The entire record is viewed in the light most favorable to the judgment. Martinez v. Fluor Utah, Inc., 90 N.M. 782, 783, 568 P.2d 618, 619 (Ct.App. 1977). To warrant reversal, this Court must be persuaded it "cannot conscientiously say that the evidence supporting the decision is substantial, when viewed in the light that the whole record furnishes."

In rejecting this contention, the Court of Appeals correctly held that the credibility of the witnesses was for the jury to determine. In support of this contention, see Tapia v. Panhandle Steel Erectors Company, 78 N.M. 86, 428 P.2d 625 (1967); Dungan v. Smith, 76 N.M. 424, 415 P.2d 549 (1966); Martinez v. Fluor Utah, Inc., 90 N.M. 782, 568 P.2d 618 (Ct.App. 1977); Curtiss v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 90 N.M. 105, 560 P.2d 169 (Ct.App. 1976), cert. denied, 90 N.M. 7, 558 P.2d 619 (1976); Westbrook v. Lea General Hospital, 85 N.M. 191, 510 P.2d 515 (Ct.App. 1973), cert. denied, 85 N.M. 228, 511 P.2d 554 (1973); Mascarenas v. Gonzales, 83 N.M. 749, 497 P.2d 751 (Ct.App. 1972). The rationale and decision adopted by the Court of Appeals, with which we disagree, stems from the following quoted portions of its opinion:

5. the rise in the cost of living: Shillinglaw v. Owen Shillinglaw Fuel Company, 70 N.M. 65, 370 P.2d 502 (1962); and 6. the time and effort expended by the attorney in the particular case: Turrieta v. Creamland Quality Chekd Dairies, Inc., 77 N.M. 192, 420 P.2d 776 (1966); Ortega, supra; Waymire, supra; Reed, supra; Lamont, supra; Gearhart, supra; Marez, supra; Martinez v. Fluor Utah, Inc., 90 N.M. 782, 568 P.2d 618 (Ct.App. 1977); Gallegos, supra; Trujillo v. Tanuz, 85 N.M. 35, 508 P.2d 1332 (Ct.App. 1973); Brannon, supra; Adams, supra. However, the Court of Appeals has also held that the time spent and the effort expended by the attorney, while relevant, is not always dispositive of the amount of attorney fees to be awarded.

In other words, even where a health care provider lacks some pertinent information, that provider's opinion supporting causation may be valid, depending on the circumstances surrounding that opinion. See Martinez v. Fluor Utah, Inc., 1977-NMCA-096, ¶ 8, 90 N.M. 782, 568 P.2d 618 (distinguishing physicians' "minor omissions" from the circumstances in Niederstadt, in which the physician supporting causation "had not had available highly pertinent medical information"). {16} After Sanchez was decided, this Court again had occasion to address Niederstadt at some length in Mendez v. Southwest Community Health Services, 1986-NMCA-066, ¶¶ 9-16, 104 N.M. 608, 725 P.2d 584. In Mendez, the treating physician, who testified that the work-related accident caused the injury to the worker's shoulder, did not know about several prior complaints of pain in that shoulder.

Although psychological testimony varied as to the effects on Samantha of removing her from appellees between the age of 6 and 18 months, the discrepancy was not so great for us to find error in the trial court's decision to leave the child in the custody of appellees. It is for the trier of fact, and not the appellate court, to weigh the evidence and determine the credibility of expert witnesses. Martinez v. Fluor Utah, Inc., 90 N.M. 782, 568 P.2d 618 (Ct.App. 1977). We conclude, therefore, that the trial court did not err in terminating appellant's parental rights under Section 32-1-54(B)(4).

The opinion in Niederstadt on this issue has not been followed in any reported case and has been distinguished in the three cases that have cited it. See Fryar v. Johnsen, 93 N.M. 485, 601 P.2d 718 (1979); Sanchez v. Molycorp, Inc., 103 N.M. 148, 703 P.2d 925 (Ct.App. 1985); Martinez v. Fluor Utah, Inc., 90 N.M. 782, 568 P.2d 618 (Ct. App. 1977). We, too, distinguish it here.

Second, the testimony in this case does not support defendants' argument concerning injury in an intervening accident. See Martinez v. Fluor Utah, Inc., 90 N.M. 782, 568 P.2d 618 (Ct.App. 1977). On cross-examination the physician testified that he was unaware of any trauma intervening between the accident and the time of trial.

The view, that total disability may be temporary, has been recognized in various decisions. See Martinez v. Fluor Utah, Inc., 90 N.M. 782, 568 P.2d 618 (Ct.App. 1977); Martinez v. Earth Resources Co., 90 N.M. 590, 566 P.2d 838 (Ct.App. 1977); Goolsby v. Pucci Distributing Company, 80 N.M. 59, 451 P.2d 308 (Ct.App. 1969); compare Mares v. City of Clovis, 79 N.M. 759, 449 P.2d 667 (Ct.App. 1968). Plaintiff asserts that the judgment violates § 59-10-16(A), N.M.S.A. 1953 (2d Repl. Vol. 9, pt. 1) and that the judgment should have provided for compensation for 600 weeks from the date of the accident.

The trial court was the trier of facts. As this Court said in Martinez v. Fluor Utah, Inc., 90 N.M. 782, 568 P.2d 618 (Ct.App. 1977), quoting from Montano v. Saavedra, 70 N.M. 332, 373 P.2d 824 (1962): "It is for the trier of the facts to weigh the testimony, determine the credibility of the witnesses, and, to reconcile inconsistent statements and say where the truth lies. . . .