Opinion
24A-CR-1385
11-01-2024
Joshua A. Martinez, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Mark D. Altenhof Elkhart, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Indiana Attorney General, Kathy Bradley Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Elkhart Circuit Court The Honorable Michael A. Christofeno, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 20C01-2207-F4-000032
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Mark D. Altenhof Elkhart, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Indiana Attorney General, Kathy Bradley Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Felix, Judge
Statement of the Case
[¶1] Leslie and Craig Coffman died as a result of Joshua Martinez's dangerous, drunk, and distracted driving. Martinez was speeding approximately 93 miles per hour in a 30-mile-per-hour zone while intoxicated and on FaceTime video chat with his girlfriend when he ran a red light and struck the Coffmans' vehicle. The Coffmans died from their collision-related injuries. Martinez was charged with and pled guilty to two offenses related to causing death while operating a vehicle. Martinez's plea agreement left his sentence to the trial court's discretion. The trial court sentenced Martinez to a near-maximum sentence. Martinez now appeals, raising two issues for our review:
We remind Martinez's counsel that each issue presented for review must be concisely and particularly described in the Statement of Issues, as required by Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A)(4), and that each argument must have its own heading in the Argument, as required by Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(c).
1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by not identifying certain mitigating factors; and
2. Whether Martinez's sentence is inappropriate under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B).
[¶2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶3] On the afternoon of June 10, 2022, Martinez left work and went to a casino in South Bend, where he consumed alcohol. At approximately 10:30 p.m., Martinez left the casino, got in his vehicle, began speaking to his girlfriend via FaceTime, and started the 45-minute drive to his home in Goshen, Indiana. During this drive, Martinez remained on FaceTime with his girlfriend and was "weaving in and out of traffic," driving "insanely reckless," and driving at a "high rate of speed." Tr. Vol. II at 80. At approximately 11:00 p.m., Martinez was driving within the city limits of Goshen at approximately 93 miles per hour in a 30-mile-per-hour zone. As Martinez approached the intersection at Pike Street and Third Street, his traffic light was red and had been for approximately 29 seconds. Martinez did not stop. When Martinez entered the intersection, he struck Leslie and Craig's vehicle. After the collision, Martinez's blood was drawn and tested, revealing he had an alcohol concentration equivalent of 0.177.
[¶4] Both Leslie and Craig were alive when first responders arrived on scene, but after Leslie was removed from the wreckage, she died in an ambulance before she could be transported to a hospital. Leslie's trauma was so severe that none of her organs could be donated even though she had previously elected to be an organ donor. Craig suffered seven broken ribs, a fractured pelvis, a broken ankle, substantial bruising, and trauma to his lumbar, neck, and head. Craig was airlifted to South Bend Memorial Hospital, where he was in intensive care for two weeks before being discharged home into the care of his daughters-20-year-old Anna and 17-year-old Lillian. On Craig's second night home, one of his daughters found him on the floor of his bedroom struggling to breathe. She called 911. Shortly after first responders arrived, Craig died from his collision-related injuries.
Anna was 19 years old at the time of the crash and turned 20 years old while Craig was in the hospital.
[¶5] In the wake of their parents' deaths, Anna and Lillian were faced with a bill of more $17,000 for their parents' funeral expenses; they had to sell their parents' home; they had to rehome their new puppy; and they had to euthanize their German Sheperd, who had become aggressive and unpredictable after their parents' deaths. Anna attempted to return to college for the fall semester, but she subsequently dropped out because she was depressed after losing her parents and was frequently driving back to Goshen so her sister would not be alone, all of which made being a student difficult. Lillian, who was entering her last year of high school at the time, had to live with a host family. Both now suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder.
[¶6] In July 2022, the State charged Martinez with two counts of causing death when operating a vehicle with an alcohol concentration equivalent of .08 or more as Level 4 felonies.
[¶7] In February 2023, Martinez and the State entered into a plea agreement by which Martinez pled guilty as charged and would receive an 18-year sentence to be served as follows: "Six (6) years shall be served at the [DOC;] Six (6) years shall be served on home detention[; and] Six (6) years shall be served on probation." Appellant's App. Vol. II at 5. This plea agreement also provided Martinez the opportunity to request a modification of his sentence after serving "two (2) actual years in custody." Id. The trial court took Martinez's guilty plea under advisement pending a presentence investigation report ("PSI Report") and second hearing. Before the second hearing in late April 2023, many of Leslie's and Craig's family members wrote letters to the trial court expressing their disapproval of the plea agreement. Anna submitted a victim impact statement detailing the consequences of Martinez's actions on her and Lillian's lives. Martinez filed letters of support from his friends, family, and a prior employer. After reviewing Martinez's PSI Report and the record, the trial court rejected the plea agreement.
[¶8] In April 2024, the parties reached a new plea agreement by which Martinez pled guilty as charged and his sentence was left to the trial court's discretion. The trial court accepted Martinez's guilty plea and entered judgment of conviction on both counts. Martinez also agreed to pay $20,182.35 in restitution. At the subsequent sentencing hearing in May 2024, Martinez submitted the letters of support filed before the April 2023 hearing and testimony from the pastor of his church. The State submitted letters from Craig's parents and presented testimony from Goshen Police Department Detective Jason Bailey, who investigated the fatal crash; Leslie's parents; Anna; and Lillian.
[¶9] Martinez argued for a mitigated sentence that would be split between incarceration and some form of probation or community corrections. In support, he argued that he took responsibility for his actions, he chose to plead guilty without knowing what the sentence would be, he was only 21 years old at the time of the crash, he had no criminal history aside from his convictions in this case, he did not intend to cause harm or injury when he drove drunk, he had strong family support and community ties, he had a low Indiana Risk Assessment System ("IRAS") score, he has a low likelihood of reoffending, the chances of this event reoccurring were low, and he continued to return to court despite moving to Texas to be closer to family.
[¶10] The State argued for the maximum possible sentence of 24 years of incarceration with two years of that suspended to probation. In support, the State contended that Martinez's actions caused immense suffering for not only Leslie and Craig before their deaths, but also for their children and families. The State further argued that the nature of Martinez's offenses was egregious, namely that he was intoxicated by twice the legal limit and was driving 93 miles per hour when he ran a red light, all while on FaceTime with his girlfriend.
[¶11] The trial court found Martinez's acceptance of responsibility and guilty plea to be "a very large mitigator." Tr. Vol. II at 143. The trial court also determined that Martinez's remorse, young age, and lack of criminal history to be mitigating factors. Additionally, the trial court found that Martinez's IRAS score demonstrated a low risk of reoffending. The trial court found Martinez's high alcohol content, excessive speed, disregard of the red light, and being on FaceTime were all aggravating circumstances. The trial court also concluded that Martinez was driving recklessly, which was another aggravating factor. Further, the trial court determined that the severity of Leslie's and Craig's injuries as well as the pain and suffering their daughters suffered were aggravating circumstances. The trial court stated that "this was a totally irresponsible and senseless combination of acts on [Martinez's] part, which the Court finds to be aggravating." Id. at 146.
[¶12] Finding that "the aggravators, taken individually or as a whole, outweigh any mitigating factors," Tr. Vol. II at 146, the trial court imposed a total aggregate sentence of 22 years executed at the Indiana Department of Correction ("DOC"), with 2 of those years suspended to probation and another 2 years to be served on home detention. This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
1. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Not Identifying Certain Circumstances as Mitigating
[¶13] Martinez contends that the trial court erred by not identifying certain mitigating circumstances at sentencing. Our Supreme Court has explained the standard of review for such a claim as follows:
We review a sentencing court's decision about whether to find a mitigating factor for an abuse of discretion. Carter v. State, 711 N.E.2d 835, 838-39 (Ind. 1999). "An allegation that the trial court failed to identify or find a mitigating factor requires the defendant to establish that the mitigating evidence is both significant and clearly supported by the record." Id. at 838. Sentencing courts are "under no duty to deem mitigating every factor" advanced "simply because it [was] supported by some evidence in the record." Bivins v. State, 642 N.E.2d 928, 952 (Ind. 1994). And "the sentencing judge is not obligated to explain why
[they have] chosen not to make a finding of mitigation .... Moreover, the [sentencing] court is not obligated to credit or weigh the defendant's evidence of mitigating circumstances the same way the defendant does." Id. (quotations omitted).Russell v. State, 234 N.E.3d 829, 847-48 (Ind. 2024) (alterations in original) cert. denied. Furthermore, if "the defendant does not advance a factor to be mitigating at sentencing," then we "will presume that the factor is not significant and the defendant is precluded from advancing it as a mitigating circumstance for the first time on appeal." Henley v. State, 881 N.E.2d 639, 651 (Ind. 2008) (quoting Spears v. State, 735 N.E.2d 1161, 1167 (Ind. 2000)).
[¶14] Martinez asserts that he presented evidence of the following four circumstances he believes to be mitigators: (a) the crime was not likely to recur, (b) his character and attitude indicated he was unlikely to commit another crime, (c) he was likely to respond affirmatively to probation or short-term incarceration, and (d) he agreed to pay restitution to the victim's family.
[¶15] Starting with the first two alleged mitigating factors, the trial court did, in fact, find them to be mitigating circumstances: "As a supplemental factor, I find that your IRAS score is low risk to reoffend." Tr. Vol. II at 143. As for the latter two alleged mitigating factors, Martinez did not request the trial court consider them. Martinez did not argue that he would respond affirmatively to probation or short-term incarceration. Rather, he asked the trial court to impose a "split sentence" so he could "transition out of incarceration into a more liberty-provided placement." Tr. Vol. II at 127. The parties did inform the court at the May 2024 sentencing hearing that Martinez had agreed to pay restitution, but Martinez did not argue that it was a mitigating circumstance. Because Martinez did not advance these two factors to be mitigating at sentencing, we presume they were not significant, and Martinez is precluded from advancing them as mitigating circumstances on appeal. See Henely, 881 N.E.2d at 651 (quoting Spears, 735 N.E.2d at 1167). Based on the foregoing, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in omitting any mitigating factors.
2. Martinez's Sentence Is Not Inappropriate Under Appellate Rule 7(B)
[¶16] Martinez argues his sentence is inappropriate under Appellate Rule 7(B) and should be revised. The Indiana Constitution authorizes us to independently review and revise a trial court's sentencing decision. Russell, 234 N.E.3d at 855-56 (citing Ind. Const. art. 7, §§ 4, 6; Jackson v. State, 145 N.E.3d 783, 784 (Ind. 2020)). That authority is implemented through Appellate Rule 7(B), which permits us to revise a sentence if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, we find that the sentence is "inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender." Id. (quoting Faith v. State, 131 N.E.3d 158, 159 (Ind. 2019)). Our role under this rule "is primarily to 'leaven the outliers' and identify 'guiding principles' for sentencers, rather than to achieve the 'perceived "correct" result' in each case." Lane v. State, 232 N.E.3d 119, 122 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008)). As such, "we rely on our 'collective judgment as to the balance' of all the relevant considerations involved, which include 'the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.'" Id. at 122 (quoting Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1224, 1226).
[¶17] Because we give "considerable deference" to a trial court's sentencing decision, Lane, 232 N.E.3d at 122 (quoting Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1222), a defendant requesting revision under Appellate Rule 7(B) must present "compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense and the defendant's character," id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Oberhansley v. State, 208 N.E.3d 1261, 1267 (Ind. 2023)). In reviewing the defendant's sentence, "we are not limited to the mitigators and aggravators found by the trial court," Brown v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1, 4 (Ind. 2014), and we "focus on the forest-the aggregate sentence-rather than the trees- consecutive or concurrent, number of counts, or length of the sentence on any individual count," Lane, 232 N.E.3d at 122 (quoting Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1225). Similarly, a defendant "need not 'necessarily prove' that the sentence is inappropriate on both counts" so long as "one of the prongs weighs heavily in favor" of revising the defendant's sentence. Id. at 126-27 (emphasis in original) (quoting Connor v. State, 58 N.E.3d 215, 219 (Ind.Ct.App. 2016)). Nonetheless, "to the extent the evidence on one prong militates against relief, a claim based on the other prong must be all the stronger to justify relief." Id. at 127 (citing Connor, 58 N.E.3d at 220).
[¶18] When considering the nature of the offense, we start with the advisory sentence. Brown, 10 N.E.3d at 4 (citing Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 494 (Ind. 2007), as amended (July 10, 2007), decision clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007)). Here, Martinez was convicted of and sentenced on two Level 4 felonies. "A person who commits a Level 4 felony shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between two (2) and twelve (12) years, with the advisory sentence being six (6) years." I.C. § 35-50-2-5.5 (emphasis added). Choosing a nearmaximum sentence, the trial court sentenced Martinez on each of his Level 4 felony convictions to 11 years executed at the DOC, with 1 of those years suspended to community corrections and another 1 of those years suspended to probation. The trial court ordered Martinez's two sentences to run consecutively, resulting in a total aggregate sentence of 22 years executed at the DOC with 2 of those years suspended to community corrections and another 2 of those years suspended to probation.
[¶19] Where, as here, the trial court deviated from the advisory sentence, one factor we consider is "whether there is anything more or less egregious about the offense committed by the defendant that makes it different from the 'typical' offense accounted for by the legislature when it set the advisory sentence." T.A.D.W. v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1205, 1211 (Ind.Ct.App. 2016) (quoting Holloway v. State, 950 N.E.2d 803, 806-07 (Ind.Ct.App. 2011)), as amended (May 26, 2023). We also consider whether the offense was "accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality." Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015).
[¶20] Martinez concedes on appeal that the nature of his offense has "no mitigating criteria." Appellant's Br. at 8. In consideration of the totality of the circumstances, it is not difficult to conclude that the nature of Martinez's offense is especially egregious. Martinez chose to drive intoxicated at excessive speeds while using the video-chat feature of FaceTime and disregarded an obviously red light, resulting in the deaths of two people. The deaths of Leslie and Craig Coffman resulted in lifelong consequences for their surviving family, family pets, and friends. His offense was not accompanied by any modicum of restraint or regard. In fact, Martinez indicated in his presentence investigation report that he had been "drinking responsibly" before the collision but that he was not sure how much he had to drink that night, could not remember anything after he "[w]ent down the express way," and was unconscious at the time of the collision. Appellant's App. Vol. II at 143. His belief that he had been drinking responsibly all the way up to the sentencing hearing demonstrates his carelessness as well as his continued lack of maturity and insight. As the trial court aptly observed, the deadly collision Martinez caused was "a totally irresponsible and senseless combination" of his own actions. Tr. Vol. II at 146.
[¶21] In considering the character of the offender, "we engage in a broad consideration of a defendant's qualities," T.A.D.W., 51 N.E.3d at 1211 (citing Aslinger v. State, 2 N.E.3d 84, 95 (Ind.Ct.App. 2014), clarified on other grounds on reh'g), including whether the defendant has "substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character," Stephenson, 29 N.E.3d at 122.
[¶22] Martinez has no prior criminal history, and he is young, having turned 21 years old just one month prior to these offenses. Martinez accepted responsibility for the collision and chose to plead guilty, and he demonstrated remorse. Additionally, Martinez has the support of family, friends, and a prior employer.
[¶23] However, Martinez's decision to plead guilty was pragmatic in light of the evidence against him, including surveillance video of him running the red light and the collision, evidence that he was driving more than three times the speed limit, and evidence that his blood alcohol content was more than twice the legal limit hours after the collision. See Primmer v. State, 857 N.E.2d 11, 16 (Ind.Ct.App. 2006) (stating that a plea may be considered less significant if there is substantial admissible evidence of guilt), trans. denied. Additionally, Detective Bailey testified at the sentencing hearing that when he interviewed Martinez's girlfriend during his investigation of the crash, she stated that she and Martinez "always talk on FaceTime" but that she cannot "see anything" when Martinez has his phone "plugged into the car," Tr. Vol. II at 81; this shows Martinez regularly disregards his and others' safety and security while driving.
[¶24] Based on the serious nature of Martinez's offenses, we cannot say that he has produced compelling evidence demonstrating that the nature of his offense or his character renders his sentence inappropriate. See Lane, 232 N.E.3d 119.
Conclusion
[¶25] In sum, the trial court neither abused its discretion in identifying mitigating factors nor imposed an inappropriate sentence under Appellate Rule 7(B). We therefore affirm the trial court on all issues raised.
[¶26] Affirmed.
Pyle, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.