Opinion
00-CV-10270-MEL.
September 28, 2000
MEMORANDUM AND DECISION
Marcos A. Martinez ("Martinez") sues Michael Maloney and Lawrence DuBois, present and former Commissioner of Correction for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, the former superintendent for MCI-Cedar Junction, Ronald T. Duval, three correctional officers, Roland Goncalves, Keith Furrier, and Correctional Officer Alves, Correctional Medical Services, Inc. and a nurse employed by Correctional, Jean Kinsella ("defendant's") under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming that he has been maliciously and sadistically beaten, threatened, intimidated, put in fear of harm, and denied proper medical treatment. The defendants move to dismiss the action on the grounds that the action is time-barred. The motion is granted.
Correctional Medical Services, Inc. provides MCI-Cedar Junction with medical personal and services as a private contractor.
Martinez alleges that on September 24, 1996, at MCI-Cedar Junction, he was assaulted in a cell in the Health Services Unit by defendant Roland Goncalves, a correctional officer; that on October 22, 1996, he was again attacked by Goncalves and two other correctional officers, Furrier and Alves; and that following that attack he was denied proper medical treatment by defendant Jean Kinsella, a nurse practitioner or physician's assistant employed at MCI-Cedar Junction.
Martinez filed an almost identical action, based on the same two incidents, in this Court on January 21, 1997, 97-CV-10144-MEL. After some discovery was completed, the action was voluntarily dismissed without prejudice on September 10, 1999.
The defendants move to dismiss on the grounds that the present action is time-barred under the statute of limitations, which, in the case of a section 1983 claim in Massachusetts, is three years. As the alleged later incident occurred on October 22, 1996, the statute of limitations expired on October 22, 1999. This case was filed on February 15, 2000.
The plaintiff does not dispute that the applicable statute of limitations is three years. However, citing the holding in Hemric v. Reed and Prince Mfg. Co., 739 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1984), he argues that the statute of limitations was tolled for the twenty month pendency of the previous litigation, and accordingly is not time-barred.
A claim of tolling is governed by state law. Torres v. Superintendent of Police of Puerto Rico, 893 F.2d 404, 407 (1st Cir. 1990) (citing Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478 (1980)).
It is true that there exist limited circumstances under which Massachusetts statutes allow or Massachusetts courts have applied the doctrine of equitable tolling. However, Massachusetts courts have indicated a reluctance to "tamper with limitation periods enacted by the Legislature," Buker v. National Management Co., 16 Mass. App. Ct. 36, 40 (Mass.App.Ct. 1983). Relief has been granted sparingly and has been limited to specific exceptions where the plaintiff has filed a defective pleading, within the statutory period, or where the plaintiff was "affirmatively misled". See Shafnacker v. Raymond James Assocs., Inc., 425 Mass. 724, 727, 683 N.E.2d 662 (Mass. 1997) (quoting Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990)). In the case at hand, the plaintiff did not file a defective pleading nor was he affirmatively misled.
It is arguable that tolling the statute of limitations, in this case, would not violate the rationale that limitations periods are designed "to promote justice by preventing surprises through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared." Buker, 16 Mass. App. Ct. at 41. In the case at hand, Martinez filed suit on the same claim within the statutory period and discovery was begun. As a result, the defendants had notice of the claim within the required statute of limitations.
Nevertheless, the tolling of limitations periods, whether statutory or judicial, is based either on a disability of the plaintiff or misbehavior of the defendant, which prevented the plaintiff from suing within the limitation period. Neither such factor existed in this case, and accordingly, defendants' motion to dismiss must be granted.
For the reasons stated, the defendants' motion to dismiss is granted and the complaint is dismissed.
It is so ordered.