A court must measure the "good faith" requirement against a standard of objective legal reasonableness, without regard to the particular governmental employee’s subjective state of mind. Id.; see also Martinez v. Harris Cnty., 526 S.W.3d 557, 563 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, no pet.) (governmental employee’s subjective state of mind or motive is irrelevant).
A court must measure the "good faith" requirement against a standard of objective legal reasonableness, without regard to the particular governmental employee's subjective state of mind. Id.; see also Martinez v. Harris Cty., 526 S.W.3d 557, 563 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, no pet.) (governmental employee's subjective state of mind or motive is irrelevant).
The test for good faith is whether a reasonably prudent government employee operating in like circumstances could have believed that the need for the officer's actions outweighed a clear risk of harm to the public from those actions. Bonilla, 481 S.W.3d at 643; Martinez v. Harris Cnty., 526 S.W.3d 557, 562 (Tex. App.- Houston [1st Dist] 2017, no pet).
The Texas common law doctrine of official immunity protects government employees from civil liability for conduct that otherwise would be actionable. Martinez v. Harris Cty., 526 S.W.3d 557, 562 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, no pet.); Ramos v. Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 35 S.W.3d 723, 726 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. denied). It is an affirmative defense that applies when government employees discharge discretionary duties in good faith and act within the course and scope of their authority.
The TTCA's personal liability requirement narrows the scope of the waiver by ensuring that when a governmental unit employee is immune from suit the governmental unit likewise remains immune from suit. See City of San Antonio v. Riojas, 640 S.W.3d 534, 537 (Tex. 2022) ("If [an] employee is protected from liability by official immunity, the employee is not personally liable to the claimant and the government retains its sovereign immunity under [Section 101.021(1)]."); Martinez v. Harris Cnty., 526 S.W.3d 557, 562 (Tex. App.- Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, no pet.).
; Martinez v. Harris County , 526 S.W.3d 557, 562 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, no pet.).
We construe the pleadings liberally in favor of the plaintiff, look to the pleader's intent, and accept as true the factual allegations in the pleadings. See id. ; Martinez v. Harris County , 526 S.W.3d 557, 562 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, no pet.) ; Quested , 440 S.W.3d at 279. When, as here, the governmental unit challenges the existence of jurisdictional facts, we consider relevant evidence submitted by the parties.
We construe the pleadings liberally in favor of the plaintiff, look to the pleader's intent, and accept as true the factual allegations in the pleadings. See id; Martinez v. Harris County, 526 S.W.3d 557, 562 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist] 2017, no pet.); Quested, 440 S.W.3d at 279.
Therefore, an assessment of road, weather, and traffic conditions may be sufficient when the record does not indicate that other circumstances affected the risks that were not assessed. See id. ; Martinez v. Harris Cty. , 526 S.W.3d 557, 563 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, no pet.) ; Harris Cty. v. Smyly , 130 S.W.3d 330, 335 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.). Hewitt's affidavit provided, in relevant part, as follows:
See id.; Martinez v. Harris County, 526 S.W.3d 557, 562 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, no pet.); Quested, 440 S.W.3d at 279.