Opinion
NO. 01-16-00594-CR
06-13-2017
CARLOS MARTINEZ, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 248th District Court Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 1496343
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The State charged Carlos Martinez with capital murder. Martinez pleaded not guilty. A jury found Martinez guilty. Because the State did not seek the death penalty, the trial court sentenced Martinez to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. In two issues, Martinez contends (1) the evidence is legally insufficient to demonstrate that he intended to cause the complainant's death or that he committed an assaultive act with intent to obtain or maintain control of the complainant's property; and (2) the trial court improperly limited voir dire by preventing him from questioning the jury panel about the insanity defense. We affirm.
Background
Martinez met Jose Ramos, the complainant, at a restaurant at which Martinez and Ramos both worked. Martinez and Taylor Coyledean were friends from high school who had bonded over their turbulent childhoods. Ramos and Coyledean met through their mutual acquaintance with Martinez. Coyledean eventually moved into Ramos's apartment. Martinez lived with them for a few days but left after an argument with Ramos. Coyledean stayed in the apartment, but he and Ramos had a tumultuous relationship. Ramos threatened to evict Coyledean from the apartment.
Unhappy with this turn of events, Colyedean suggested to Martinez that they use a sleeper hold to subdue Ramos, steal Ramos's car, and use the car to start a new life in California. Coyledean demonstrated the sleeper hold on Martinez, who discovered that the hold completely restricted the airway. Martinez initially tried to dissuade Coyledean from using the sleeper hold because he was afraid that it would kill Ramos, but Martinez eventually agreed to use it. In November 2014, Martinez knocked on the door and Ramos let him in. After a sign from Coyledean, Martinez grabbed Ramos from behind to administer the chokehold. Ramos resisted and broke Martinez's thumb. Colyedean took over, with Martinez holding down Ramos's hand while Coyledean put Ramos in a sleeper hold. Colyedean choked Ramos with his hands until Ramos died. Traveling westward in Ramos's black BMW, Martinez and Coyledean maxed out Ramos's credit card with purchases that began at a gas station near the pond where Ramos's body was found and ended at a gas station in Slaton, Texas, near Lubbock.
Three weeks after the murder, two patrol officers for the Los Angeles Police Department noticed Texas plates on a black BMW parked in the Venice Beach area. They discovered Martinez and Coyledean sitting inside. Martinez was in the driver's seat of the BMW and Ramos's wallet was in the right passenger door. The officers arrested Martinez and Coyledean. An inventory of the BMW revealed clothing and a blanket that belonged to Ramos.
Meanwhile, the Houston Police Department recovered Ramos's body from a retention pond. They located Ramos's television at Martinez's mother's house. Martinez's mother testified that she had purchased the television from Martinez for $500.
A homicide detective from the Houston Police Department traveled to California to meet with the officers who had apprehended Martinez and Coyledean and to interview the suspects. During his police interview, Martinez admitted to his role in the killing but insisted that he reluctantly agreed to go along with Coyledean's plan. As Martinez recounted the night of the murder, he reflected that, "I could not believe [I] was being driven to follow this man's plan." Martinez reported feeling a strong sense of guilt and regret during the commission of the offense. He stated:
I bonded with this man [Ramos]. . . . Whenever I was going to choke him. Whenever I was going to kill him. It didn't go that way. Because of this [indicating his injured thumb] or because of this [pointing to his heart]—you call it whatever—it didn't go through like that. . . . Didn't want it. Not for me. I wanted to get out. I wanted to go. He [Coyledean] jumps on him [Ramos]. And he grabs him. He doesn't let go. He [Coyledean] said help me. I didn't know what to do. I'm just standing over there in front.Martinez acknowledged that he helped Coyledean by holding one of Ramos's hands while Coyledean strangled Ramos. As the interview ended, Martinez reiterated his reluctance to go through with the plan to rob Ramos. The relevant portion of the record follows:
MARTINEZ: I want you to know that I could never have the heart to have done that to this man, unless he gave me the mind—the criminal mind that he had—to help him out.
POLICE: Taylor put it in your mind is what you're saying?
MARTINEZ: Yes sir.
Discussion
I. Legal Sufficiency
Martinez complains that the evidence is legally insufficient to show that he intended to cause Ramos's death or that he committed an assaultive act with intent to obtain or maintain control of Ramos's property.
A. Standard of review and applicable law
When evaluating the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in a light favorable to the verdict and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979); Drichas v. State, 175 S.W.3d 795, 798 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). The fact-finder is the exclusive judge of the witnesses' credibility and the weight to be given to their testimony. Jones v. State, 944 S.W.2d 642, 647-48 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
A person commits capital murder if he intentionally causes the death of an individual while in the course of committing or attempting to commit robbery. TEX. PENAL. CODE ANN. §§ 19.02(b)(1), 19.03(a)(2) (West 2011 & Supp. 2016).
The State charged Martinez both as a primary actor and as a party. Under the law of parties, the jury could have found Martinez guilty by concluding that either: (1) under Penal Code section 7.02(a), acting with intent to promote or assist the commission of the murder, Martinez solicited, encouraged, directed, aided, or attempted to aid another person to commit the murder; or (2) under section 7.02(b), the murder was committed in an attempt to carry out a conspiracy to commit robbery, and, though Martinez had no intent to commit the murder, it was committed in furtherance of the unlawful purpose and should have been anticipated as a result of the carrying out of the conspiracy. See id. § 7.02(a), (b) (West 1994); see also Love v. State, 199 S.W.3d 447, 452 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. ref'd).
B. Analysis
Martinez confessed that he agreed with Coyledean to subdue Ramos using a sleeper hold for the purpose of stealing Ramos's car. This admission is sufficient to support a finding that Martinez entered a conspiracy to commit robbery. A person commits criminal conspiracy if he agrees with another person that one of them will commit a felony, intends that the felony be committed, and he or one or more of them performs an overt act in pursuance of the agreement. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 15.02 (West 1994).
Using a fatal sleeper hold to steal a car satisfies the elements of aggravated robbery, which is a first degree felony. See id. §§ 29.02, 29.03 (West 1994) (a person commits robbery if he causes serious bodily injury to another while in the course of committing theft and with the intent to obtain control of the property). Martinez told the police that Coyledean strangled Ramos to death in order to steal his car. Martinez stated that when Coyledean demonstrated the sleeper hold on Martinez, Martinez learned that he could not breathe, and he was reluctant to use the hold because he was afraid that it would kill Ramos. The sleeper hold that choked Ramos was committed in furtherance of Martinez and Coyledean's plan to rob Ramos. Thus, the record demonstrates that Ramos knew that a sleeper hold closed off the airway and could potentially kill Ramos. Based on this evidence, the jury could reasonably have concluded that Ramos should have anticipated that the murder would result from carrying out the robbery by using a sleeper hold. See TEX. PENAL CODE 7.02(b). Accordingly, we hold that the evidence is legally sufficient to support Martinez's conviction.
Martinez relies on Ibanez v. State, 749 S.W.2d 804, to argue that the State failed to prove that Martinez intended to cause Ramos's death because it was Coyledean, not Martinez, that administered the sleeper hold. See id. at 807 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (holding that State must prove intentional or knowing killing in the course of committing robbery for capital murder conviction), overruled by Russeau v. State, 785 S.W.2d 387, 390 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). Ibanez is distinguishable because the defendant in that case acted alone and was not convicted under the law of the parties. TEX. PENAL CODE § 7.02(a), (b); Ibanez, 749 S.W.2d at 806. Here, the State satisfied the intent requirement by proving that Martinez conspired with Coyledean to rob Ramos by using a sleeper hold, the murder was committed in the furtherance of the robbery, and Martinez should have anticipated the murder as a result of carrying out the conspiracy. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 7.02(b); Love, 199 S.W.3d at 452.
Martinez also cites Ibanez to argue that he lacked the requisite intent to obtain or maintain control of Ramos's property. See Ibanez, 749 S.W.2d at 807 (noting that when alleging capital murder based on robbery, State must prove that intentional act that caused victim's death occurred in order to facilitate taking of property). Martinez argues that the State failed to show that he intended his assaultive conduct to facilitate the taking of the property, because, he argues he assisted Coyledean with the sleeper hold to recover his clothes and did not intend to use the hold to steal Ramos's car. Martinez confessed to the Houston police, however, that he and Coyledean planned to use a sleeper hold to subdue Ramos and steal his car. As the fact-finder, the jury was entitled to reject Martinez's theory and credit what he told police.
II. Improper Restriction of Voir Dire
Martinez next contends that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his voir dire request to ask the jury panel about its views on the insanity defense. The relevant portion of the record follows:
MARTINEZ: I find myself in a position [of] asking for permission from the Court to voir dire the jury on insanity basing that on
testimony perhaps from the defendant or from his family. . . . So I guess I'm waiting to find out from the Court whether I'm permitted to go into insanity at the time of the offense during jury selection.Martinez, however, never tendered any specific question that he wished to submit to the panel. The State responds that Martinez's failure to provide the questions waives review of the trial court's ruling.
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THE COURT: So my ruling is going to be that insofar as the insanity defense being offered and this particular panel being voir dired, asked questions about the insanity as the defense, I'm going to deny that request by the defense to do that based on my interpretation of section 81 in the Penal Code.
When reviewing a trial court's limitation on the voir dire questioning, we analyze the claim under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Caldwell v. State, 818 S.W.2d 790, 793 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). At the outset, we determine whether the defendant proffered a proper question concerning a proper area of inquiry. Id.; Cockrum v. State, 758 S.W.2d 577, 584 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988). A proper question is one designed to discover a venire member's views on an issue applicable to the case. McCarter v. State, 837 S.W.2d 117, 121 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992); Caldwell, 818 S.W.2d at 794. The appellant must present particular, proper questions to preserve error. Sells v. State, 121 S.W.3d 748, 756 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003); Mohammed v. State, 127 S.W.3d 163, 170 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. ref'd).
Martinez did not present a particular, proper question to review in connection with the trial court's ruling. Accordingly, we hold that he has failed to preserve error. See Sells, 121 S.W.3d at 756; Mohammed, 127 S.W.3d at 170.
Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Jane Bland
Justice Panel consists of Justices Higley, Bland, and Brown. Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).