Summary
granting discovery request for officers' information except for home addresses
Summary of this case from Brown v. City of PhiladelphiaOpinion
99 Civ. 11911 (DAB)(JCF).
March 18, 2002
Jonathan S. Chasan, Esq., Mary Lynne Werlwas, Esq., The Legal Aid Society, Brooklyn, New York.
Gail Savetamal, Esq., Assistant Corporation Counsel, City of New York Law Department, New York, New York.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
The plaintiffs in this civil rights action, David Martinez and Rudy Kaval, allege that while they were in the custody of the New York City Department of Correction (the "DOC"), they were beaten by DOC staff members in separate incidents. The plaintiffs seek damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Mark Robinson, William Maisonette, Mingo Lee, Robert Mullaney, Michael Karban, Frank Forti, Ruben Robles, Gary Davis, and John Does One and Two, who are DOC employees who allegedly administered the beatings or who were present and failed to prevent the assaults. The plaintiffs have also sued Bernard Kerik, who was then Commissioner of DOC, William Fraser, who was Chief of Security and later became Chief of Department, and Ronald Galletta, who preceded Mr. Fraser as Chief of Security (collectively, the "supervisory defendants"). It is the plaintiffs' theory that these supervisory defendants were responsible for a policy pursuant to which inmates were handcuffed behind their backs while being transported to and from court and were thus rendered more vulnerable to assaults by correction officers, particularly while in transit or when being held in the Bronx court pens.
The plaintiffs have now submitted a letter motion pursuant to Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure seeking an order compelling the defendants to respond to certain discovery requests.
In response, the defendants have cross-moved for a protective order under Rule 26(c) precluding any discovery relating to supervisory liability. They also seek an order pursuant to Rule 42(b) bifurcating for trial the claims of supervisory liability from those concerning individual liability and staying any discovery on the supervisory claims. Finally, the defendants have objected to the plaintiffs' specific discovery demands and seek a confidentiality order. I will address each of these issues in turn.
Discussion
A. Protective Order
The broadest relief that the defendants request is a protective order barring all discovery on supervisory liability.
They argue that such an order is warranted because the plaintiffs' theory is conclusory and speculative in that they have offered no proof of any pattern of abuse of rear-cuffed inmates nor of the supervisory defendants' knowledge of such a pattern. Furthermore, the defendants contend that the discovery requested is overbroad and not reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence.
Neither argument justifies the blanket protective order that the defendants seek. First, the plaintiffs are not required to prove a prima facie case in order to be entitled to discovery. The Supreme Court recently held that a complaint generally need only contain "a short and plain statement of the claim" as required by Rule 8(a)(2). Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., U.S., 122 S. Ct. 992, 995 (2002) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)). The Court went on to note that "[t]his simplified notice pleading standard relies on liberal discovery rules and summary judgment motions to define disputed facts and issues and to dispose of unmeritorious claims." Id. at 998 (citations omitted). This structure cannot be circumvented by imposing a requirement that, before obtaining discovery, a plaintiff not only plead specific facts but also produce supporting evidence. Nor are objections as to relevance or overbreadth a basis for precluding discovery altogether. As long as the plaintiffs' supervisory liability allegations state a claim — and the defendants have not moved to dismiss them — then the plaintiffs are entitled to seek relevant information by means of properly tailored discovery requests. The plaintiffs' specific requests will be considered below, but the defendants' motion for a blanket protective order is denied.
B. Bifurcation
Under Rule 42(b), a district court, "in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate trials will be conducive to expedition and economy, may order a separate trial of any claim . . . ." Fed.R.Civ.P. 42(b). Factors to be considered in ruling on a motion for separate trials include:
"(1) whether the issues sought to be tried separately are significantly different from one another; (2) whether the severable issues require the testimony of different witnesses and different documentary proof; (3) whether the party opposing the severance will be prejudiced if it is granted; and (4) whether the party requesting the severance will be prejudiced if it is not granted."
Lewis v. Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority, No. 97 Civ. 0607, 2000 WL 423517, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. April 19, 2000) (quoting BD v. DeBuono, 193 F.R.D. 117, 125 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)). However, the presumption is that all claims in a case will be resolved in a single trial, and "'it is only in exceptional instances where there are special and persuasive reasons for departing from this practice that distinct causes of action asserted in the same case may be made the subjects of separate trials.'" Id. (quoting Miller v. American Bonding Co., 257 U.S. 304, 307 (1921)); see also Thrower v. Pozzi, No. 99 Civ. 5871, 2002 WL 91612, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2002); Monaghan v. SZS 33 Associates, L.P., 827 F. Supp. 233, 245 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) ("separate trials remain the exception rather than the rule, regardless of the nature of the action"). Accordingly, the burden is on the party seeking bifurcation to demonstrate that it is warranted. Thrower, 2002 WL 91612, at *6; Lewis, 2000 WL 423517, at *2.
Here, the defendants have not met this burden because their motion is premature. Discovery has barely begun, and, as a consequence, information necessary to evaluate the relevant factors is not yet available. See Krueger v. New York Telephone Co., 163 F.R.D. 446, 448-49 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Rosen v. Reckitt Coleman Inc., No. 91 Civ. 1675, 1994 WL 652534, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 1994); Pavlovich v. City of New York, No. 91 Civ. 5030, 1992 WL 230472, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 1992). For example, little can be gleaned from the pleadings alone about the extent of evidentiary overlap among the claims. Similarly, whether some defendants would be unduly prejudiced by proof presented against others cannot be ascertained until the evidence is identified.
The defendants appear to argue that claims of municipal liability brought pursuant to Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), should always be bifurcated from claims of individual liability. But, as the court observed in Pavlovich, "there are instances in which there is a close nexus between the conduct of an official on a given occasion and a municipal practice or policy." 1992 WL 230472, at *3 (citation omitted). That reasoning is all the more compelling here, where the plaintiffs have asserted supervisory liability rather than Monell claims. Therefore, the defendants' application for bifurcation is denied without prejudice to being renewed when sufficient discovery has been conducted.
C. Stay of Discovery
The same factors that make an order of bifurcation premature also militate against a stay of discovery. See Pavlovich, 1992 WL 230472, at *3. Furthermore, "[t]he possibility that some portion of the case may be bifurcated for trial, or the fact that there may be more than one trial, does not adequately support [the defendants'] request to stay discovery." Krueger, 163 F.R.D. at 449.
As the court observed in Krueger, staying discovery at this point, given the circumstances of the case, would be both inefficient and unfair. Until now, discovery has not been stayed, severed, or in any way limited to specific issues. The parties should have been proceeding in good faith to complete all discovery by the [December 31, 2001] deadline — a date selected [on May 17, 2001] after the parties fully explained their anticipated need for time.
Id. Accordingly, discovery shall proceed on all issues.
D. The Plaintiffs' Specific Discovery Demands
1. Document Request No. 15
This request seeks all documents concerning the promulgation or application of the rear-cuffing policy prepared by or forwarded to a variety of high level police officials. To the extent that it seeks documents that were neither prepared or maintained by or sent to the supervisory defendants or to persons who held their positions, it is overbroad. The defendants shall therefore respond by producing all requested documents insofar as they were created or maintained by or forwarded to the Commissioner of Correction, Chief of Department, or Chief of Security.
2. Document Requests No. 18 19
These two requests seek all use of force reports, unusual incident packages, and Investigation Division files for any incident in which any of the non-supervisory defendants were present from July 1, 1990 to date. Again, the demand is overbroad.
A defendant's presence during an incident is in no way probative of any pattern of assault on inmates. In addition, incidents occurring years before the rear-cuffing policy went into effect have only a tenuous connection to this case. Accordingly, the defendants shall produce the requested documents for the period from January 1, 1995 through the present for any incident in which any of the non-supervisory defendants was identified as using force.
3. Document Request No. 20
The plaintiffs request all documents other than use of force reports from 1995 forward concerning any use of force against an inmate by an officer in the Bronx court pens or the Transportation Division insofar as such documents were prepared by or came into the custody of a variety of DOC officials. This request is overbroad and unduly burdensome. To establish supervisory liability in this case, the plaintiffs must show that the named defendants were aware of a pattern of excessive force or assault on inmates, that inmates were more vulnerable to such abuse as a result of being rear-cuffed, and that the defendants were recklessly indifferent to the risks posed by the rear-cuffing policy. The awareness of other DOC officials about patterns of abuse is not relevant. Moreover, while an individual defendant might infer a pattern from multiple incident reports that he receives, the probative value of those individual reports is outweighed by the burden of producing them. By contrast, summary reports of use of force, such as monthly statistical run-downs, would be highly probative.
In light of these considerations, the defendants shall produce the documents sought in Request No. 20 to the extent that they are summaries rather than individual incident reports and only insofar as they were produced or maintained by or sent to the named supervisory defendants.
4. Document Request No. 22
This request asks for all documents created or maintained by the DOC Investigation Division concerning use of force incidents in the Transportation Division from January 1, 1995 through August 5, 1998. Again, production is more appropriately limited to summary documents, not individual case files.
5. Document Request No. 23
Request No. 23 seeks all documents from the Investigation Division concerning use of force in the court pens of each of the boroughs. Production shall again be limited to summaries. The defendants argue that information concerning boroughs other than the Bronx is irrelevant. However, proof of a pattern of abuse anywhere within the DOC could well lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, and a comparison of use of force in the Bronx pens with that in other boroughs could be quite significant.
6. Document Request No. 24
The disciplinary records of the line officer defendants are highly relevant and shall be produced.
7. Document Request No. 25
This request asks for Directive 5003 reports — listings of officers involved in three or more use of force incidents — for the Bronx House of Detention and the Transportation Division. This is an appropriate request to the extent that it is limited to the Bronx court pens rather than the broader category of the Bronx House of Detention. The defendants' additional argument that the privacy interests of non-defendant officers would be infringed upon can be addressed with an appropriate protective order.
8. Document Request No. 26
Request No. 26 seeks summaries, tabulations, or compilations of use of force on a department-wide basis. This is an appropriate request. Patterns of abuse outside the Bronx court pens could well have alerted the defendants to the risks of a rear-cuffing policy.
9. Document Request No. 27
This request, which seeks all teletype communications between the Bronx House of Detention and the Transportation Division is overbroad and unduly burdensome both because it is not limited to use of force incidents and because it asks for information relating to individual events. The defendants need not respond further.
10. Document Requests No. 28 29
These two requests seek all documents concerning discipline imposed on DOC staff in the Bronx court pens and the Transportation Division. To the extent that these demands go beyond discipline for inappropriate use of force, they are overbroad. Otherwise, the defendants shall produce the requested documents.
11. Document Requests No. 30 31
These requests ask for communications between DOC and the New York State Commission of Correction, the New York City Board of Correction, the Health and Hospitals Corporation, the Department of Health, or Correctional Health Services concerning cuffing devices.
To the extent that such communications concern rear-cuffing, they shall be produced; otherwise, the request is overbroad.
12. Document Requests No. 32-36
Each of these requests demands production of documents concerning claims of excessive force: notices of claim, court complaints, or records of disposition in relation to incidents in the court pens or the Transportation Division or in cases where the inmate was injured while restrained in handcuffs. These requests are overbroad and not reasonably likely to elicit relevant information. Therefore, the defendants need not respond.
13. Interrogatories 1-4 and Document Requests 6-14, 17, 21, 38
The defendants previously indicated that notwithstanding their objections, they were seeking information responsive to these discovery demands. They shall produce all such information by March 28, 2002. 14. Interrogatories 5 6
These interrogatories seek identifying information with respect to the line officers allegedly involved in the two incidents at issue. Except for the home addresses of the officers, the defendants shall provide the requested information.
Furthermore, they shall also disclose the home addresses for any officer who does not agree by March 28, 2002, to permit defendants' counsel to accept service on his behalf. 15. Document Request No. 37
Request No. 37 seeks the personnel files of the line officer defendants. Apart from personal identification information such as home address, social security number, and names of family members, which may be redacted, the files are relevant and shall be produced. There is no basis for an in camera review of the files.
E. Confidentiality Order
Finally, the defendants request entry of a confidentiality order. Such an order is warranted to preserve as confidential discoverable information that is nevertheless private in nature or for other reasons should not be made publicly available. The order proposed by the defendants, however, is overly restrictive. It does not define what types of information may be designated confidential, nor does it provide a mechanism for court review of the defendants' designations. Therefore, counsel shall confer in an effort to agree on a confidentiality order, failing which they shall submit their competing drafts by March 28, 2002. Until an order is in place, all documents produced by the defendants shall be maintained on an attorneys'-eyes-only basis.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the defendants' applications to bar all discovery on supervisory liability or to bifurcate these proceedings and stay discovery on supervisory liability are denied.
Except as otherwise directed, the defendants shall produce all documents responsive to the plaintiffs' requests as limited by this order no later than April 15, 2002. By March 28, 2002 counsel shall submit draft confidentiality orders unless they have agreed to a joint proposal by that date.
SO ORDERED.