{9} "We generally review the district court's grant of relief under Rule 1-060(B) for an abuse of discretion except in those instances where the issue is one of pure law[.]" Martinez v. Friede, 2004-NMSC-006, ¶ 19, 135 N.M. 171, 86 P.3d 596 (citation omitted), superseded on other grounds by Rule 1-059 NMRA as stated in State v. Moreland, 2008-NMSC-031, ¶ 11, 144 N.M. 192, 185 P.3d 363; see also Meiboom v. Watson, 2000-NMSC-004, ¶ 29, 128 N.M. 536, 994 P.2d 1154 (addressing Rule 1-060(B)(6)); Edens v. Edens, 2005-NMCA-033, ¶ 13-14, 137 N.M. 207, 109 P.3d 295 (addressing Rule 1-060(B)(1), (3), (5), and (6)). The scope of Rule 1-060(B)(1) and application of the rule to the facts involve questions of law which we review de novo.

Analogizing to Rule 5-614's civil counterpart, Rule 1-059, as interpreted by Martinez v. Friede, the State argued before the Court of Appeals that the trial court lost jurisdiction after thirty days and that the motion was automatically denied if not ruled upon within that time. See Rule 1-059(D) NMRA (prior to 2006 amendment); Martinez v. Friede, 2004-NMSC-006, ¶¶ 11-13, 135 N.M. 171, 86 P.3d 596; Moreland, 2007-NMCA-047, ¶ 11, 141 N.M. 549, 157 P.3d 728. However, since the time that briefing was completed in the Court of Appeals, the automatic denial provision of Rule 1-059(D) has been eliminated.

Those cases are not helpful to our analysis here. {21} The State relies on Martinez v. Friede, 2004-NMSC-006, ¶ 13, 135 N.M. 171, 86 P.3d 596, to argue that the policy of encouraging the expeditious handling of post-trial motions would be thwarted by a decision holding that the district court retains jurisdiction to decide a motion for new trial under the circumstances of this case. We disagree for several reasons.

"Rule 1-059 sets forth the procedures governing post-trial motions for new trial in civil cases." Martinez v. Friede, 2004-NMSC-006, ¶ 11, 135 N.M. 171, 86 P.3d 596. In the early 2006 version of the rule, only Rule 1-059(D) provided for automatic denial: "If a motion for new trial is not granted within thirty (30) days from the date it is filed, the motion is automatically denied."

Therefore, it is clear that in reviewing Judge Knowles' conclusions of law, "we exercise our own independent judgment without assigning special weight to [his] decision." Martinez v. Friede, 2004-NMSC-006, ¶ 10, 135 N.M. 171, 86 P.3d 596. {13} It is less clear the standard of review that we should apply to Judge Knowles' findings of fact.

As such, we construe Petitioner's July 2022 motion as an attempt to set aside the June 2021 orders under Rule 1-060(B) NMRA, and we limit our appellate review of the denial of this motion accordingly. Cf. Martinez v. Friede, 2004 NMSC-006, ¶ 17, 135 N.M. 171, 86 P.3d 596 (noting that a district court's power to reopen judgment and grant a new trial under Rule 1-060(B) has "no effect on the parties' ability to calculate the time in which they must file their notice of appeal . . . because a motion under Rule 1-060(B) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation" (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)), superseded by rule on other grounds as stated in State v. Moreland, 2008-NMSC-031, 144 N.M. 192, 185 P.3d 363. We review the district court's ruling for an abuse of discretion.

[RP 562, 568] Our calendar notice therefore construed Plaintiff's motions as motions made pursuant to Rule 1-060(B) NMRA, and we limited our appellate review accordingly. Cf. Martinez v. Friede, 2004 NMSC-006, ¶ 17, 135 N.M. 171, 86 P.3d 596 (noting that a district court's power to reopen judgment and grant a new trial under Rule 1-060(B) has "no effect on the parties' ability to calculate the time in which they must file their notice of appeal . . . because a motion under Rule 1-060(B) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation" (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)), superseded by rule on other grounds as stated in State v. Moreland, 2008-NMSC-031, 144 N.M. 192, 185 P.3d 363.

[RP 30] We therefore construe Respondent's motion to dismiss as a motion made pursuant to Rule 1-060(B) NMRA, and we limit our appellate review of the denial of this motion accordingly. Cf. Martinez v. Friede, 2004-NMSC-006, ¶ 17, 135 N.M. 171, 86 P.3d 596 (noting that a district court's power to reopen judgment and grant a new trial under Rule 1-060(B) has "no effect on the parties' ability to calculate the time in which they must file their notice of appeal . . . because a motion under Rule 1-060(B) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation" (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)), superseded by rule on other grounds as stated in State v. Moreland, 2008-NMSC-031, 144 N.M. 192, 185 P.3d 363. We review the district court's ruling for an abuse of discretion.

Under Rule 1-060, the district court is authorized to change, modify, correct or vacate a judgment on its own motion. See Desjardin v. Albuquerque Nat'l Bank, 1979-NMSC-052, ¶ 11, 93 N.M. 89, 596 P.2d 858; see also Martinez v. Friede, 2004-NMSC-006, ¶ 15, 135 N.M. 171, 86 P.3d 596 (holding that the district court retains a "reservoir of equitable power" after a judgment is entered to assure justice has been done), superseded by rule on other grounds as stated in State v. Moreland, 2008-NMSC-031, ¶ 11, 144 N.M. 192, 185 P.3d 363. While Maes argues that the district court improperly modified the August 8, 2017 judgment under Rule 1-060(B), she does not provide us with the basis for the district court's decision or an argument addressing why she contends the district court's reasons for amending the judgment constitute an abuse of discretion.

See Harrison v. ICX, Ill.-Cal. Exp., Inc., 1982-NMCA-089, ¶¶ 18-19, 98 N.M. 247, 647 P.2d 880 (holding that because the plaintiffs concurred in the instruction and did not object before the jury retired to deliberate, they "participated in the submission of these matters to the jury, and they cannot now seek to have the verdict set aside by way of a motion for a new trial or on appeal"), abrogated on other grounds by Martinez v. Friede, 2004-NMSC-006, 135 N.M. 171, 86 P.3d 596. {23} The dissociation instruction, Instruction 19, was resolved similarly at the conference settling the jury instructions.