§

Martinez v. State

222 Ga. App. 497 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996)
Martinez v. State

8 Citing cases

  1. Jordan v. State

    272 Ga. 395 (Ga. 2000)   Cited 37 times
    Upholding murder conviction where defendant "donned camouflage pants and accompanied to the victim's home two armed men who had just discussed in his presence killing the victim," then, after the killing, helped look for shotgun shells and bury the body

    " One guilty of hindering the apprehension of a criminal is, at common law, an "accessory after the fact" and is not a "party to the crime" under OCGA § 16-2-20. Moore v. State, 240 Ga. 210 (1) ( 240 S.E.2d 68) (1977); Martinez v. State, 222 Ga. App. 497 (2) ( 474 S.E.2d 708) (1996). The statutory definition of hindering the apprehension of a criminal eliminates the possibility that one guilty of hindering participated as a party to the crime in the perpetration of the major crime.

  2. Stewart v. State

    243 Ga. App. 860 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000)   Cited 7 times

    Johnson, C. J., and McMurray, Senior Appellate Judge, concur. Martinez v. State, 222 Ga. App. 497, 499 (2) ( 474 S.E.2d 708) (1996). Id. at 500.

  3. Bullard v. State

    242 Ga. App. 843 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000)   Cited 10 times

    "An accessory after the fact is not a party to the crime under OCGA § 16-2-21, but the act constitutes the separate offense of obstruction of justice." Martinez v. State, 222 Ga. App. 497, 500 ( 474 S.E.2d 708) (1996). Because Carol Bullard was neither indicted nor charged with the offense of felony obstruction, but rather with the offense of making or using false writings, it would have been improper for the trial court to charge the jury on this offense.

  4. Knight v. State

    528 S.E.2d 258 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000)   Cited 1 times

    Although police were unable to continuously observe the events surrounding the transaction, the informant's testimony was corroborated by evidence that: a search of the informant just prior to the buy revealed no contraband; the informant was given $20 to buy drugs, and he returned two to three minutes later with a piece of crack cocaine and no money; and police saw him in Knight's yard and heard him ask for Knight. The circumstantial evidence was sufficient to corroborate the informant's testimony. See Martinez v. State, 222 Ga. App. 497, 499 (1) ( 474 S.E.2d 708) (1996). The trial court properly denied Knight's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal.

  5. Crumpton v. State

    240 Ga. App. 422 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999)   Cited 5 times
    Observing that the evidence showed merely that the defendant had cashed stolen checks after the burglary, knowing that they were stolen, and while such conduct might prove him to have been an accessory after the fact, it did not show that he had intentionally aided or abetted the commission of the crime or had intentionally advised, encouraged, counseled, or procured another person to commit the crime: elements that must be proved to convict one of being a party to a crime

    Moreover, an accessory after the fact is not a party to the crime within the meaning of OCGA § 16-2-21. Martinez v. State, 222 Ga. App. 497, 499 (2) ( 474 S.E.2d 708) (1996). Conspirators are responsible for the acts of each other in carrying out their common purpose or design, although these acts may constitute another criminal offense.

  6. Houston v. State

    517 S.E.2d 357 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999)   Cited 2 times

    "An accessory after the fact is not a party to the crime under OCGA § 16-2-21, but the act constitutes the separate offense of obstruction of justice under OCGA § 16-10-24. . . ." Martinez v. State, 222 Ga. App. 497, 499(2) ( 474 S.E.2d 708) (1996). Accordingly, the court's statement was not erroneous.

  7. Brown v. State

    228 Ga. App. 281 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997)   Cited 4 times

    Furthermore, Officer Green's testimony that Brown helped Johnson flee with the stolen goods did not necessarily establish Brown as a party to shoplifting. See OCGA §§ 16-2-20 (b); 16-8-14; Martinez v. State, 222 Ga. App. 497, 499 (2) ( 474 S.E.2d 708) (1996) ("An accessory after the fact is not a party to the crime . . ., but the act constitutes the separate offenses of obstruction of justice. . . ."). Johnson, Brown's sole defense witness, testified that Brown was not involved in the theft.

  8. Price v. State

    223 Ga. App. 807 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996)   Cited 6 times

    Nor was Price charged as an accessory under OCGA § 16-10-24. See Martinez v. State, 222 Ga. App. 497, 499-500 (2) ( 474 S.E.2d 708) (1996). The trial court also correctly rejected a requested charge necessitating that the State prove a "specific intent" to commit the crime of possession with intent to distribute.