Summary
In Martinez, investigators pulled over a vehicle bearing the same license plate that the complainants in a suspected armed robbery had recorded.
Summary of this case from State v. BaldwinOpinion
NUMBER 13-15-00441-CR
02-02-2017
MICHAEL MARTINEZ, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
On appeal from the 103rd District Court of Cameron County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Benavides and Hinojosa
Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Valdez
Appellant Michael Martinez pleaded guilty to the offense of aggravated robbery, a second degree felony, and the trial court sentenced him to ten years in prison. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 29.02 (West, Westlaw through 2015 R.S.). By one issue, Martinez contends the trial court erred in denying his pretrial motion to suppress evidence found in his cell phone because the search was conducted in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Martinez was arrested and charged with aggravated robbery after an investigation led by Officer Joel Yanes with the Harlingen Police Department revealed that Martinez participated in a robbery. Officer Yanes petitioned a magistrate judge for a warrant to search a cell phone found in Martinez's possession at the time of his arrest. In support of his request for the search warrant, Officer Yanes prepared an affidavit setting forth the facts and circumstances leading up to Martinez's arrest. Based on the information provided by Officer Yanes in the affidavit, the magistrate judge found probable cause to issue a warrant authorizing a search of Martinez's cell phone. After searching Martinez's cell phone, Officer Yanes found incriminating messages implicating Martinez as a participant in the robbery.
Prior to trial, Martinez moved to suppress the messages found in his cell phone under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Specifically, Martinez argued that the warrant authorizing the search of his cell phone was not supported by probable cause. The trial court denied Martinez's motion to suppress. Martinez then pleaded guilty to aggravated robbery, and this appeal followed.
II. DISCUSSION
By his sole issue, Martinez contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. Specifically, Martinez asserts, as he did below, that Officer Yanes's affidavit in support of the warrant did not supply probable cause sufficient to authorize a search of his cell phone under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
A. Applicable Law
No search warrant may legally issue unless it is based on probable cause that evidence of a crime will be found at the place to be searched. See U.S. CONST. AMEND. IV; TEX. CONST. art. I § 9; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.06 (West, Westlaw through 2015 R.S.). Probable cause exists when, under the totality of the circumstances, there is a "fair probability" that evidence of a crime will be found at a specified location. Bonds v. State, 403 S.W.3d 867, 872-73 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). A "sworn affidavit setting forth substantial facts establishing probable cause" must be filed with the search-warrant request. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 18.01(b) (West, Westlaw through 2015 R.S.). "To justify a search, the circumstances must indicate why evidence of an illegal activity will be found in a particular place." U.S. v. Bass, 785 F.3d 1043, 1049 (6th Cir. 2015) (citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 238). Accordingly, the affidavit must establish "a nexus between the place to be searched and things to be seized, such that there is a substantial basis to believe that the things to be seized will be found in the place searched." Id.
B. Standard of Review
A trial judge's determination regarding whether probable cause exists to support issuance of a search warrant is restricted solely to the affidavit's four corners. See Walker v. State, 494 S.W.3d 905, 907 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. ref'd) (citing Bonds, 403 S.W.3d at 873). When reviewing a magistrate's decision to issue a warrant, "appellate courts as well as trial courts apply a highly deferential standard of review because of the constitutional preference for searches conducted pursuant to a warrant over warrantless searches." Id. (citing State v. McLain, 337 S.W.3d 268, 271-72 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011)). As such, reviewing courts must uphold the magistrate's probable-cause determination if the magistrate had a "substantial basis" for concluding that a search warrant probably would uncover evidence of wrongdoing. See id. (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983); Bonds, 403 S.W.3d at 873). A magistrate may interpret a search-warrant affidavit in a "non-technical, common-sense manner, drawing reasonable inferences solely from the facts and circumstances contained within the affidavit's four corners." Id. (citing Bonds, 403 S.W.3d at 873). Reviewing courts are not to invalidate a warrant by interpreting the affidavit in a "hypertechnical, rather than a common-sense, manner." Id. at 908.
C. Analysis
Regarding probable cause to search Martinez's cell phone, Officer Yanes's affidavit stated, in relevant part, as follows: i. On [October 5, 2014] at approximately 10:44 PM, Eduardo Mata and Nancy Mata reported to Harlingen Police Officer Benito Bravo that they had been the victims of an [aggravated robbery] that had occurred about 4 minutes prior. ii. Eduardo Mata reports that he was driving a white Ford Explorer eastbound on the 900 block of W Lincoln Ave, Harlingen, [Texas]. Nancy Mata is his passenger in the vehicle. iii. The Matas both report that a silver colored sport utility vehicle suddenly passed them and stopped right in front of them, blocking them from proceeding. Mr. Mata stated that he had to "slam" on his brakes to avoid a collision. iv. Both Matas report that two men exited from the silver sport utility vehicle and had their faces concealed with bandannas. They were both holding handguns. v. Mr. Mata is approached by one suspect who puts the handgun to his chest and demanded money from him. They comply and give him approximately $90 in cash. vi. The same suspect also demands the gold necklace that Mr. Mata is wearing, again he complies and gives him the necklace. vii. Both suspects return to the silver sport utility vehicle and flee the area. viii. Mr. Mata describes both male subjects as being in their early 20's and the subject that approached him had a dark bandanna with white, was wearing a red and white striped shirt and had a tattoo on his upper arm. ix. Mr. Mata was also able to obtain and write down the license plates to the suspect vehicle, they were Texas license plate CVV 9097. x. [. . .] xi. On [October 6, 2014], Eduardo Sanchez is stopped on a traffic stop at 23rd and Clifford in Harlingen, TX. Eduardo Sanchez is driving [a] Kia Sorrento [with Texas license plates CVV 9097]. Flor Garcia is his passenger. Eduardo [Sanchez] has an outstanding Harlingen Municipal Court warrant and is placed under arrest for said warrant. xii. Flor Garcia states that Eduardo Sanchez is her boyfriend who had stayed at her residence overnight. She provides consent to search her residence. xiii. Subsequent search yields a red, white, blue and gray striped shirt, a brown leather holster, men's blue jeans with a dark blue bandanna in the back pocket and a gold necklace. xiv. Mr. Mata positively identifies the gold necklace as being the necklace stolen from him and the striped shirt as the same shirt used by the suspect in the robbery. xv. On [October 7, 2014], Flor Garcia is interviewed and she confirms that she was present inside the Kia Sorento at the time of the robbery of the Matas. xvi. Flor Garcia states that Eduardo Sanchez and a second subject named Michael Martinez were the two subjects that committed the robbery. . . . xvii. Flor Garcia confirms Michael Martinez's identity by confirming his [phone number]. xviii. [. . .] xix. Eduardo Sanchez is also interviewed on [October 7, 2014], and he confirms that [Michael Martinez] had a role in the robbery and was on[] the passenger side of the vehicle while he himself was the subject on the driver's side of the vehicle. xx. Michael Martinez was arrested on [October 7, 2014] for the offense of [aggravated robbery] and at the time of his arrest he had a black LG cell phone [.] xxi. With the prevalence of cell phone usage in today's age[,] I believe that Michael Martinez's cell phone contains crucial evidence . . . that would tend to show that he is culpable for the offense of [aggravated robbery].
Restricting our review to the four corners of Officer Yanes's affidavit, and applying a highly deferential standard, we conclude that a substantial basis supporting probable cause to search Martinez's cell phone rests in the following allegations contained in the affidavit: (1) Eduardo Sanchez and Flor Garcia, both of whom were present for the Matas robbery, positively identified Martinez as an active participant in the robbery [paragraphs xvi & xix]; (2) Flor Garcia knew Martinez's phone number, implying that a point of communication had been previously established between the two [paragraph xvii]; and (3) Martinez was in possession of a cell phone at the time of his arrest [paragraph xx]. Based on these facts, it is fairly probable, though not certain, that Martinez and his cohorts communicated via cell phone in preparation for and in furtherance of the Matas robbery. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 246 (observing that probable cause requires only a fair probability of criminal activity, not a certain showing of such activity); see also Walker v. State, 494 S.W.3d 905, 909 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. ref'd) (concluding that a fair probability of criminal activity existed to search appellant's cell phone based on the search-warrant affidavit's allegation that appellant and the murder victim had been communicating via appellant's cell phone, planning robberies around the time that the victim was killed). Because these facts provided the magistrate judge a substantial basis for finding that probable cause to search Martinez's cell phone existed, we conclude that the trial court properly denied Martinez's motion to suppress the incriminating messages found on his phone.
We note that the final paragraph of Officer Yanes's affidavit attempts to establish a nexus between the robbery and Martinez's cell phone by generally noting that, because cell phones are "prevalent" in "today's age," evidence connecting Martinez to the robbery might be found in his phone. We take this opportunity to emphasize that such boilerplate language in an affidavit, standing alone, does not supply probable cause sufficient to search a criminal suspect's cell phone. See U.S. v. Ramirez, 180 F. Supp. 3d 491, 494 (W.D. Ky. 2016) (observing that affidavit's boilerplate language—that "[criminal suspects] may keep text messages or other electronic information stored in their cell phones which may relate them to the crime and/or co-defendants/victim"—does not demonstrate particularized facts supporting probable cause). However, for the reasons stated above, we conclude that, notwithstanding the boilerplate language in the final paragraph of Officer Yanes's affidavit, the affidavit nonetheless contains particularized facts demonstrating a fair probability that evidence relating to the robbery in this case would be located in Martinez's cell phone. We overrule Martinez's sole issue.
III. CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court's judgment.
/s/ Rogelio Valdez
ROGELIO VALDEZ
Chief Justice Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b). Delivered and filed the 2nd day of February, 2017.