Opinion
EP-04-CA-263-DB.
January 4, 2007
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
On this day, the Court considered Defendant Steven Robinson's "Motion For Summary Judgment And Brief In Support," filed on October 11, 2006. On October 24, 2006, Plaintiff David Martinez filed a Response, to which Robinson filed a Reply on October 27, 2006. After due consideration, the Court is of the opinion that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted.
BACKGROUND
This is a civil rights case under Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On October 26, 2000, pursuant to an "Agreed Dispositional Judgment And Order Of Commitment To The Texas Youth Commission Under An Indeterminate Sentence" ("Judgment"), Judge Philip R. Martinez sentenced Plaintiff to "be incarcerated for an indeterminate period of nine (9) months to twenty-four (24) months." On November 12, 2000, Plaintiff was committed to the Texas Youth Commission's ("TYC") custody. Judge Martinez entered the Judgment on November 13, 2000, and further indicated that Plaintiff should receive credit for the time he had served in detention prior to the Judge's entry of the Judgment. Specifically, Judge Martinez noted that Plaintiff had already spent 78 days in detention. Plaintiff was incarcerated by the TYC at its San Saba State School. At all relevant times, Defendant Steven Robinson served as the TYC's Executive Director, and was responsible for Plaintiff's release.
Because the Motion before the Court falls under FED. R. CIV. P. 56, all inferences are viewed in a light most favorable to Plaintiff. See Calbillo v. Cavender Oldsmobile, Inc, 288 F.3d 721, 725 (5th Cir. 2002).
On September 4, 2002, Plaintiff filed an "Application For Issuance Of Writ Of Habeas Corpus," in the 65th Judicial District Court of El Paso County, Texas. Therein, Plaintiff challenged his continued detention by the TYC under the Judgment, asserting that he had been incarcerated for twenty-four months as of August 30, 2002. Plaintiff prayed that the court issue a writ of habeas corpus, and order his release. Under Defendant's supervision, the TYC's legal counsel handled this matter. On September 19, 2002, Judge Alfredo Chavez granted Plaintiff's "Application For Issuance Of Writ Of Habeas Corpus," and ordered Plaintiff immediately released.
On July 6, 2004, Plaintiff initiated this lawsuit against the TYC and Defendant alleging violations of civil rights guaranteed under the federal and Texas constitutions, as well as claims for false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence, and malicious abuse of process. By Order dated September 27, 2005, the Court granted Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, and dismissed all claims against Defendant Robinson in his official capacity, as well as all claims against Defendant TYC. Plaintiff filed his Sixth Amended Complaint ("Complaint"), on January 17, 2006. Further, by Order dated April 24, 2006, the Court denied Defendant's Motion to Dismiss based on qualified immunity, but dismissed Plaintiff's state law claims based on respondeat superior liability. The instant Motion followed.
The Court notes that there have been a flurry of pleadings in this case. For completeness and brevity, the Court only highlights the most recent and relevant pleadings.
On December 21, 2005, the Court dismissed these same claims, asserted under the Texas Tort Claims Act, TEXAS CIV. PRAC. REM. CODE § 101.001, et seq.
STANDARD
Summary judgment should be granted only where "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). The party that moves for summary judgment bears the initial burden of identifying those portions of the pleadings and discovery on file, together with any affidavits, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See, e.g., Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). A material fact is not one that is established conclusively, but rather showing a dispute that requires a fact finder to resolve the truth of the matter. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. "More important . . . summary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is `genuine,' that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. at 248.
"If the moving party fails to meet this burden, the motion must be denied, regardless of the nonmovant's response." Tubacex, Inc. v. M/V Risan, 45 F.3d 951, 954 (5th Cir. 1995). If the movant does meet this burden, however, the nonmovant must go beyond the pleadings and designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See, e.g., Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. "If the nonmovant fails to meet this burden, then summary judgment is appropriate." Tubacex, 45 F.3d at 954. "When the nonmovant fails to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case, the moving party is entitled to summary judgment `since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.'" McKee, 877 F.2d at 414-15 (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 317).
When making a determination under Rule 56, factual questions and inferences are viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmovant. See Calbillo, 288 F.3d at 725. The party opposing a motion supported by evidence cannot discharge his burden by alleging mere legal conclusions. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49; see also Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (stating the nonmovant may not successfully oppose summary judgment by merely citing the pleadings). Instead, the party must present affirmative evidence in order to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49. The Court considers all the evidence in the record, but makes no determination as to credibility of the evidence. See id. at 248.
DISCUSSION
Through the instant Motion, Defendant claims he cannot be held liable in his individual capacity by virtue of the doctrine of qualified immunity. Defendant alleges that Plaintiff cannot negate all elements of qualified immunity and therefore Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Defendant's claims are based on two grounds: 1) that Defendant did not have personal knowledge nor did his own conduct lead to Plaintiff's confinement; and 2) the actions of Defendant's staff were objectively reasonable. In his Response, Plaintiff retorts that Defendant was personally involved in the decision to continue Plaintiff's confinement, and that Defendant has not met his burden to show facts that Defendant's belief was not objectively reasonable. Through his Reply, Defendant counters that Plaintiff's allegations are merely conclusory, speculative, and unsubstantiated, and therefore, there is no competent summary judgment evidence to defeat the instant Motion. The Court agrees with Defendant.
Plaintiff remains undeterred by this Court's prior rulings. This is Plaintiff's third attempt to assert respondeat superior liability. The Court has grown tired of dealing with Plaintiff's inability to follow directions and will not rehash the analysis which dismissed this specific claim by Orders dated December 21, 2005 and April 24, 2006.
Plaintiff advances a single theory to establish Defendant's personal liability under § 1983. Defendant bears the initial burden to show the absence of evidence to support Plaintiff's claim. See, e.g., Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The Court is satisfied that Defendant has met his initial burden, and thus, the burden of production shifts to Plaintiff. Id. at 324. Therefore, to survive summary judgment, Plaintiff must put forth competent summary judgment evidence which demonstrates that a genuine issue of material fact exists. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49. Thus, it becomes the Plaintiff's burden to produce a genuine issue of material fact as to each element of his case. See, e.g., McKee, 877 F.2d at 414-15. The Court addresses each element in turn.
A. Qualified Immunity
The doctrine of qualified immunity shields government officials from civil liability "to the extent that their conduct is objectively reasonable in light of clearly established law." Kinney v. Weaver, 367 F.3d 337, 346 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). The burden of negating the defense of qualified immunity lies with the plaintiff. Foster v. City of Lake Jackson, 28 F.3d 425, 428 (5th Cir. 1994). When a motion for summary judgment is before the court on qualified immunity, the district court must make two determinations: 1) whether the conduct at issue, as a matter of law, is unreasonable in light of clearly established law; and 2) whether there exists a genuine issue of material fact that the defendant actually engaged in such conduct. Kinney, 367 F.3d at 346; see also Conroe Creosothing Co. v. Montgomery County, 249 F.3d 337, 350 (5th Cir. 2001) (construing the two-step test into a three-part inquiry: 1) is there an allegation of a violation of a constitutional right; 2) was the official's conduct objectively reasonable; and 3) is there a genuine issue of material fact as to whether defendant engaged in the conduct that violated plaintiff's clearly established right). The first-prong is a question of law and the second is fact driven. Kinney, 367 F.3d at 347. Thus, Plaintiff must show that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to each prong under the doctrine of qualified immunity to survive summary judgment.
The initial question of law requires the plaintiff to show that "[t]he contours of the right [are] sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, (1987) ("[I]n the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent."). A necessary concomitant to this initial inquiry is whether the plaintiff asserted a violation of a constitutional right at all. Conroe Creosothing, 249 F.3d at 350. Then, the court must determine whether the challenged conduct, viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, constitutes a violation of federal law. Id. (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (1991)). The Fifth Circuit further refined this inquiry to determine whether the official's conduct would have been objectively reasonable at the time of the incident. Id. at 340. Thus, the analysis for the first prong under qualified immunity is a two-part analysis. See, e.g., id. (interpreting the qualified immunity doctrine as a three prong test).
Although not in dispute, the Court briefly discusses Plaintiff's allegation of his clearly established right. In 1980, the Fifth Circuit held that absent a facially valid court order or warrant, a person's right to be free beyond the expiration of a sentence constitutes a deprivation of due process. Douthit v. Jones, 619 F.2d 527, 532 (5th Cir. 1980). Plaintiff was released on September 19, 2002, beyond the Judgment's explicit, final term of August 27, 2002. Thus, because Douthit was decided prior to the incident at hand, it illustrates that Plaintiff's right was clearly established at the time of his confinement. See, e.g., Kinney, 367 F.3d at 350-55 (holding that a clearly established law is one where a prior decision provided reasonable warning that the conduct violated federal law). The Court is of the opinion that Plaintiff has asserted a constitutional violation.
As the analysis shows Plaintiff has asserted a constitutional violation, the Court determines whether the Defendant's conduct was objectively reasonable. Defendant argues that the actions taken on his behalf, by the staff, were objectively reasonable in light of applicable law, TYC policy and rules, and the facts of the instant case. The burden remains on Plaintiff to demonstrate by competent summary judgment evidence that Defendant's conduct was not objectively reasonable. See, e.g., Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Foster, 28 F.3d at 428. Plaintiff cites only to Defendant's deposition in support of this allegation. This evidence tends to show that Defendant never viewed the documents relating to Plaintiff's confinement until the date of the deposition. Although Defendant opines that the TYC would not be required to adhere to the Judgment terms, that opinion was elicited for this trial, and does not relate to conduct at the time of Plaintiff's incarceration. The evidence makes no attempt to specify the conduct or action taken by Defendant. Then, it is axiomatic that the evidence fails to specify the justification that demonstrates Defendant's conduct was not objectively reasonable. Throughout the Response, Plaintiff repeatedly concludes Defendant was solely responsible for Plaintiff's injuries. Repetition alone is insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49 (requiring affirmative evidence). The Court is of the opinion that Plaintiff has not produced competent summary judgment evidence to show that Defendant's conduct was objectively unreasonable.
Again, Plaintiff attempts to assert liability based on respondeat superior theory. The Court will not entertain this issue for a third time.
Assuming arguendo that Plaintiff satisfied his burden on the first prong of the doctrine of qualified immunity, the court analyzes the evidence as to the second prong. Plaintiff's burden is to present specific facts that show Defendant's own conduct led to Plaintiff's continued incarceration. See, e.g., id. Plaintiff proffers two pieces of evidence, a letter and Defendant's deposition. Neither raises a genuine issue of material fact demonstrating that Defendant's personal conduct violated Plaintiff's constitutional right.
The letter at issue, dated April 25, 2002, was sent to Ruben Martinez, Plaintiff's father, and issued by Steven Robinson. Defendant addressed three complaints made by Ruben Martinez. Therein, Defendant indicates that Brian Reeves had previously explained to Ruben Martinez that Plaintiff was committed to the TYC until age 21 or upon successful completion of the criteria for release. Then Defendant explains that the TYC could not assist Ruben Martinez in appealing the Plaintiff's sentence in the judicial system. Third, the letter states that one avenue available to Ruben Martinez was an appeal to the TYC. However, this letter tends to show that the decision to incarcerate Plaintiff beyond the terms set forth in the Judgment was previously made by Brian Reeves. Additionally, Defendant proffers a "Complaint Resolution Form" that was sent by Brian Reeves to Ruben Martinez on January 17, 2002. While this letter shows Defendant's personal knowledge regarding the appeal of the matter, it fails to show that the Defendant made the actual decision to extend Plaintiff's incarceration beyond the term set forth in the Judgment. Further, Defendant's evidence tends to show that another TYC employee, Mario Mokarzel, the complaint coordinator in the Office of General Counsel to TYC, drafted the letter on behalf of Defendant.
The two remaining complaints relate to college credits, transfer to a facility closer to Houston, Plaintiff's headaches, and a "staffing" decision, all unrelated to the instant Motion.
Brian Reeves was a caseworker at the San Saba State School, who received the initial complaint by Plaintiff. Defendant's uncontroverted evidence tends to show that Reeves contacted Karen Kenney to report the complaint and received legal guidance that led to Plaintiff's continued incarceration. Neither Reeves nor Kenney contacted any another individual regarding this decision.
Defendant's uncontroverted evidence tends to show that Mokarzel independently researched the complaint, drafted the letter and received approval from his supervisor. The letter was forwarded to Defendant's secretary who signed it and was then mailed to Ruben Martinez.
Plaintiff's remaining evidence is Defendant's deposition on July 24, 2006. The excerpts provided tend to show that Defendant had no knowledge of Plaintiff's confinement until the date of the deposition. Defendant was responsible for approximately twenty three (23) facilities, and nearly 9,000 youths, throughout the state of Texas and delegated several of his duties to the assistant deputy directors. Defendant's personal knowledge relating to the instant facts was attained in preparation of the instant case. Additionally, Defendant's opinion was made in terms of TYC general policy rather than specific application to the instant facts. None of the excerpts of Defendant's deposition show that Defendant had personal knowledge of Plaintiff at the time of the confinement. Further, the record lacks evidence that Defendant took affirmative acts to confine Plaintiff. Thus, the Court is of the opinion that Plaintiff has failed to present specific facts that support an essential element of his claim. Therefore, as Plaintiff has failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to one element of his claim, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. See McKee, 877 F.2d at 414-15 (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 317).
The facilities included institutions and half-way houses. The number of children included those in the facilities, half-way houses, and on parole.
Plaintiff's counsel asked Defendant if he had seen the documents relating to Plaintiff's incarceration before the instant case was filed. Defendant answered that he had not seen those documents, and his interpretations of the documents were formed after Plaintiff's incarceration.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, the Court finds there is no genuine issue of material fact as to Plaintiff's § 1983 claims against Defendant. Plaintiff's fails to produce competent summary judgment evidence that Defendant's conduct caused Plaintiff's injury. Plaintiff's Response consists of purely conclusory allegations and speculations, and does not produce specific facts which could give rise to a genuine issue of material fact. Therefore, the Court finds that Defendant Steven Robinson, in his individual capacity, is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on all of Plaintiff's claims.
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant Steven Robinson's "Motion For Summary Judgment And Brief In Support" is GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all other pending motions, if any, are DENIED AS MOOT.