Opinion
C. A. 9:23-01989-TMC-MHC
09-12-2023
Tyrease Sherrod Martinez, Plaintiff, v. Spartanburg County Detention Center, Spartanburg County, Sheriff Chuck Wright, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Molly H. Cherry United States Magistrate Judge
This a civil action filed by Plaintiff Tyrease Sherrod Martinez, a pretrial detainee. Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), pretrial proceedings in this action have been referred to the assigned United States Magistrate Judge.
In an Order dated July 18, 2023, Plaintiff was directed to provide certain documents to bring his case into proper form. Plaintiff was also notified of pleading deficiencies and given the opportunity to amend his Complaint. See ECF No. 5. The time for Plaintiff to bring his case into proper form has passed, and Plaintiff has failed to bring his case into proper form and has not filed an amended complaint.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is a pretrial detainee at the Spartanburg County Detention Center (SpCDC). He bring claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (§ 1983) and generally alleges that his First, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights have been violated. ECF No. 1 at 4.
Additionally, Plaintiff asserts that his rights under the United Nations “Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners” (Standard Minimum Rules) have been violated. He appears to contend that this provision is enforceable by Article 6, Clause 2 (the Supremacy Clause). See ECF No. 1 at 4.
The Standard Minimum Rules is not a treaty (Plaintiff refers to it as a treaty) and is not binding on the United States. Even if it were a self-executing treaty, the document does not purport to serve as a source of private rights. See Sierra v. Lappin, 600 F.3d 1191, 1197 (9th Cir. 2010). Thus, Plaintiff cannot state a claim based on an alleged violation of the Standard Minimum Rules. See, e.g., Alejandro v. Quiros, No. 3:21-CV-00542 (JAM), 2021 WL 5324905, *7 (D. Conn. Nov. 16, 2021).
The Supremacy Clause is not the source of any federal rights, and does not create a cause of action. Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Center, Inc., 575 U.S. 320, 324-325 (2015). It instructs courts what to do when state and federal law clash, but is silent regarding who may enforce federal laws in court, and in what circumstances they may do so. Id. Moreover, there is no suggestion in the record by Plaintiff of a clash between state and federal law.
Records from Spartanburg County indicate that Plaintiff has pending charges for murder (case number 2022A42101000445) and possession of a weapon during a violent crime (case number 2022A4210100446). He is represented by counsel. See Spartanburg County Seventh Judicial Circuit Public Index, https://publicindex.sccourts.org/Spartanburg/PublicIndex/PISearch. aspx [search case numbers listed above] (last visited Sept. 11, 2023).
This Court may take judicial notice of factual information located in postings on government websites. See Tisdale v. South Carolina Highway Patrol, No. 0:09-1009-HFF-PJG, 2009 WL 1491409, at *1 n. 1 (D.S.C. May 27, 2009), aff'd, 347 Fed.Appx. 965 (4th Cir. 2009); In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., No. 05-4182, 2008 WL 4185869, at * 2 (E.D. La. Sept. 8, 2008) (noting that courts may take judicial notice of governmental websites including other courts' records).
The claims in the Complaint are difficult to decipher, but it appears Plaintiff is alleging he is subjected to harsh conditions at the SpCDC in deprivation of his constitutional rights because of alleged overcrowding in his cell. He claims that his has been subjected to “quadruple celling” in an approximately 83-square-foot “bathroom made only for two.” ECF No. 1 at 5. He alleges he “has contracted COVID-19 virus more than once” and is subjected to 22 or more hours of lockdown each day. Id. Additionally, Plaintiff appears to assert claims about procedural issues as to his criminal cases and claims about his appointed counsel allegedly failing to properly pursue obtaining a bond for him. Id. at 7-8.
As to injuries, Plaintiff asserts that his constitutional rights have been violated and appears to allege that his ability to defend himself in his pending criminal cases has been impacted. ECF No. 1 at 8. Plaintiff seeks “[i]njunctive relief to stop inhibiting access to ‘competent attorney representation'” and to allow him access to the courts and counsel. He also seeks punitive damages, filing costs, and fees. Id.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A pro se Complaint is reviewed pursuant to the procedural provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996), and in light of the following precedents: Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992), Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989), Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972), and Todd v. Baskerville, 712 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1983). Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys, and a court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 214 (4th Cir. 2016). However, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that this Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for “all civil actions”).
III. DISCUSSION
This action should be summarily dismissed for the reasons discussed below.
A. Failure to State a Claim
Although Plaintiff lists the names of Defendants in the caption of his Complaint, he fails to provide any specific facts to support a claim that these Defendants violated his federal constitutional or statutory rights. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (requiring, in order to avoid dismissal, “‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests'” (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2))). Although the “liberal pleading requirements” of Rule 8(a) only require a “short and plain” statement of the claim, a plaintiff must “offer more detail ... than the bald statement that he has a valid claim of some type against the defendant.” Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 405 (4th Cir. 2001) (internal citations omitted); see also White v. White, 886 F.2d 721, 723 (4th Cir. 1989) (district court did not abuse discretion by dismissing plaintiff's complaint which “failed to contain any factual allegations tending to support his bare assertion”).
Additionally, to the extent that Plaintiff may be attempting to bring a claim against Defendant Sheriff Wright based on a theory of supervisory liability, such a claim is subject to summary dismissal. To state a § 1983 claim for supervisory liability, a plaintiff must allege:
(1) that the supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge that [his or her] subordinate was engaged in conduct that posed “a pervasive and unreasonable risk” of constitutional injury to citizens like the plaintiff; (2) that the supervisor's response to that knowledge was so inadequate as to show “deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of the alleged offensive practices”; and (3) that there was an “affirmative causal link” between the supervisor's inaction and the particular constitutional injury suffered by the plaintiff.Wilkins v. Montgomery, 751 F.3d 214, 226 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994)). Here, Plaintiff has not alleged any facts to establish supervisory liability as to Defendant Wright.
Also, Defendant SpCDC appears to be a building or group of buildings and is subject to summary dismissal because courts have routinely held that an inanimate object such as a building, facility, or grounds does not act under color of state law, and it is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983. See Allison v. California Adult Auth., 419 F.2d 822, 823 (9th Cir. 1969) (California Adult Authority and San Quentin Prison not “person[s]” subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Nelson v. Lexington Cnty. Det. Ctr., No. 8:10-2988-JMC, 2011 WL 2066551, at *1 (D.S.C. May 26, 2011) (Finding that a detention center, as a building and not a person, was not amenable to suit under § 1983); Brooks v. Pembroke City Jail, 722 F.Supp. 1294, 1301 (E.D. N.C. 1989) (“Claims under § 1983 are directed at ‘persons' and the jail is not a person amenable to suit.”).
To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
Defendant Spartanburg County is also entitled to dismissal as a party defendant because it is not responsible for, and has no control over, the operation of the SpCDC. Rather, it is the Sheriff of Spartanburg County who operates and runs the Detention Center. See S.C. Code Ann. § 24-510 (“The sheriff shall have custody of the jail in his county...”); see also Cobb v. South Carolina, No. 13-2370, 2014 WL 4220423, at * 2, 7 (D.S.C. Aug. 25, 2014) (finding that because Berkeley County had no control over the operations or policy of the Berkeley County Detention Center, it cannot be held liable for events that take place there). Sheriffs and sheriffs' deputies are not county employees. Cone v. Nettles, 417 S.E.2d 523, 524 (S.C. 1992).
Even if Plaintiff could establish that Spartanburg County is responsible for the operation of the SpCDC, municipalities and other local governmental units cannot be sued on a respondeat superior theory for the alleged unconstitutional acts of their employees. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978). Nor has Plaintiff established municipal liability (which requires that a plaintiff plausibly allege that the county's policies cause the alleged constitutional violation). McMillian v. Monroe Cnty., 520 U.S. 781, 784 (1997). A municipality is responsible only when the execution of its policy or custom, made by its lawmakers or individuals whose acts “may fairly be said to represent official policy[,]” inflicts injury. Id. (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694); Spell v. McDaniel 824 F.2d 1380, 1385 (4th Cir. 1987). When the alleged constitutional deprivation is not an act of a municipality, relief under § 1983 must be sought against the officer in his individual capacity. Hughes v. Blankenship, 672 F.2d 405, 405-06 (4th Cir. 1982). Here, Plaintiff's claims against Spartanburg County are subject to summary dismissal because he has not identified any governmental policy or custom to demonstrate municipal liability.
B. Fourteenth Amendment Conditions of Confinement Claims
As noted above, Plaintiff appears to be attempting to allege that his constitutional rights have been violated based on his conditions of confinement at the SpCDC. The Fourteenth Amendment proscribes incarcerating a pretrial detainee in conditions that “amount to punishment, or otherwise violate the Constitution.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979). Conditions constitute punishment when there is “an ‘expressed intent' to punish” or “a lack of a reasonable relationship ‘to a legitimate nonpunitive governmental objective, from which a punitive intent may be inferred.'” Hill v. Nicodemus, 979 F.2d 987, 991 (4th Cir. 1992) (quoting Martin v. Gentile, 849 F.2d 863, 870 (4th Cir. 1988)).
Although these claims are analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment, case law interpreting the standard of “deliberate indifference” under the Eighth Amendment is instructive. Mays v. Sprinkle, 992 F.3d 295, 300 (4th Cir. 2021) (“[E]ven though [the plaintiff's] claim arises under the Fourteenth Amendment, we have traditionally looked to Eighth Amendment precedents in considering a Fourteenth Amendment claim of deliberate indifference....”). “To demonstrate that conditions of confinement constitute cruel and unusual punishment, [an inmate] must (1) establish that prison officials acted with ‘deliberate indifference' and (2) prove extreme deprivations of basic human needs or ‘serious or significant' pain or injury.” Smith v. Ozmint, 578 F.3d 246, 255 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Williams v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756, 761 (4th Cir. 1996)). To show that the conditions deprived him of a basic human need, a plaintiff must allege officials failed to provide him with humane conditions of confinement, such as “adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and [taking] reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994).
Plaintiff appears to be attempting to allege that his constitutional rights have been violated because of overcrowding. He asserts there are four prisoners assigned to one cell measuring approximately 83 square feet. However, the Fourth Circuit has noted that confinement of three prisoners in a cell measuring approximately 63 square feet, while unpleasant, did not reach a constitutional magnitude of cruel and unusual punishment. Crowe v. Leeke, 540 F.2d 740, 742 (4th Cir. 1976). Here, Plaintiff fails to state a claim a conditions of confinement claim. He has not alleged any facts to indicate that Defendants acted with deliberate indifference. Nor has he alleged any facts to indicate that he suffered an extreme deprivation of a basic human need or suffered serious or significant pain or injury.
C. Medical Claim
Plaintiff alleges that he contracted COVID-19 twice. To the extent Plaintiff may be attempting to assert a claim under § 1983 for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, he must allege that he had a serious medical need, and that officials knowingly disregarded that need and the substantial risk it posed. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. at 835; Heyer v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 849 F.3d 202, 209-11 (4th Cir. 2017). An official acts with deliberate indifference if he had actual knowledge of the detainee's serious medical needs and the related risks, but nevertheless disregarded them. See Scinto v. Stansberry, 841 F.3d 219, 236 (4th Cir. 2016). Here, Plaintiff has not alleged that any of the named Defendants had knowledge of any serious medical need and nevertheless disregarded such.
Because Plaintiff was a pre-trial detainee at all relevant times, the Fourteenth Amendment applies to his claim for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. The analysis, however, remains the same. See City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239 (1983); but see Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 397-398, 400-401 (2015) (holding that the test for excessive force claims brought by pretrial detainees under the Fourteenth Amendment differs from the test for excessive force claims brought by convicted prisoners under the Eighth Amendment). Therefore, Eighth Amendment cases are instructive in analyzing pretrial detainees' claims of deliberate indifference.
D. Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel/Claims Concerning Pending Criminal Proceedings
Plaintiff may also be attempting to assert a claim for violations of his Sixth Amendment right of access to counsel. He also appears to complain about his bond. However, the Complaint fails to allege facts showing his Sixth Amendment rights have been violated or who is alleged to have violated those rights. Thus, these claims should be dismissed.
Plaintiff may be attempting to allege claims concerning his pending criminal proceedings. However, federal courts, absent extraordinary circumstances, are not authorized to interfere with a State's pending criminal proceedings. See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971); Cinema Blue of Charlotte, Inc. v. Gilchrist, 887 F.2d 49, 50-53 (4th Cir. 1989). The Younger Court noted that courts of equity should not act unless the moving party has no adequate remedy at law and will suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief. Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-44. Here, Plaintiff may raise claims about any pending criminal charge in the state court and his claims in this Court should be dismissed.
E. First Amendment/Access to Courts
Plaintiff alleges that his First Amendment rights have been violated and makes a number of vague allegations regarding his ability to access the courts. See ECF No. 1 at 8 (alleging injury of access to the courts and, for relief, seeking injunctive relief to stop Defendants from inhibiting his access to the courts). However, any First Amendment claim is subject to summary dismissal because he has not alleged an actual injury.
To state a claim for denial of access to the courts, a plaintiff must satisfy the constitutional standing requirement by alleging an actual injury. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996). To meet this requirement, a plaintiff must show that the actions of the prison officials hindered the prisoner's efforts to pursue a nonfrivolous claim.” Id. at 354; see also Harden v. Bodiford, 442 Fed.Appx. 893, 896 (4th Cir. 2011). Actual injury requires the inmate to “demonstrate that his nonfrivolous, post-conviction or civil rights legal claim has been frustrated or impeded.” Jackson v. Wiley, 352 F.Supp.2d 666, 679-80 (E.D. Va. 2004).
Here, Plaintiff is temporarily held at the county detention center awaiting trial on criminal charges. He has alleged no facts to indicate that Defendants are responsible for appointing counsel for him or the level of competency of appointed counsel. Plaintiff also appears to claim that he is not allowed to study caselaw and may be asking for access to a law library. However, the Fourth Circuit has unambiguously held that local jails, designed for temporary detainment, are generally not required to have a law library. See Magee v. Waters, 810 F.2d 451, 452 (4th Cir. 1987); see also United States v. Chatman, 584 F.2d 1358, 1360 (4th Cir. 1978) (discussing applicability of Bounds to pretrial detainees). Plaintiff has made no allegations of any actual injury and/or prejudice that he is likely to suffer as a result of any alleged claim that he has been denied access to his counsel and the courts.
F. Failure to Bring Case Into Proper Form
Additionally, it should be noted that Plaintiff has failed to bring this case into proper form. In the Court's Order dated July 18, 2023, Plaintiff was given the opportunity to bring his case into proper form by paying the $350.00 filing fee or, if he is indigent, completing and signing an Application to Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees and Affidavit (Form AO-240). See ECF No. 5.
The time to bring this case into proper form has now lapsed, and Plaintiff provide the required item to bring his case into proper form and has failed to contac any way. Thus, in the alternative, it is recommended that this action be dismissed i with Fed.R.Civ.P. 41. See Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626 (1962); Ballar 882 F.2d 93, 95-96 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding that district court's dismissal following a reasonable warning was not an abuse of discretion).
IV. RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that the Court dismiss this a prejudice, without leave to amend, and without issuance and service of process.
See Britt v. DeJoy, 45 F.4th 790 (4th Cir. 2022) (noting that “when a district court dismisses a complaint or all claims without providing leave to amend ... the order dismissing the complaint is final and appealable”).
Plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the following Page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).