Martinez v. Allstate Ins. Co.

18 Citing cases

  1. Boradiansky v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.

    141 N.M. 387 (N.M. 2007)   Cited 26 times
    Noting that New Mexico courts have throughout the years "invalidated exclusions that they determined were in conflict with the underlying purpose of the Uninsured Motorist Act" and stating "we have referred several times to the exclusion of a discrete group as improper ... [w]e have been clearest about limitation on the rights of a class-one insured to recover"

    Reserve Ins. Co. v. Marin, 109 N.M. 533, 787 P.2d 452 (1990) (exclusion from uninsured motorist coverage for uninsured vehicles owned by insured or any family member); Chavez v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 87 N.M. 327, 533 P.2d 100 (1975) (exclusion of uninsured motorist coverage in an automobile policy when insured was occupying an uninsured motor vehicle owned by him); Demir v. Farmers Tex. County Mut. Ins. Co., 2006-NMCA-091, 140 N.M. 162, 140 P.3d 1111 (exclusion of uninsured motorist coverage for accidents not involving physical contact with uninsured vehicle); Martinez v. Allstate Ins. Co., 1997-NMCA-100, 124 N.M. 36, 946 P.2d 240 (household exclusion under liability coverage); Sandoval v. Valdez, 91 N.M. 705, 580 P.2d 131 (Ct.App. 1978) (one year limitation of time provision for claiming of uninsured motorist coverage). Throughout, our courts have invalidated exclusions that they determined were in conflict with the underlying purpose of the Uninsured Motorist Act.

  2. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Szuszalski

    No. 19-191 MV/KK (D.N.M. Jan. 4, 2021)

    Specifically, an insurer's underinsured motorist "liability is calculated by the formula contained in [N.M. Stat. Ann.] Section 66-5-301(B) as explained by [the New Mexico] Supreme Court in Schmick v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 103 N.M. 216, 222, 704 P.2d 1092, 1098 (1985), and reaffirmed by the Court a number of times." Martinez v. Allstate Ins. Co., 946 P.2d 240, 243 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997). In construing the underinsured motorist statute (Section 66-5-301(B)), the Schmick court stated:

  3. Padilla v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.

    133 N.M. 661 (N.M. 2003)   Cited 71 times
    Holding that "[t]he principle of stare decisis dictates adherence to precedent . . . and promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process"

    ovide for the stacking of multiple uninsured motorist policies purchased by the insured, Schmick v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 103 N.M. 216, 219, 704 P.2d 1092, 1095 (1985), and New Mexico courts have invalidated contract provisions in uninsured motorist policies that excluded coverage of punitive damages, Stinbrink v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Ariz., 111 N.M. 179, 180-81, 803 P.2d 664, 665-66 (1990), that provided for the splitting of costs of arbitration, id. at 181-82, 803 P.2d at 666-67, that excluded coverage while occupying a vehicle other than the one insured, Chavez v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 87 N.M. 327, 329-30, 533 P.2d 100, 102-03 (1975), that prevented stacking through ambiguous language, Schmick, 103 N.M. at 220-21, 704 P.2d at 1096-97, or through clear and unambiguous language, Jimenez v. Found. Reserve Ins. Co., 107 N.M. 322, 324-25, 757 P.2d 792, 794-95 (1988), and that excluded household members from coverage, Martinez v. Allstate Ins. Co., 1997 NMCA 100, ¶ 18, 124 N.M. 36, 946 P.2d 240. {10} On its face, the provision at issue in the present case creates an unfair limitation on an insured's access to a de novo appeal and creates an inequity in the certainty of an arbitration award.

  4. Rehders v. Allstate Insurance Co.

    139 N.M. 536 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006)   Cited 21 times
    Finding that "judgment against an insured is appropriate as a matter of law when the insured's expectations do not extend to the facts of the case, or when the insured's expectations conflict with the clear language of the policy itself"

    {33} The doctrine of reasonable expectations may be invoked when the language of an insurance policy or representations of the insurance company lead an insured to reasonably expect coverage. See, e.g., Barth v. Coleman, 118 N.M. 1, 5, 878 P.2d 319, 323 (1994); Martinez v. Allstate Ins. Co., 1997-NMCA-100, ¶ 11, 124 N.M. 36, 946 P.2d 240. The doctrine is also available where policy language is ambiguous, see Rummel, 1997-NMSC-041, ¶¶ 21-22, 123 N.M. 752, 945 P.2d 970, and when the "dynamics of the insurance transaction" make way for its application.

  5. Montano v. Allstate Indem. Co.

    133 N.M. 696 (N.M. Ct. App. 2003)   Cited 5 times

    We construe an insurance policy as a whole." Martinez v. Allstate Ins. Co., 1997-NMCA-100, ¶ 8, 124 N.M. 36, 946 P.2d 240 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). We will not strain to locate ambiguities.

  6. Fickbohm v. St. Paul Ins. Co.

    133 N.M. 414 (N.M. Ct. App. 2003)   Cited 9 times
    Holding that offset for medpay in UM/UIM policy is enforceable where insureds are fully compensated for their damages

    Id.{18} Plaintiffs also rely on Sloan v. Dairyland Insurance Co., 86 N.M. 65, 519 P.2d 301 (1974) and Martinez v. Allstate Insurance Co., 1997-NMCA-100, 124 N.M. 36, 946 P.2d 240. In Sloan, the deceased was killed while riding as a passenger in a car insured by Dairyland with minimum UM/UIM coverage.

  7. Apodaca v. Young Am. Ins. Co.

    702 F. Supp. 3d 1094 (D.N.M. 2023)   Cited 3 times

    Schmick, 1985-NMSC-073, ¶ 27, 103 N.M. at 223, 704 P.2d at 1099. See Martinez v. Allstate Ins. Co., 1997-NMCA-100, ¶ 14, 124 N.M. 36, 39, 946 P.2d 240, 243 ("Schmick ... clearly holds that the insurance policy may not provide either more or less than Section 66-5-301(B) allows." (emphasis in original)).

  8. Carolina Casualty Insurance Company v. Nanodetex Corp.

    Civ. No. 09-1183 JCH/RHS (D.N.J. Jul. 27, 2011)

    A clause in a policy is ambiguous if it "is `reasonably and fairly susceptible of different [interpretations].'" Martinez v. Allstate Ins. Co., 124 N.M. 36, 38 (Ct. App. 1997) (citations omitted). When "determining the existence of an ambiguity, the language at issue should be considered not from the viewpoint of a lawyer, or a person with training in the insurance field, but from the standpoint of a reasonably intelligent layman, viewing the matter fairly and reasonably, in accord with the usual and natural meaning of the words, and in light of existing circumstances, prior to and contemporaneously with the making of the policy."

  9. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Ballard

    No. CIV 01-0171 LCS (D.N.M. Nov. 28, 2001)

    This restriction is analogous to the household exclusion in Estep because it segregates persons and limits coverage according to their familial status. See Martinez v. Allstate Ins. Co., 124 N.M. 36, 40, 946 P.2d 240, 244 (Ct. App. 1997) (invalidating household exclusion that attempted to limit under insured motorist coverage to the liability limit required by law). As such, the family exclusion provision in Carol Ballards policy may be invalid under New Mexico law.

  10. Hooten v. Progressive Casualty Insurance Company

    CIV 00-984 KBM/LCS (D.N.M. Feb. 20, 2001)

    The Samora decision has not been overruled and, in fact, continued to be cited with approval after the effective date of the new regulations. See Casias v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 126 N.M. 772 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 127 N.M. 389 (1995); Martinez v. Allstate Ins. Co., 124 N.M. 36, 39 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 124 N.M. 226 (1997). Finally, the Hootens unsuccessfully attempt to distinguish the Samora decision. Although the Samora case involved a one-car accident, this is a distinction without import.