Opinion
No. 2023-02965 Index No. 515652/21
11-27-2024
Casimiro Reyes Martinez, respondent, v. Michael Colonna, et al., appellants.
Fabiani Cohen & Hall, LLP, New York, NY (Kevin B. Pollak of counsel), for appellants. Tarasov & Associates, P.C. (The Altman Law Firm, PLLC, Woodmere, NY [Michael T. Altman], of counsel), for respondent.
Fabiani Cohen & Hall, LLP, New York, NY (Kevin B. Pollak of counsel), for appellants.
Tarasov & Associates, P.C. (The Altman Law Firm, PLLC, Woodmere, NY [Michael T. Altman], of counsel), for respondent.
BETSY BARROS, J.P. WILLIAM G. FORD HELEN VOUTSINAS CARL J. LANDICINO, JJ.
DECISION & ORDER
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Robin S. Garson, J.), dated February 14, 2023. The order granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability and dismissing the defendants' affirmative defense alleging comparative negligence.
ORDERED that the order is modified, on the law, by deleting the provision thereof granting that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the defendants' affirmative defense alleging comparative negligence, and substituting therefor a provision denying that branch of the motion; as so modified, the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
The plaintiff commenced this action against the defendants to recover damages for personal injuries that he allegedly sustained when the vehicle he was operating was struck in the rear by a vehicle operated by the defendant Michael Colonna and owned by the defendant Royal Realty Corp. The plaintiff moved for summary judgment on the issue of liability and dismissing the defendants' affirmative defense alleging comparative negligence. In an order dated February 14, 2023, the Supreme Court granted the motion. The defendants appeal.
"A driver of a vehicle approaching another vehicle from the rear is required to maintain a reasonably safe distance and rate of speed under the prevailing conditions to avoid colliding with the other vehicle" (Whaley v Carvana N.Y. City, 219 A.D.3d 1561, 1562 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1129[a]; O'Rourke v Carucci, 117 A.D.3d 1015, 1015). "As such, a rear-end collision with a stopped or stopping vehicle establishes a prima facie case of negligence on the part of the operator of the rear vehicle, thereby requiring that operator to rebut the inference of negligence by providing a nonnegligent explanation for the collision" (Fleischmann v County of Suffolk, 226 A.D.3d 873, 873 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Bruce v Takahata, 219 A.D.3d 448, 449). "Stops by a lead vehicle which are foreseeable under the prevailing traffic conditions, even if sudden and frequent, must be anticipated by the driver who follows" (Perez v Persad, 183 A.D.3d 771, 772; see Thompson v New York City Tr. Auth., 208 A.D.3d 815, 817). "Moreover, an assertion that the lead vehicle came to a sudden stop, standing alone, is insufficient to rebut the presumption of negligence on the part of the operator of the rear vehicle" (Thompson v New York City Tr. Auth., 208 A.D.3d at 817 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Perez v Persad, 183 A.D.3d at 772). "A plaintiff is no longer required to show freedom from comparative fault to establish her or his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability" (Jimenez-Pantaleon v Aucancela, 221 A.D.3d 676, 677 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Martin v Copado-Esquivel, 226 A.D.3d 668, 670).
The Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was for summary judgment on the issue of liability. The plaintiff established his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by submitting, inter alia, his own affidavit, in which he averred that the defendants' vehicle struck the plaintiff's stopped vehicle in the rear (see Bruce v Takahata, 219 A.D.3d at 449; Etingof v Metropolitan Laundry Mach. Sales, Inc., 134 A.D.3d 667, 667). In opposition, the defendants failed to rebut the inference of negligence by providing a nonnegligent explanation for the collision (see Bruce v Takahata, 219 A.D.3d at 449).
The Supreme Court should have denied that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the defendants' affirmative defense alleging comparative negligence. In support of his motion, the plaintiff submitted his affidavit, in which he averred that his vehicle, after having been stopped at an intersection for approximately 20 to 30 seconds, was struck in the rear by the defendants' vehicle. Thus, the plaintiff established, prima facie, that he was not at fault in the happening of the accident (see Guralenko v New York City Tr. Auth., 220 A.D.3d 847, 848; Quintanilla v Mark, 210 A.D.3d 713, 714). In opposition, however, the defendants raised a triable issue of fact as to whether the plaintiff was comparatively at fault in the happening of the accident because he stopped suddenly for no apparent reason (see Martin v Copado-Esquivel, 226 A.D.3d at 670; Thompson v New York City Tr. Auth., 208 A.D.3d at 818).
The defendants' remaining contention need not be reached in light of our determination.
BARROS, J.P., FORD, VOUTSINAS and LANDICINO, JJ., concur.