Summary
concluding that officer who had performed over one hundred DWI stops in the past had reasonable suspicion to detain Martinez when, while driving behind her at 2:49 a.m. on a flat, well-lit, clearly marked road, he saw and heard her vehicle strike the curb hard enough to push the car back into the lane in which she had been driving
Summary of this case from State v. Flemmons No. 05-09-00147-CR
Opinion issued January 21, 2010. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex. R. App. P. 47.
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 4 Collin County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 004-83819-08.
Before Justices MORRIS, O'NEILL, and FILLMORE.
Opinion By Justice FILLMORE.
Following a traffic stop, Leanne Beth Martinez was arrested for driving while intoxicated (DWI), second offense. Martinez filed a motion to suppress "any and all evidence seized or developed as a result" of the stop and "[a]ll statements made and actions done" by Martinez following the stop. After the trial court denied the motion, Martinez pleaded nolo contendere to the charge, and the trial court assessed punishment of 180 days' confinement in the Collin County jail, probated for eighteen months, and a $1200 fine. In one issue, Martinez asserts the trial court erred by denying the motion to suppress because the police officer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop her. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Background
At 2:49 a.m. on a Sunday morning, Rajib Bhattacharjee, a patrol officer with the Richardson Police Department, was driving behind Martinez on a flat, well-lit, clearly-marked road. Although Bhattacharjee did not see any obstacles in the road, he saw and heard Martinez's vehicle strike the curb along the outside of the road hard enough to push the car back into the lane. Bhattacharjee stopped Martinez to investigate whether she was intoxicated. After conducting field sobriety tests, Bhattacharjee arrested Martinez for DWI. Martinez filed a motion to suppress any evidence discovered after the stop asserting Bhattacharjee did not have reasonable suspicion to stop her. At the hearing on the motion, Bhattacharjee testified he had been a certified peace officer for approximately two years and, in addition, was further certified in conducting field sobriety tests. He routinely conducts DWI investigations and has performed approximately 100 DWI stops. He has also observed the driving patterns of intoxicated drivers. In previous DWI investigations, Bhattacharjee has seen a vehicle strike a curb. In his opinion, this demonstrates the intoxicated driver is unable to maintain a single lane or to avoid obstacles in the road. Bhattacharjee stopped Martinez because in his "training and experience, the inability to navigate the roadway safely is usually indicative of some sort of intoxication. . . ." Further, in Bhattacharjee's experience, Sunday mornings between 2:00 a.m. and 4:00 a.m. are a "high DWI time" because the bars have recently closed. Bhattacharjee stopped Martinez's vehicle based on "the day of the week, the time, the nature of the road, the fact there was a clear, level, well lit, well marked road, and the nature of the offense when the subject hit the curb." Bhattacharjee testified Martinez committed a traffic violation by failing to maintain a single lane. However, there were no other vehicles in the area, and Martinez was a not a threat to any other vehicle. Bhattacharjee agreed that a vehicle straying out of its lane is not, by itself, evidence the driver is intoxicated. The State introduced the recording from the police cruiser's dashboard camera of the stop, the field sobriety tests, and the arrest. Although the recording is not completely clear, Bhattacharjee provided testimony indicating the point on the recording at which Martinez's vehicle hit the curb. Martinez testified she did not strike the curb. The trial court denied the motion to suppress. The trial court also entered findings of fact that Martinez's vehicle hit the curb and Bhattacharjee, based on his training and experience, reasonably believed that a "vehicle that strikes a curb early on a Sunday morning, at approximately 2:49 A.M., with the bars closing at 2:00 A.M., is usually indicative of intoxication." Relying on State v. Curtis, 238 S.W.3d 376 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007), the trial court concluded that, based on the totality of the circumstances, Bhattacharjee was reasonable in assuming Martinez might be intoxicated and had reasonable suspicion to stop Martinez to determine if she was intoxicated. Analysis
Martinez contends the trial court erred by overruling her motion to suppress because the State failed to show her failure to maintain a single lane of traffic was unsafe, and therefore she did not commit a traffic offense. In response, the State does not rely on the commission of a traffic offense as justification for the stop. Instead, the State argues the stop was justified because, based on the totality of the circumstances, Bhattacharjee had reasonable suspicion to believe Martinez may have been intoxicated. After reviewing the record, we agree with the State. We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress under a bifurcated standard of review. St. George v. State, 237 S.W.3d 720, 725 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). The trial court is the sole trier of fact and judge of credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony. Id. Therefore, we give almost total deference to the trial court's determination of historical facts, particularly when the trial court's findings are based on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Id.; Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). We afford the same deference to mixed questions of law and fact if resolving those questions turns on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 89. We review de novo the application of legal principles to a specific set of facts, including the trial court's determination of reasonable suspicion. State v. Garcia-Cantu, 253 S.W.3d 236, 241 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 87. When the trial court makes explicit fact findings, we determine whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, supports those fact findings. State v. Kelly, 204 S.W.3d 808, 818-19 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). A law enforcement officer is justified in detaining a person for investigative purposes if the officer has a reasonable suspicion to believe the individual is violating the law. Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488, 492 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); Woods v. State, 956 S.W.2d 33, 35 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29 (1968)). "Reasonable suspicion exists if the officer has specific, articulable facts that, when combined with rational inferences from those facts, would lead him to reasonably conclude that a particular person actually is, has been, or soon will be engaged in criminal activity." Castro v. State, 227 S.W.3d 737, 741 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). The reasonable suspicion determination disregards the subjective intent of the officer making the stop and looks solely to whether there was an objective basis for the stop. Ford, 158 S.W.3d at 492. The determination of whether an officer had reasonable suspicion is made by considering the totality of the circumstances. Curtis, 238 S.W.3d at 379-80; Ford, 158 S.W.3d at 492. Because Bhattacharjee did not have a warrant when he stopped Martinez, the burden was on the State to demonstrate the reasonableness of the stop. Ford, 158 S.W.3d at 492. Martinez claims the State failed to demonstrate that Bhattacharjee had reasonable suspicion to make the stop because hitting the curb, by itself, is not a traffic violation and is an insufficient justification for a traffic stop. In support of her argument, Martinez relies on several cases in which courts of appeals determined that failure to maintain a single lane of traffic alone did not justify an investigative stop. Aviles v. State, 23 S.W.3d 74, 78 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. ref'd) (multiple lane change did not justify stop where there was no evidence it was not performed safely); Hernandez v. State, 983 S.W.2d 867, 870 (Tex. App.-Austin 1998, pet. ref'd) (no reasonable suspicion existed when driver swerved left into center lane and officer did not testify about subjective or objective reasons for believing defendant was intoxicated); State v. Tarvin, 972 S.W.2d 910, 912 (Tex. App.-Waco 1998, pet. ref'd) (no reasonable suspicion existed when car drifted over solid white line at right side of road two to three times at 2:00 a.m. near nightclub and officer did not testify he was conducting an investigative stop or that he suspected defendant of any criminal activity other than weaving in lane). Here, unlike the cases cited by Martinez, Bhattacharjee did not stop Martinez solely for failing to maintain a single lane. Rather, Bhattacharjee testified to a subjective belief the driver may have been intoxicated and to objective facts regarding Martinez's driving, the conditions of the road, and the time of the stop, all of which indicated to Bhattacharjee that Martinez may have been intoxicated. Importantly, Bhattacharjee testified Martinez was driving on a flat, straight, well-lit road with no obstacles when Martinez's vehicle left its lane and hit the curb with enough force to push it back into the lane. In Bhattacharjee's experience, intoxicated drivers sometimes hit the curb, demonstrating they are unable to safely navigate the road. Further, it was early Sunday morning shortly after the bars had closed, a "high DWI" time. Because Bhattacharjee believed all of these things indicated the driver might be intoxicated, he stopped the car to investigate further. Based on the totality of the circumstances, Bhattacharjee's specific, articulable facts, together with inferences from those facts, were sufficient to support the trial court's conclusion that Bhattacharjee had a reasonable suspicion Martinez could be intoxicated. Curtis, 238 S.W.3d at 379-80; Dunkelberg v. State, 276 S.W.3d 503, 507-08 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2008, pet. ref'd). Accordingly, the trial court did not err by overruling Martinez's motion to suppress. We resolve Martinez's sole issue against her. We affirm the trial court's judgment.