Opinion
Case No. 1:18-cv-358 Erie
05-29-2019
JESSIE L. MARTIN, JR., Petitioner v. WARDEN OF F.C.I. MCKEAN-CAMP, Respondent
SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION I. RECOMMENDATION
It is respectfully recommended that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus (ECF No. 4) filed by former federal prisoner Jessie L. Martin, Jr. ("Petitioner") be dismissed as moot and that this case be closed. II. REPORT
A. Relevant Background
On January 2009, Petitioner appeared before the United States District Court for the Western District of New York (the "trial court") and pleaded guilty to one count of possession with intent to distribute five grams or more of cocaine based, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(B). Under the terms of the plea agreement, Petitioner agreed that he was properly categorized as a career offender under § 4B1.1(b)(A) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines. The trial court sentenced him to a term of 188 months of imprisonment to be followed by eight years of supervised release. ECF No. 4-1 at 2.
On or around January 4, 2019, Petitioner, who at the time was incarcerated at FCI McKean, which is located within the territorial boundaries of this Court, filed his habeas petition with this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. In his petition, he challenged his career offender sentence under Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016), seeking an order from this Court directing Respondent, the Warden of FCI McKean, to immediately release him. ECF No. 4 at 10.
On April 29, 2019, Respondent filed a Notice of Suggestion of Mootness. ECF No. 13. Respondent explained that on March 12, 2019, the trial court entered an order (ECF No. 13-2 at 2) granting Petitioner's Motion for Reduced Sentence Pursuant to 404 of the First Step Act. That order reduced Petitioner's sentence from 188 months of incarceration to time served and reduced his term of supervised release from eight years to six years. The Federal Bureau of Prisons (the "BOP") released Petitioner from custody two days later, on March 14, 2019. ECF No. 13 at 1. As a result of all of this, Respondent contends that the Court should dismiss this case as moot. Petitioner has not filed any response.
B. Discussion
It is a well-established principle that federal courts do not have jurisdiction to decide an issue unless it presents a live case or controversy as required by Article III, § 2, of the Constitution. Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998). "'To invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court, a litigant must have suffered, or be threatened with, an actual injury traceable to the defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.'" Burkey v. Marberry, 556 F.3d 142, 147 (3d Cir. 2009) (emphasis added) (quoting Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990)). "The case or controversy requirement continues through all stages of federal judicial proceedings, trial and appellate, and requires that parties have a personal stake in the outcome." Id. (citing Lewis, 494 U.S. at 477-78). Thus, if developments occur during the course of adjudication that eliminate a petitioner's personal stake in the outcome of a suit or prevent a court from being able to grant effective relief, the case must be dismissed as moot. Id. at 147-48; Keitel v. Mazurkiewicz, 729 F.3d 278, 280 (3d Cir. 2013).
In the habeas context, the crucial issue with respect to mootness is often whether "some concrete and continuing injury other than the now-ended incarceration or parole" might still be amenable to remedy. Spencer, 523 U.S. at 7. In other words, there still may be a case or controversy before the court - even if the injury that a complaining party seeks to remedy through litigation no longer exists - if there is a "collateral injury" that is "likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision." Id. (quoting Lewis, 494 U.S. at 477); Burkey, 556 F.3d at 147-51. Where the petitioner is attacking a wrongful conviction, courts often will presume the existence of collateral consequences that can be remedied by a favorable decision from a habeas court. Id. However, in cases such as the instant case, where Petitioner is challenging the term of his sentence rather than the lawfulness of his underlying conviction, there is no such presumption; rather, the petitioner has the burden of demonstrating that he has sustained a collateral injury that can be effectively remedied by the court in order to avoid having his case dismissed on mootness grounds. Burkey, 556 F.3d at 148 ("Where...the appellant is attacking a sentence that has already been served, collateral consequences will not be presumed, but must be proven."); Killian v. FCI-Allenwood, 2018 WL 2292757, at *1 (M.D. Pa. May 18, 2018) (collateral consequences "will not be presumed" with respect to "challenges to the execution of a sentence that has already been served").
Applying these principles to the instant case, the Court concludes that this matter is indeed moot. Since the trial court recently resentenced petitioner to time served, reduced his term of supervised release from eight years to six years, and the BOP released him from its custody on March 14, 2019, there is no longer any habeas relief that this Court can provide. See, e.g., Killian, 2018 WL 2292757, at *1 (dismissing 2241 petition as moot upon petitioner's release from incarceration because "his release eliminates the Court's ability to grant him any relief"); Scott v. Schuykill FCI, 298 Fed. Appx. 202, 204 (3d Cir. 2008) ("[Petitioner's] § 2241 petition is moot because it is not redressable by a favorable judicial decision."). Nor has Petitioner demonstrated the existence of any sort of lingering collateral injury within this Court's power to redress. Burkey, 556 F.3d at 147 (once a prisoner has been released from custody, "some continuing injury, also referred to as a collateral consequence, must exist for the action to continue."). As such, the Court agrees with Respondents that this matter is now moot. Spencer, 523 U.S. at 18 ("[M]ootness, however it may have come about, simply deprives us of our power to act; there is nothing for us to remedy, even if we were disposed to do so."). Petitioner's habeas petition should be dismissed, with prejudice, and this case marked closed. III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully recommended that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus be dismissed as moot and that this case be closed. Pursuant to the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and (C), and Rule 72.D.2 of the Local Civil Rules, the parties are allowed fourteen (14) days from the date of this Order to file objections to this Report and Recommendation. Failure to do so will waive the right to appeal. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011).
28 U.S.C. § 2253 sets forth the standards governing the issuance of a certificate of appealability for appellate review of a district court's disposition of a habeas petition. Federal prisoner appeals from the dismissal of a § 2241 habeas corpus proceeding are not governed by the certificate of appealability requirement. United States v. Cepero, 224 F.3d 256, 264-65 (3d Cir. 2000), abrogated on other grounds by Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134 (2012). --------
/s/ Richard A. Lanzillo
RICHARD A. LANZILLO
United States Magistrate Judge Dated: May 29, 2019