Opinion
No. 05-01-01770-CR
AFFIRM and Opinion issued June 30, 2003 Do Not Publish
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. F99-01035-RH. AFFIRM
OPINION
Eric Ray Martinez appeals his conviction for the March 1999 aggravated sexual assault of his pregnant girlfriend, Natalie Salmeron. After appellant entered an open plea of guilty, the trial court accepted appellant's guilty plea and assessed punishment at fifteen years' imprisonment. In a single point of error, appellant claims the trial court erred in failing to sua sponte determine competency. We affirm. In his sole point of error, appellant contends the trial court erred in failing to stop the plea proceedings and conduct an inquiry into his competency. Although he concedes he did not request such an inquiry, he nevertheless argues the trial court had a duty to sua sponte conduct the inquiry because the evidence raised the issue of his competency. A defendant is presumed competent to stand trial and shall be found competent unless proved incompetent by a preponderance of the evidence. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46.02, § 1A(b) (Vernon Supp. 2003). A person is incompetent to participate in a trial if he does not have (1) sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding or (2) a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings against him. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 46.02, § 1A (Vernon Supp. 2003). Article 46.02, section 2(b) provides that the trial court conduct a competency inquiry before conducting a competency hearing. See Alcott v. State, 51 S.W.3d 596, 601 (Tex.Crim.App. 2001). A section 2(b) competency inquiry is required "only if the evidence brought to the judge's attention is such as to raise a bona fide doubt in the judge's mind as to the defendant's competency to stand trial." Id. In other words, the evidence must cause the court a bona fide doubt that the defendant has a sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding or that he lacks an understanding of the proceedings against him. Mata v. State, 632 S.W.2d 355, 359 (Tex.Crim.App. 1982). Generally, evidence is sufficient to create a bona fide doubt if it shows recent severe mental illness, at least moderate retardation, or truly bizarre acts by the defendant. Alcott, 51 S.W.3d at 603, n. 10. Only if such a bona fide doubt exists need the court conduct a competency inquiry, and only after such inquiry does the trial court conduct a competency hearing. Id. at 601. The record shows a one-year gap between the plea hearing (October 2000) and the punishment hearing (September/October 2001). To the extent appellant complains the trial court should have determined competency before accepting his plea, we note that, at the time of the plea hearing, there was no evidence before the court of appellant's mental state and appellant had not filed a pretrial motion asserting incompetency. Instead, appellant testified he understood the accusations being made against him, entered his open plea of guilty freely and voluntarily, and understood the range of punishment. He responded lucidly to all questions posed. Because there was no evidence to raise a bona fide doubt about appellant's competency at the plea hearing, the trial court did not err in not conducting a competency inquiry (followed by a competency hearing) sua sponte before it accepted his plea. During the punishment hearing, appellant presented evidence of his seven-year history with mental illness and chemical dependency. The evidence showed that, from the age of fourteen, appellant had been hospitalized several times and received medical treatment for chemical dependency, depression, bipolar disorder, and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder. The evidence also showed appellant kicked, beat, and bit Natalie, then forced her to have anal sex with him and with a beer bottle. He hit her in the stomach and told her he wanted to kill the baby. Natalie testified that during the aggravated sexual assault, appellant did not appear to be himself. At the time of his punishment hearing, however, appellant's hospitalizations were no longer recent events; in fact, the most recent hospitalization occurred fourteen months before the trial court held the punishment hearing. See Loftin v. State, 660 S.W.2d 543, 546-47 (Tex.Crim.App. 1983) (to raise competency issue, there must be evidence of recent severe mental illness or bizarre acts by defendant) (citing Porter v. State, 623 S.W.2d 374 (Tex.Crim.App. 1981)). Furthermore, even assuming they were "recent," prior hospitalizations, treatment for depression, or a determination that a person is mentally ill do not per se constitute a finding that the person is incompetent to stand trial. See Loftin, 660 S.W.2d at 546-47; see also Reeves v. State, 46 S.W.3d 397, 399, 400 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2001, pet. dism'd) (evidence of drug addiction and suicide attempt was no reflection on appellant's ability to understand or participate in proceedings against her); Townsend v. State, 949 S.W.2d 24, 27 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1997, no pet.) (suicidal tendencies and depression did not support finding of incompetency). Moreover, other evidence at punishment indicated that after the assault, appellant attended Alcoholic Anonymous meetings. He expressed a sincere desire to control his alcohol addiction, he worked a full-time job, he went to school, and, for the first time, he began to respond well to new medication. His mother testified he "seemed to be back to normal." See Marbut v. State, 76 S.W.3d 742, 748 (Tex.App.-Waco 2002, pet. ref'd) (no bona fide doubt of competence found where evidence showed that appellant, if allowed to avoid prison and continue with psychological treatment, could function normally enough to remain free). No evidence was presented that appellant was at least moderately retarded. And his assault on the victim, while brutal, was not bizarre. In fact, appellant's behavior at the punishment hearing contradicted his argument that he was incompetent to stand trial. He lucidly testified at the punishment hearing that on several occasions he had discussed with his attorney his right to not testify, he invoked his right to not testify, his counsel had "done exactly what [he] wanted [her] to do" with regard to his case, and he was satisfied with her performance as his attorney. See Townsend, 949 S.W.2d at 27 (appellant's knowledge that he was facing time in prison and his agreement to cooperate with his attorney contradicted appellant's claim of incompetency). The evidence was not sufficient to raise a bona fide doubt in the trial judge's mind that the defendant had the sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding or that he lacked an understanding of the proceedings against him. Because there was insufficient evidence presented to trigger a competency inquiry, the trial court did not err in failing to conduct a competency hearing. See Alcott, 51 S.W.3d at 601; Mata, 632 S.W.2d at 360. We overrule appellant's sole point. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Defense exhibits showed appellant was hospitalized in January and February 1993, January 1995, and November 1998. By January 2000, he was seeing Dr. Khatami, who ultimately prescribed him the new medications to which he began responding well. In July 2000, appellant was admitted for the most recent hospitalization, a one-week stay at Timberlawn Mental Health System where he reported symptoms of depression, hallucinations, and paranoia.