Opinion
No. 77-1113
Decided November 24, 1978. Rehearing denied December 28, 1978.
Premised on his having accumulated 12 traffic violation points in 12 month period, department of revenue suspended driver's license, and, on review, district court affirmed. Licensee appealed.
Affirmed
1. AUTOMOBILES — Driver's License — Suspension Hearing — Department's Records — Defendant's Convictions — Admitted by Defendant — Binding on Him — — Sufficiency of Evidence — May Not Be Challenged. Where, at hearing on driver's license suspension, there was no challenge to the validity of convictions shown on department of revenue's records, and where driver admitted that that record was correct, the driver is bound by that admission, and may not challenge on appeal the sufficiency of the evidence of his convictions upon which the order of suspension was premised.
Appeal from the District Court of the City and County of Denver, Honorable Joseph R. Quinn, Judge.
Frickey Cairns, P.C., Dan N. Hover, for plaintiff-appellant.
J. D. MacFarlane, Attorney General, David W. Robbins, Deputy Attorney General, Edward G. Donovan, Assistant Attorney General, Anthony M. Marquez, Assistant Attorney General, for defendants-appellees.
Plaintiff appeals from a judgment of the district court sustaining an order of the Department of Revenue suspending plaintiff's driver's license for a period of five months. We affirm.
At a hearing conducted by the Department pursuant to § 42-2-123, C.R.S. 1973, it was determined that plaintiff had been convicted of four traffic violations within a twelve month period resulting in an accumulation of twelve points. Plaintiff contended in the district court and contends here that the Department acted improperly in assessing points for two of the four violations. He asserts that there was no court judgment or signed acknowledgement of guilt as prescribed by §§ 42-4-1501(4)(a) and 42-4-1505(2)(a), C.R.S. 1973, for two of the violations, and that the Department's records with respect to these violations merely showed that traffic citations had been issued and that sums of money had been paid for each violation. Relying on Troutman v. Department of Revenue, 38 Colo. App. 417, 571 P.2d 726 (1976), and Gurule v. State Department of Revenue, 38 Colo. App. 295, 558 P.2d 587 (1976), plaintiff contends that the mere payment of a traffic ticket without a court judgment or a signed acknowledgement of guilt is insufficient to establish the conviction for a traffic violation.
[1] In the cases relied on by the plaintiff, the validity of the convictions was challenged at the hearing before the Department. In this case, however, no such challenge was made at the departmental hearing. Instead, when, after reviewing plaintiff's driving record which included the convictions now challenged, the hearing officer asked plaintiff whether that record was correct, plaintiff responded affirmatively. And plaintiff was aware at that time that representation by an attorney was permitted. In fact, plaintiff's attorney, who arrived during the hearing, after plaintiff had admitted the accuracy of his driving record to the hearing officer, made no attempt to challenge the convictions. He only asked whether plaintiff agreed that his driving record was correct, and plaintiff again answered affirmatively.
Thus plaintiff admitted, without contradiction, the convictions he now challenges. We hold that he is bound by those admissions, see Ridley v. Young, 127 Colo. 46, 253 P.2d 433 (1953); see also 9 J. Wigmore, Evidence §§ 2588, 2590 (3d ed. 1940), and therefore, the evidence was sufficient to order the suspension.
Judgment affirmed.
CHIEF JUDGE SILVERSTEIN and JUDGE COYTE concur.