Opinion
24A-CT-75
08-14-2024
Kevin L. Martin, Appellant/Cross-Appellee-Plaintiff, v. Warden Vanihel and Lieutenant Hoffer, Appellees/Cross-Appellants-Defendants.
APPELLANT PRO SE Kevin L. Martin Pendelton, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana, Frances H. Barrow Supervising Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Sullivan Superior Court The Honorable Hugh R. Hunt, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 77D01-2311-CT-559
APPELLANT PRO SE Kevin L. Martin Pendelton, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana, Frances H. Barrow Supervising Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Robb, Senior Judge
Statement of the Case
[¶1] Kevin L. Martin appeals from the trial court's order dismissing his complaint after review under Indiana's Screening Statute, Indiana Code section 34-58-1-1 (2004). Warden Vanihel and Lieutenant Hoffer (the Wabash Correctional Facility Defendants) cross-appeal, contending the court improperly granted Martin's request for pauper status. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶2] Kevin L. Martin is an inmate currently housed in the Pendleton Correctional Facility, serving sentences for battery and murder, with an earliest possible release date of August 18, 2046. See Indiana Dep't of Correction Incarcerated Search at https://www.in.gov/apps/indcorrection/ofs/ofs (last visited August 7, 2024).
[¶3] On November 21, 2023, Martin filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 against the Wabash Correctional Facility Defendants, the warden and a lieutenant at the Wabash Correctional Facility, alleging they had violated his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. He alleged that the Wabash Correctional Facility Defendants acted with deliberate indifference by failing to provide him adequate medical care at the Wabash Valley Correctional Facility, where he contracted Covid-19, and by transferring him to Pendleton Correctional Facility without informing the new facility that he had contracted Covid-19. Martin requested "injunction relief in [the]amount of $250,000.00 and punitive damage[s]." Appellant's App. Vol. II, p. 8. He also filed a motion for fee waiver.
[¶4] The trial court's November 27, 2023 order granted Martin's motion for fee waiver, but ordered Martin to file an amended complaint within thirty days because he had failed to comply with the pleading requirements of the Indiana Tort Claim Act (ITCA), Indiana Code chapter 34-13-3 (1998). Martin filed his amended Section 1983 complaint, requesting "injunction relief, in amount [of] 250,000 and punitive damage[s]." Id. at 18. His amended complaint alleged that he "was in immediate danger or serious bodily injury because the plaintiff was so weak he could [not] get out of bed at Wabash Valley Correctional Facility." Id. at 16. He submitted an affidavit with his amended complaint, stating he was "in immediate danger of serious bodily injury at Wabash Valley Correctional Facility." Id. at 24. By that time, Martin had been transferred to Pendleton Correctional Facility.
[¶5] The trial court issued an order on December 15, 2023, dismissing Martin's complaint because it was "completely incomprehensible" and did not comply with the November 27, 2023 order. Appellee's App. Vol. II, p. 2.
Discussion and Decision
[¶6] Martin appeals from the trial court's order dismissing his complaint. We begin by noting that Martin proceeds pro se. A litigant who proceeds pro se is held to the same rules of procedure that trained counsel is bound to follow. Smith v. Donahue, 907 N.E.2d 553, 555 (Ind.Ct.App. 2009), trans. denied. Pro se litigants are afforded no inherent leniency simply by virtue of being selfrepresented. Zavodnik v. Harper, 17 N.E.3d 259, 266 (Ind. 2014).
A. Standard of Review
[¶7] Indiana's Screening Statute requires a trial court to assess complaints filed by offenders as soon as the complaints are received. Ind. Code § 34-58-1-2(a) (2004); Zavodnik v. Harper, 17 N.E.3d 259, 264 (Ind. 2014). The purpose of the statute is to screen and prevent abusive and prolific offender litigation in our state. Benson v. WANE-TV 15, 106 N.E.3d 1055, 1056 (Ind.Ct.App. 2018). An offender's claim may not proceed and is subject to dismissal if the trial court determines that it
(1) is frivolous;
(2) is not a claim upon which relief may be granted; or
(3) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from liability for such relief.I.C. § 34-58-1-2(a). If a trial court determines that a claim may not proceed, the statute requires that the trial court enter an order explaining why the claim may not proceed and stating if any of the offender's remaining claims may proceed. I.C. § 34-58-1-3. We conduct a de novo review of a trial court's decision to dismiss a claim pursuant to the Screening Statute. Smith v. Donahue, 907 N.E.2d 553, 555 (Ind.Ct.App. 2009), trans. denied. In conducting our review, we look only to the well-pleaded facts contained in the complaint or petition to determine whether it contains allegations concerning all the material elements necessary to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory. Id. We may affirm the trial court's dismissal on any theory or basis found in the record. Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores East, LP, 853 N.E.2d 478, 483 (Ind.Ct.App. 2006), trans. denied.
B. Cross-Appeal
[¶8] We first address the State's cross-appeal issue. The State argues the trial court erred by finding Martin was indigent and waiving the filing fee. Under the Three Strikes Law, "[i]f an offender has filed at least three (3) civil actions in which a state court has dismissed the action or a claim under IC 34-58-1-2, the offender may not file a new complaint . . . as an indigent person . . . unless a court determines the offender is in immediate danger of serious bodily injury." Ind. Code § 34-10-1-3(2009). The State argues that the court was required to first find that Martin was in immediate danger of serious bodily injury before waiving fees because Martin had at least three strikes against him as of 2019, but did not do so.
[¶9] The trial court allowed Martin the opportunity to amend his complaint in light of his failure to follow pleading requirements. Although Martin did not allege he was in immediate danger of serious bodily injury (albeit at his previous place of incarceration) until he filed his amended complaint, which was after the waiver had been granted, we decline to reverse the trial court's decision. The record does not reflect that the court had documentation that Martin was an offender who had three previous dismissals under the Screening Statute. See Smith v. Ind. Dept. of Corr., 883 N.E.2d 802, 810 (Ind. 2008) (under Three Strikes Law, defendant must present evidence plaintiff is an offender and has three previous dismissals under the Frivolous Claim law; court must read those papers and the complaint to screen for bodily injury exception and then rule).
C. Dismissal of Martin's Complaint
The State argues that Martin has waived his appellate arguments because he failed to follow the Appellate Rules by supporting them with cogent reasoning. We choose to exercise our preference for deciding cases on their merits. See Omni Ins. Group v. Poage, 966 N.E.2d 750, 753 (Ind.Ct.App. 2012)("We prefer to decide a case on the merits whenever possible."), trans. denied.
[¶10] We conclude that Martin's complaint was subject to dismissal for each of the reasons set out in the Screening Statute.
1. Frivolous Claim
[¶11] "A claim is frivolous under subsection (a)(1) if the claim: (1) is made primarily to harass a person; or (2) lacks an arguable basis either in: (A) law; or (B) fact." Ind. Code § 34-58-1-2(b). Martin sought $250,000 in damages, but has not pleaded facts to show he has been directly damaged in that amount. His claim was that he contracted Covid-19 while housed at the Wabash Valley Correctional Facility and was allowed to stay in a bed with urine and feces for fourteen days. Those facts are insufficient to show he was damaged in the amount of $250,000. See Martin v. Broden, No. 23A-CT-936 (Ind.Ct.App. Jan. 31, 2024) (mem.)(defendant "has not pled sufficient facts to show he has been directly damaged in the amount of $700 million."). Additionally, to the extent he requests punitive damages, Martin has not alleged sufficient facts to show the Wabash Correctional Facility Defendants acted with malicious intent or that aggravating circumstances existed, as is required in Section 1983 actions. See Kellog v. City of Gary, 562 N.E.2d 685, 711 (Ind. 1990) (aggravating circumstances or malicious intent required in Section 1983 action).
2. No Claim Upon Which Relief May Be Granted
[¶12] Martin's complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The trial court dismissed Martin's complaint after determining that it did not comply with the ITCA.
[¶13] Section 1983 of Title 42 provides a civil remedy against any person who, under color of state law, subjects a citizen of the United States to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the federal Constitution or federal laws. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. "Section 1983 does not provide a remedy against states, state entities or state officials sued in their official capacities." Lake Cnty Juv. Court v. Swanson, 671 N.E.2d 429, 43 (Ind Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied.
[¶14] Here, we focus on whether the Wabash Correctional Facility Defendants are persons for purposes of Section 1983. "One indicia of the capacity in which a government agent has been sued under [Section 1983] is the language of the caption of the case." Id. at 434. Martin's complaint names the Wabash Correctional Facility Defendants in the caption of his complaint in their official capacities ("Warden Vanihel" and "Lieutenant Hoffer"). And Martin's complaint alleges the Wabash Correctional Facility Defendants acted "under color of state law." Appellant's App. Vol. II, pp. 4, 12. "Another indicia is the allegations and language used in the body of the complaint." Swanson, 671 N.E.2d at 434. "[C]ourts ordinarily assume that an official is sued only in [his] official capacity when a plaintiff alleges that a state official acted under the color of state law giving rise to liability under § 1983." Id. States and their agencies are never "persons" subject to suit under Section 1983. Bd. of Trustees of Purdue Univ. v. Eisenstein, 87 N.E.3d 481, 494 (Ind.Ct.App. 2017), trans. denied. The Wabash Correctional Facility Defendants are not "persons" subject to suit under Section 1983.
[¶15] To bring suit against a governmental employee personally under the ITCA, a plaintiff must "allege that an act or omission of the employee that causes a loss is (1) criminal; (2) clearly outside the scope of the employee's employment; (3) malicious; (4) willful and wanton; or (5) calculated to benefit the employee personally." Ind. Code § 34-13-3-5(c) (2003). The trial court's November 27, 2023 order directed Martin to file an amended complaint because "his complaint fails to allege how the Defendants['] acts or omission[s] are criminal, malicious, will[ful] or wanton, outside the scope of their employment or calculated to benefit them personally." Appellant's App. Vol. II, p. 26. The court dismissed Martin's amended complaint because it was "almost completely indecipherable" and failed to comply with the court's prior order. Appellee's App. Vol. II, p. 2. The amended complaint did not remedy the deficiencies of the original complaint by failing to state operative facts necessary to set forth a claim against the Wabash Correctional Facility Defendants.
[¶16] To a certain extent Martin's amended complaint can be understood to request injunctive relief. He sought "injunction [sic] relief in [an] amount of 250,000 and punitive damage[s] behind the corrupt and failure to follow the train policy and other policy [sic] that guide both defendant [sic] duty inside prison wall." Appellant's App. Vol. II, p. 18. "An exception to this general rule [of official capacity suit immunity] exists if the state official is sued in his or her official capacity for prospective relief such as an injunction based on an alleged ongoing constitutional violation." Melton v. Ind. Athletic Trainers Bd., 156 N.E.3d 633, 651 (Ind.Ct.App. 2020), trans. denied. This exception does not apply here, however, because the relief Martin seeks would not benefit him. Martin alleged acts that occurred at the Wabash Valley Correctional Facility. Martin was transferred to the Pendleton Correctional Facility. Damages are the only available relief after an offender is transferred to another facility. See Grayson v. Schuler, 666 F.3d 450, 451 (7th Cir. 2012) (injunctive relief unavailable due to offender's release); Vinning-El v. Evans, 657 F.3d 591, 592 (7th Cir. 2011) (damages only available relief after offender was transferred). The exception does not apply here.
3. Eleventh Amendment Immunity From Suit
[¶17] Martin's complaint was properly dismissed because he sought monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from suit. State agencies have Eleventh Amendment immunity from federal causes of action. "The ultimate guarantee of the Eleventh Amendment is that nonconsenting States may not be sued by private individuals in federal court." Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 (2001). Eleventh Amendment immunity, however, also bars claims brought under federal law in state courts. Montgomery v. Bd. of Trustees of Purdue Univ., 849 N.E.2d 1120, 1124 (Ind. 2006).
[¶18] The three exceptions to the Eleventh Amendment immunity are inapplicable here. First, a state official may be sued in his or her official capacity for prospective equitable relief. Id. at 1126. Next, Congress may abrogate States' immunity through an unequivocal exercise of valid legislative power. Id. at 1124. And third, a State may waive its immunity and consent to suit in federal court. Id. at 1125 n.3. Prospective equitable relief is not available because Martin is no longer confined at Wabash Valley Correctional Facility, which moots his claim for injunctive relief. Next, Congress did not abrogate the State's sovereign immunity with respect to Section 1983 claims. Will v. Mich. Dept of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 68 (1989). And the State has not expressly waived its immunity from suit for Section 1983 claims and has not done so by conduct. See Ind. Code §§ 34-13-3-5(f) (2003), 34-13-4-3(1998).
[¶19] For each of these reasons, the trial court correctly dismissed Martin's complaint against the Wabash Correctional Facility Defendants.
Conclusion
[¶20] In light of the foregoing, we affirm the trial court's judgment in all respects.
[¶21] Affirmed.
Crone, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.