Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:02-CV-222-C
June 3, 2003
ORDER
On September 4, 2002, Plaintiff Adrian Gutierrez Martinez ("Martinez"), acting pro se, filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, complaining that the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division ("TDCJ-ED"), Captain George Fry, and the TDCJ-ID Montford Facility retaliated against him by denying him due process at a prison disciplinary hearing on February 28, 2001, and discriminated against him in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Martinez requests that this Court "overturn and delete prison disciplinary case no. 20010173741" and award him compensatory and punitive monetary damages in the amount of $80,000.00. Martinez was granted permission to proceed in forma pauperis and he filed answers to the Court's questionnaire on October 7, 2002. See Watson v. Ault, 525 F.3d 886, 892 (5th Cir. 1976) (holding that a questionnaire may be used to develop the factual basis of a prisoner complaint). The complaint was then transferred to the United States Magistrate Judge for screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and 1915A.
Martinez was granted permission to proceed in forma pauperis by Order dated September 9, 2002, before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found that pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), Martinez was barred from bringing any civil action or appeal in forma pauperis while he is incarcerated unless he shows that he is under imminent danger of serious physical injury. See Martinez v. Ross-Taylor, et al, USCA No. 01-11083 (5th Cir. May 15, 2003).
The United States Magistrate Judge conducted a Spears evidentiary hearing on January 7, 2003, to determine whether service of process should issue. Spears v. McCotter, 766 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1985). Pursuant to the Order Setting Evidentiary Hearing, TDCJ-ID provided copies of Martinez's relevant prison grievance records, classification records, medical records, and disciplinary records. See Martinez v. Aron, 570 F.3d 317 (10th Cir. 1978) (approving the use of relevant prison records to evaluate § 1983 complaints by prison inmates). Martinez appeared in person and testified under oath. See Eason v. Holt, 73 F.3d 600, 602 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that testimony from a Spears hearing becomes part of the complaint). Martinez did not consent to the jurisdiction of the Magistrate Judge; therefore, his complaint was transferred back to this Court's docket.
The Defendants have not filed an answer.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When a prisoner seeks to proceed in forma pauperis, "[n]otwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines" that the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (West 1994 and Supp. 2000). See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915A (West 1994 and Supp. 2000) (stating that when a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or one of its employees, the court shall review the complaint as soon as practicable and dismiss it if the court finds the complaint frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief); 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e(c) (West 1994 and Supp. 2000) (providing that a district court shall on its own motion or the motion of any party dismiss a complaint by a prisoner regarding prison conditions if the court is satisfied the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from an immune defendant).
A claim is frivolous if it has no arguable basis in law or fact. Nietzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989). A claim has no arguable basis in law if it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, "such as if the complaint alleges the violation of a legal interest which clearly does not exist." Davis v. Scott, 157 F.3d 1003, 1005 (5th Cir. 1998) (quotation omitted). A claim has no arguable basis in fact if "after providing the plaintiff the opportunity to present additional facts when necessary, the facts alleged are clearly baseless." Talib v. Gilley, 138 F.3d 211, 213 (5th Cir. 1998).
District courts must construe in forma pauperis complaints liberally, particularly in the context of dismissals under § 1915(e)(2)(B), but are given broad discretion in determining when such complaints are frivolous. Macias v. Raul A. (Unknown) Badge No. 153, 23 F.3d 94, 97 (5th Cir. 1994). A complaint may not be dismissed under § 1915(d)(2)(B) "simply because the court finds the plaintiffs allegations unlikely." Jolly v. Klein, 923 F. Supp. 931, 942-43 (S.D. Tex. 1996). A civil rights plaintiff must support his claim(s) with specific facts demonstrating a constitutional deprivation and may not simply rely on conclusory allegations. Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427, 1433 (5th Cir. 1995). See Wesson v. Ogleby, 910 F.2d 278, 281 (5th Cir. 1990) ("An IFP complaint that recites bare legal conclusions, with no suggestion of supporting facts, or that postulates facts of an entirely fanciful nature, is a prime candidate for dismissal under [§ 1915(d)(2)(B)]."). Nevertheless, a district court is bound by the allegations in a plaintiffs complaint and is "not free to speculate that the plaintiff `might' be able to state a claim if given yet another opportunity to add more facts to the complaint." Macias v. Raul A. (Unknown) Badge No. 153, 23 F.3d at 97.
DISCUSSION
1. Was Martinez denied due process at the disciplinary hearing on February 28, 2001?
A prison inmate may not collaterally attack a prison disciplinary case in a civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 until he demonstrates that he has challenged those proceedings in a writ of habeas corpus and the disciplinary charge has been invalidated, reversed, expunged, or otherwise impugned. Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (1997); Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994); Woods v. Smith, 60 F.3d 1161, 1165 n. 16 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied sub nom, Palermo v. Woods, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 800 (1996). Martinez has clearly acknowledged that disciplinary case no. 20010173741 has not been invalidated, reversed, or otherwise impugned by TDCJ-ID in the administrative grievance process or in a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus.
Indeed, the Court takes judicial notice of the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed by Martinez on May 29, 2001, in this Court in Civil Action No. 5:01-CV-163-C, in which he challenged disciplinary case no. 20010173 741. By Order dated January 22, 2002, this Court found that the due process rights set forth in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557 (1974), had not been abridged in disciplinary case no. 20010173741 and the petition was denied and dismissed with prejudice. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit subsequently denied Martinez's request for a certificate of appealability (USCA No. 01-10231).
Accordingly, the Court finds that Martinez's request to have his disciplinary case expunged and monetary damages awarded for due process violations is without basis in the law.
2. Did Captain George Fry act in retaliation by finding Martinez guilty of the charges in disciplinary case no. 20010173741?
To state a claim for retaliation under § 1983, a prisoner must demonstrate (1) the invocation of a constitutional right; (2) a defendant's intent to retaliate against the prisoner for his exercise of that right; (3) a retaliatory adverse act; and (4) causation; i.e., but for the retaliatory motive, the complained-of incident would not have occurred. Johnson v. Rodriguez, 110 F.3d 299, 310 (5th Cir. 1997). The prisoner must "produce direct evidence of motivation or, the more probable scenario, `allege a chronology of events from which retaliation may plausibly be inferred.'" Woods v. Smith, 60 F.3d 1161, 1166 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting Cain v. Lane, 857 F.2d 1139, 1143 n. 6 (7th Cir. 1988). Thus, a prisoner must demonstrate more than his "mere personal belief that he was the victim of retaliation. Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d 322, 324 (5th Cir. 1999). Furthermore, trial courts should carefully scrutinize claims of disciplinary charges filed in retaliation "[t]o assure that prisoners do not inappropriately insulate themselves from disciplinary actions by drawing the shield of retaliation around them." Woods v. Smith, 60 F.3d at 1166.
Martinez alleges that Captain Fry presided over the disciplinary hearing on February 28, 2001; Captain Fry denied him the right to present exculpatory evidence at the hearing; and Captain Fry found him guilty of the three charges in retaliation for Martinez filing a grievance against him in 1999. Martinez argues that Captain Fry's questions "[H]aven't I had you in the past in my treatment teams?" and "What's with you and these treatment people?" are clearly evidence of a retaliatory motive.
Nevertheless, "[u]nless the complained-of action[, that is, the disciplinary case,] would not have taken place `but for' the retaliatory animus, then [a] retaliation claim has not been made out." Johnson v. Rodriguez, 110 F.3d at 313 n. 19. Martinez has failed to show a chronology of events which lead to a reasonable conclusion that but for the retaliatory animus Captain Fry would not have found him guilty of the disciplinary charges in case no. 2001017341. In Martinez's petition for habeas relief in Civil Action No. 5:01-CV-163-C, this Court determined that Martinez had admitted his guilt and that his mental status did not contribute to his behavior or preclude his participation in the disciplinary process. The TDCJ-ID disciplinary and medical records clearly support this finding.
Accordingly, the Court finds that Martinez's claim of retaliation is factually without merit.
3. Did the Defendants violate Martinez's rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act?
The Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA" or the "Act") clearly provides protection for disabled inmates incarcerated in state prisons. Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 209 (1998). To state a claim for discrimination under the Act, Martinez must allege that (1) he is disabled within the meaning of the Act; (2) he is being excluded from participation in, or being denied benefits of services, programs, or activities by the defendant, or that he has otherwise been discriminated against by the defendant; and (3) such exclusion, denial, or discrimination was because of his disability. Lightbourn v. County of El Paso, 118 F.3d 421, 428(5th Cir. 1997). "An individual is disabled under the ADA if he demonstrates: (1) he has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of his major life activities; (2) he has a record of such impairment; or (3) he is regarded as having such an impairment." Aldrup v. Caldera, 274 F.3d 282, 286 (5th Cir. 2001).
The Court has reviewed the prison records, Martinez's pleadings, and the record of the Spears hearing, but can find no evidence to support Martinez's claims of discrimination based on his alleged disability. Accordingly, the Court finds that his conclusory allegations of discrimination are insufficient to state a claim for violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act.
4. Did Martinez establish claims for monetary damages against Defendants TDCJ-ID, the Montford Unit, and Captain Fry, in his official capacity?
"As an instrumentality of the state, the TDCJ-ID is immune from a suit for money damages under the Eleventh Amendment." Talib v. Gilley, 138 F.3d 211, 213 (5th Cir. 1998). See Harris v. Angelina County, Tex., 31 F.3d 331, 337-38 n. 7 (5th Cir. 1994) ("Under the current state of the law, the TDCJ is deemed an instrumentality of the state operating as its alter ego in carrying out a public function of the state, and is immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment."). "Section 1983 does not waive the states' sovereign immunity, . . . and Texas has not consented to this suit." Aguilar v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice, 160 F.3d 1052, 1054 (5th Cir. 1998). Accordingly, the Court finds that TDCJ-ID and its subdivision, the Montford Unit, are immune from Martinez's suit for monetary damages.
"The Eleventh Amendment also bars a suit against a state official `when the state is the real, substantial party in interest.'" Id. (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101-02 (1984) (internal citations and citations omitted). Nevertheless, "[i]n Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, the Supreme Court carved out an exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity." Aguilar v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice, 160 F.3d at 1054. "To meet the Ex Pane Young exception, a plaintiff's suit alleging a violation of federal law must be brought against individual persons in their official capacities as agents of the state, and the relief sought must be declaratory or injunctive in nature and prospective in effect." Id. Although Martinez has sought to have his disciplinary case set aside, he has failed to demonstrate that he is entitled to such injunctive relief and only his claims for monetary damages remain. To the extent that Martinez has sued Captain Fry in his official capacity as an employee of the TDCJ-ID for monetary damages, the Court finds that Captain Fry is immune from such a suit.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, it is ORDERED that Martinez's complaint and all claims alleged therein are DISMISSED with prejudice as frivolous and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Judgment shall be entered accordingly.
All pending motions are hereby denied.
This dismissal shall count as a qualifying dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and Adepegba v. Hammons, 103 F.3d 383 (5th Cir. 1996), and this dismissal does not release Martinez from the filing fee obligations previously imposed.
Martinez is advised that if he appeals this Order, he will be required to pay the appeal fee of $105.00 at the same time he files his notice of appeal.
A copy of this Order shall be mailed to the Office of General Counsel, TDCJ-ID Litigation Support, P.O. Box 13084, Austin, Texas, 78711, and to TDCJ Local Funds Division, P.O. Box 629, Huntsville, Texas 77342-0629.
JUDGMENT
For the reasons stated in the Court's Order of even date,IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Plaintiff's complaint and all claims alleged therein are dismissed with prejudice.