Opinion
Argued September 14, 1979
October 26, 1979.
Unemployment compensation — Voluntary termination — Unemployment Compensation Law, Act 1936, December 5, P.L. (1937) 2897 — Cause of a necessitous and compelling nature — Dissatisfaction with work schedule — Health problems — Credibility.
1. An employe voluntarily terminating employment without cause of a necessitous and compelling nature is ineligible for benefits under the Unemployment Compensation Law, Act 1936, December 5, P.L. (1937) 2897, and benefits are properly denied and a request for an additional hearing is properly denied when substantial evidence establishes that the employe terminated employment because of a dissatisfaction with her work schedule rather than for health reasons as asserted. [649]
2. In an unemployment compensation case questions of credibility of medical witnesses and other witnesses are for the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, not a reviewing court, but no specific finding as to the credibility of a particular witness is necessary. [650]
Argued September 14, 1979, before Judges CRUMLISH, JR., WILKINSON, JR., and CRAIG, sitting as a panel of three.
Appeal, No. 1279 C.D. 1978, from the Order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review in case of In Re: Claim of Marjorie Martin, No. B-157003.
Application to the Bureau of Employment Security for unemployment compensation benefits. Application denied. Applicant appealed to the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review. Denial affirmed. Request for additional hearing denied. Applicant appealed to the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania. Held: Affirmed.
John Stember, for appellant.
David R. Confer, Assistant Attorney General, with him Richard Wagner, Chief Counsel, and Edward G. Biester, Jr., Attorney General, for appellee.
Marjorie Martin (Claimant) appeals a decision of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review denying benefits on the basis of a voluntary termination without cause of a necessitous and compelling nature. We affirm.
Section 402(b)(1) of the Unemployment Compensation Law, Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex. Sess., P.L. (1937) 2897, as amended, 43 P. S. § 802(b)(1).
At issue is whether Board denial of a request for an additional evidentiary hearing was erroneous.
Martin worked as a cashier for Tom's Butcher Blok for seven years until her September 10, 1977 resignation. Board found that she resigned because she was dissatisfied with her work schedule, that the new hours were not onerous, that she was not unduly harassed at work, and that she was not forced to quit for health reasons.
It is argued that the record is lacking a full development of the nature of Martin's health problems as they relate to her resignation and thus that a further hearing is required. A new hearing, however, is inappropriate where, as here, Claimant candidly admits that she quit because she was dissatisfied with her new work schedule and where Claimant's physician states that he advised her not to quit her job even though the employment conditions were contributing to her psychological problems.
34 Pa. Code § 101.104 provides in part:
(a) The Board may allow or disallow . . . further appeal . . .
. . . .
(c) . . .
(1) Whenever the further appeal involves a material point on which the record below is silent or incomplete or appears to be erroneous.
This schedule was specifically permitted by the employee's collective bargaining agreement.
Substantial evidence in the form of Claimant's testimony reveals that the quit was occasioned by the rescheduling and not by reason of health. Mere dissatisfaction with working hours will not justify a voluntary termination to support unemployment compensation. Keiper v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 38 Pa. Commw. 117, 391 A.2d 1146 (1978); Cofolla v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 26 Pa. Commw. 1995, 362 A.2d 1148 (1976).
Claimant also argues, again in error, that Board failure to make a specific finding on the credibility of Claimant's physician requires a new hearing. Martin argues that Board ignored a letter from her doctor indicating that at the time of resignation she suffered emotional problems caused in part by her work environment. She contends Board's finding that she quit because of dissatisfaction with working hours was unjustified in light of the letter. This argument goes to the weight of the evidence. Board, in exercising its duty, chose to conclude that dissatisfaction with her hours, not health problems, compelled her to quit. Implicit is the inference that less weight was accorded to the physician's letter than to Claimant's admissions. The weight to be given the evidence is fully within the province of the fact finder. Edelman v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 10 Pa. Commw. 275, 310 A.2d 707 (1973). No specific finding on the credibility of Claimant's physician is required.
Accordingly, we
ORDER
AND NOW, this 26th day of October, 1979, the decision and order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review at No. B-157003 is affirmed.