Contrary to the defendant's contention, the Supreme Court properly denied his midtrial application to preclude evidence of certain special damages, inasmuch as, among other things, that application was untimely ( see Martin v. We're Assoc., 127 A.D.2d 568, 569, 511 N.Y.S.2d 368; cf. Bass v. A & D Serv. Sta., 202 A.D.2d 464, 610 N.Y.S.2d 797). The jury's award did not deviate materially from what would be reasonable compensation ( see CPLR 5501[c] ).
Contrary to the plaintiff's contentions, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of his motion which was to compel disclosure, on the ground, inter alia, that the material sought was irrelevant to the litigation (see, CPLR 3042[d]; 3123; Martin v. We're Assocs., 127 A.D.2d 568, 569). The plaintiff's remaining contentions are without merit.
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs. The record supports the trial court's conclusion that "special circumstances" were presented, including the plaintiff's stipulation that he would serve a responsive supplemental bill of particulars, justifying the defendant's delay in moving for the relief granted (see, Kean v. Community Gen. Hosp., 158 A.D.2d 897; cf., Martin v. We're Assocs., 127 A.D.2d 568). Mangano, P.J., Balletta, O'Brien, Hart and Florio, JJ., concur.
The plaintiff did not move for an order of preclusion based on the alleged inadequacy of the responses until May 1990. Consequently, the plaintiff was not entitled to any relief arising from the allegedly defective bill (see, CPLR 3042 [d]; Martin v. We're Assocs., 127 A.D.2d 568; Murphy v. Capone, 121 A.D.2d 702). Nevertheless, by order dated August 22, 1990, the court directed that further responses be served, and based on that order the defendants voluntarily entered into a consent order dated October 29, 1990, in which they agreed to serve those responses within 30 days.
Contrary to plaintiff's claim, the defendants were not required to move for a protective Order (see CPLR 3042[c]). CPLR 3042(c) provides in pertinent part that if a party fails to comply fully with a demand for a bill of particulars the party making the demand, the plaintiffs in this case, may move to compel compliance or, if such failure is willful, then for the imposition of penalties in accordance with CPLR 3042(d)(Haszinger v. Praver, 12 AD3d 485 [2004]; Hess v. Wessendorf, 102 AD2d 926 [1984], appeal dismissed 64 NY2d 602 [1984]). A motion to preclude or to compel discovery is not the equivalent of a motion made pursuant to CPLR 3042(c) (see Martin v. We're Associates, Inc., 127 AD2d 568 [1987]; Siegel, N.Y. Prac. § 241 [5th ed.]).
(Siegel, N Y Prac § 241 [2d ed].) In Martin v We're Assocs. ( 127 A.D.2d 568 [2d Dept 1987]), the Appellate Division rejected an argument that a motion to preclude was not required where the movant had timely objected to the bill at a preliminary conference held pursuant to the Uniform Rules for Trial Courts. There, the court held (at 569): "Special Term properly denied the appellant's motion for an order of preclusion or for an order directing the service of further bills of particulars in view of the fact that the motion was made after the 10-day period within which a party must move for such relief (see, CPLR 3042 [d]).