard. See Werts, 228 F.3d at 204. Thus, the only question on habeas review is whether the state courts unreasonably determined the factual findings supporting the conclusion that Martinez failed to show Jarrett was ineffective for not calling Pacheco and Negron as trial witnesses. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). Considering the state court record, including the trial testimony from J.O. and S.O., the state court determinations regarding counsel's effectiveness with respect to the decision not to present Negron and Pacheco's purported testimony at trial are not beyond the realm of fairminded disagreement. Cf. Figueroa v. Mooney, No. 14-2876, 2016 WL 4975211, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 18, 2016) (holding a petitioner's ineffective assistance claim based on the failure to call an alibi witness did not “meet the doubly deferential standard”), report and recommendation adopted, 2016 WL 4943560 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 15, 2016).
Moreover, even if Jarrett was ineffective for failing to call Negron and/or Pacheco to testify, in light of all of the other evidence at trial, Martinez has not shown there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of his trial would have been different if they had testified. It follows that federal habeas relief is not required for this claim under Section 2254's deferential standard.
ii. Martinez Has Not Shown Relief Is Required Based on Counsel's Failure to Call Character Witnesses.
Next, Martinez maintains that he is due habeas relief because trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call character witnesses in his defense. (ECF 7 at ECF p. 7.)
Martinez argues that he “informed his counsel that he had character[] witnesses that his counsel failed to investigate and call” and thus is due habeas relief. Id. This claim also lacks merit.
Martinez also writes that “his PCRA Counsel filed a Finley letter stating that [he] inadequately plead th[is] claim.” (ECF 7 at ECF p. 7). In the Finley letter, his PCRA counsel noted that Martinez “failed to provide essential data, certificates, or affidavits, by which the alleged value of the proposed testimony might be weighed.” Martinez, 2021 WL 1087298, at *5 (Also at ECF 7 at ECF p. 39.) Martinez complains that “it was the Attorneys [sic] duty to help adequately develop the claim.” (ECF 7 at ECF p. 7). As discussed above, the Court construes Martinez's Petition as invoking a claim that his trial counsel was ineffective.
The PCRA Court disagreed with Martinez's contention that his counsel was ineffective for failing to call character witnesses. It concluded that the alleged additional testimony “would not have changed the case” especially in considering “the young victims' compelling testimony” and the “good amount of other testimony” including from the “victims' mother” and “expert Dr. Cindy Delgado, pediatrician from the Child Abuse Research Education and Service Institute.” See Commonwealth v. Martinez, No. 885 EDA 2020, slip op. at 6 (Pa. Super. Ct. June 30, 2020) (unpublished) (See ECF 12 (state court record).). Further, on PCRA appeal, the Superior Court noted that the evidence at trial included a stipulation “that three character witnesses would testify to [Martinez's] peaceful, honest, and law-abiding reputation.” Martinez, 2021 WL 1087298, at *5 (Pa. Super. Ct. March 22, 2021) (citing N.T. 5/11/12 at 103). (Also at ECF 7 at ECF p. 39.) Given the stipulation, the Superior Court held that the “proposed [character] testimony would, at best, have been merely cumulative.” Id. It further reasoned that it could not “see how cumulative character testimony would have altered [Martinez's] situation” and it was “also unclear whether [Martinez] underst[ood] what proposed testimony supported the stipulation at trial” suggesting his claim was based “on proposed testimony included in the stipulation).” Id. The Superior Court thus agreed with the PCRA Court that Martinez's claim based on the failure to call character witnesses failed. Id.
The question here is whether the state courts unreasonably determined the factual findings supporting their determination that Martinez had not shown Jarrett was ineffective for failing to call character witnesses on his behalf. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). A review of the record shows they did not. Martinez has not demonstrated how the testimony of three unspecified character witnesses could have altered the trial court's findings regarding his guilt. As the Commonwealth's brief highlights, the trial court accepted a stipulation that three witnesses could testify with respect to his good character. (See ECF 19 at ECF p. 7.); see also N.T. 5/11/12 at 103. The Court must be “highly deferential” to counsel's decision to rely on the stipulation in lieu of presenting testimony from the character witnesses themselves. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. Habeas relief is only appropriate “if every fairminded jurist would agree that every reasonable lawyer would have made a different decision.” Dunn v. Reeves, 594 U.S. 731, 740 (2021) (emphasis in original, citation and internal quotations omitted). Upon further examination of the state court record as a whole, including all trial testimony, the state courts' conclusions regarding Jarret's effectiveness with respect to the presentation of character evidence are not beyond the realm of fairminded disagreement. Martinez's conclusory argument gives no reason to decide otherwise. (See ECF 7 at ECF p. 7.) Thus, under the doubly deferential review that Section 2254(d) requires, Martinez has not shown that the state courts unreasonably concluded that the Jarrett was not ineffective for not presenting character witnesses in Martinez's defense.
Moreover, even if Jarrett was ineffective for not presenting character witnesses at trial, in light of all of the other evidence, Martinez has not shown there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of his trial would have been different if he had done so. Habeas relief is not required for Martinez's claim based on trial counsel's failure to present character witness testimony.
B. Martinez Has Not Shown Relief Is Required Based on Insufficient Evidence.
In his last asserted ground for habeas relief, Martinez argues that his petition should be granted because insufficient evidence exists to support his conviction. (ECF 7 at ECF p. 10) Martinez asserts that “[t]he evidence was very vague as to the dates of the alleged incidents and even the number of alleged incidents” and thus he was precluded from “preparing a proper defense, particularly alibi defense.” Id. Again, Martinez's claim fails. He has not shown that the state court's decision to convict him either unreasonably applied clearly established federal law or that it was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence at trial.
The question is whether there was enough evidence for a rational trier of fact to identify Martinez as the perpetrator of the crimes for which he was convicted and, ultimately whether the state court decision adjudicating the merits of his insufficient evidence claim was objectively unreasonable considering the evidence. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003); Travillion v. Superintendent Rockview SCI, 982 F.3d 896, 902 (3d Cir. 2020); see also Coleman v. Johnson, 566 U.S. 650, 651 (2012) (“[O]n habeas review, a federal court may not overturn a state court decision rejecting a sufficiency of the evidence challenge . . . [unless] the state court decision was objectively unreasonable.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted). State court factual determinations are presumptively correct. Thus, it is Martinez's burden to rebut this presumption via clear and convincing evidence. Dellavecchia v. Sec'y Pa. Dep't of Corr., 819 F.3d 682, 692 (3d Cir. 2016) (alteration in original) (quoting Werts v. Vaughn, 228 F.3d 178, 196 (3d Cir. 2000)); see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). The Court reviews “‘the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution'” and asks whether “‘any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.'” Lambert v. Warden Greene SCI, 861 F.3d 459, 467 (3d Cir. 2017). (emphasis in original) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)).
State court factual determinations are not unreasonable “merely because the federal habeas court would have reached a different conclusion in the first instance.” Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 301 (2010) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 411 (2000)). Rather, Section 2254(d)(2) requires “substantial deference” to the state trial court. Brumfield v. Cain, 576 U.S. 305, 314 (2015). “Even if reasonable minds reviewing the record might disagree about the finding in question, on habeas review that does not suffice to supersede the trial court's determination.'” Wood, 558 U.S. at 301 (citation, internal quotations and alterations omitted).
Martinez has not shown that the state court was objectively unreasonable when it decided that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support his convictions. During his trial, the court heard testimony from J.O. and S.O. detailing their individual allegations of sexual abuse. The victims gave descriptions of where, and generally when, the abuse occurred, and the court found the victims' testimony to be credible. (See N.T. 5/11/12 at 104.) As Judge Mazzola explained in his opinion, “the only factual basis for the claim that the evidence was vague as to the dates and number of the incidents was the quality of the witnesses' testimony in that regard.” Commonwealth v. Martinez, No. 1735 EDA 2016 (July 29, 2016) (See ECF 7 at ECF p. 21-21) (Trial court opinion). And he found the victim-witnesses' testimony credible, despite “the attempts to challenge their credibility on cross examination, the one victim's varying memory of the exact number of times she had been raped, the insinuation that the defendant should have crushed her, and the fact that some unknown staffer at the hospital checked the probably standard discharge instruction box ....” Id. at 23. He found that none of the attempted challenges to the victims' credibility “shed any, let alone serious, doubt on their [J.O. and S.O's] veracity and accuracy ....” Id. The Superior Court affirmed. It surveyed state law explained that “in cases involving a continuous course of conduct against a young child, the prosecution is afforded relatively broad latitude in establishing the dates of the assaults” and that “'the Commonwealth need not always prove a single specific date of the crime.'” Martinez, 2017 WL 2275091, at *4 (quoting Commonwealth v. Devlin, 333 A.2d 888 at 892 (Pa. 1975)). It concluded that the evidence was sufficient to establish “with reasonable certainty the dates of the assaults ....” Id. at *5.
While Martinez is correct that specific dates and times of the commission of the crime were not established, this information is unnecessary for his convictions to stand given the entirety of the record. He has not shown that no rational trier of fact could have agreed with the court's verdict after considering the testimony and evidence presented at trial. The trial court reasonably found that Martinez committed the now-challenged crimes and habeas relief is not due for his sufficiency of the evidence claim.
III. CONCLUSION
Martinez has not met his burden to show that habeas relief is appropriate. He has not established that either of his ineffective assistance of counsel claims have merit. Nor has he shown that any trial court error warrants relief. Accordingly, I recommend dismissing Martinez's petition with prejudice and without issuing a certificate of appealability for any of his claims.
Any habeas petitioner seeking to appeal to the circuit court must obtain a certificate of appealability, but Martinez has not shown that one should issue. See Fed. R. App. P. 22(b). He has not established that “reasonable jurists could debate” that his “petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further,” so he has not made “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right” under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c). Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483-84 (2000) (internal quotations omitted); see also Mathias v. Superintendent Frackville SCI, 876 F.3d 462, 474 (3d Cir. 2017) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Therefore, I make the following:
RECOMMENDATION
AND NOW, this 25th day of April 2024, it is respectfully recommended that Martinez's petition for writ of habeas corpus (ECF 1, ECF 7) be DISMISSED with prejudice. There has been no substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right requiring the issuance of a certificate of appealability.
The parties may file objections to this Report and Recommendation within fourteen days of being served with a copy. See Local Civ. Rule 72.1. Failure to file timely objections may constitute a waiver of any appellate rights. See Leyva v. Williams, 504 F.3d 357, 364 (3d Cir. 2007).