Opinion
Nos. 05-10-00386-CR, 05-10-00387-CR, 05-10-00507-CR
Opinion Filed April 26, 2011. DO NOT PUBLISH Tex. R. App. P. 47
On Appeal from the 265th Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause Nos. F06-88892-R, F09-61316-R, F09-73137-R.
Before Justices FITZGERALD, LANG-MIERS, and FILLMORE.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Tommy Eugene Martin appeals his convictions for three family violence assaults. In three issues, Martin asks us to reverse and set aside the convictions or, alternatively, order new trials. We affirm the trial court's judgments. In 2007, Martin pleaded guilty to family violence assault, but pursuant to a plea agreement the adjudication of his guilt was deferred and he was placed on community supervision for ten years. In 2009, the State charged Martin with two new family violence assaults and moved to adjudicate Martin's guilt in the earlier assault case. In a combined proceeding and without the benefit of a plea bargain in any of the cases, Martin waived a jury and pleaded guilty to the two new assault charges and pleaded true to the allegations in the motion to adjudicate. The trial court assessed punishment at 12 years' confinement in the two new cases and 10 years' confinement in the earlier case, all to run concurrently. In his first two issues, Martin argues that the trial court erred by not inquiring sua sponte into his competency to stand trial. In his third issue, he states, "Appellant's plea of true to the motion to adjudicate guilt and revoke community supervision was not voluntary due to appellant's plausible incompetence and the trial court's error in not `sua sponte' ordering a competency evaluation." Although Martin states in issue three that he is appealing the voluntariness of his plea of true, his argument under this issue does not address the voluntariness of his plea. Instead, he makes the same arguments that he made in issues one and two. Consequently, nothing is presented for our review with regard to the voluntariness of the plea of true. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i) (stating brief must contain clear and concise argument for contentions made). We review a trial court's decision not to conduct a competency inquiry for an abuse of discretion. Moore v. State, 999 S.W.2d 385, 395 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). A trial court cannot accept a plea of guilty unless it appears that the defendant is mentally competent and the plea is free and voluntary. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.13(b) (West 2009); McDaniel v. State, 98 S.W.3d 704, 709 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). A defendant is presumed competent to stand trial and shall be found competent to stand trial unless proved incompetent by a preponderance of the evidence. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46B.003(b) (West 2006). A defendant is incompetent to stand trial if he lacks (1) sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding, or (2) a rational, as well as factual, understanding of the proceedings against him. Id. art. 46B.003(a). A party may suggest by motion or the trial court may suggest on its own motion that the defendant may be incompetent to stand trial. Id. art. 46B.004(a). On suggestion that the defendant may be incompetent to stand trial, the trial court shall determine by informal inquiry whether there is some evidence from any source that would support a finding that the defendant may be incompetent to stand trial. Id. art. 46B.004(c). An informal inquiry is not required, however, unless the evidence is sufficient to create a bona fide doubt in the mind of the trial court about whether the defendant is legally competent. Montoya v. State, 291 S.W.3d 420, 425 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); McDaniel, 98 S.W.3d at 710; Alcott v. State, 51 S.W.3d 596, 599 n. 10 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). Evidence of recent severe mental illness, moderate retardation, or truly bizarre acts by the defendant are generally sufficient to create a bona fide doubt in the court's mind. Alcott, 51 S.W.3d at 599 n. 10. Martin argues that the trial court should have inquired sua sponte into his competence to enter his pleas based on his testimony. He testified that his mother was diagnosed paranoid-schizophrenic when he was a child and that he was placed in a foster home for three years as a result. His mother wrote a letter, which was admitted into evidence, stating that there was a history of mental illness in the family. Martin also said he was abused as a child, and his mother wrote in her letter that Martin witnessed her being abused. Martin also testified that while he was on probation for the first family violence assault, his girlfriend's baby was born prematurely. He said they spent three months in the hospital and after the baby died, he turned to drugs and alcohol to ease his grief. He said he drank alcohol and used marijuana and "wack," which he said was embalming fluid, regularly. He said he "woke up drinking [and] went to sleep drinking" and drank to intoxication. He also said he was diagnosed with schizophrenia and hears voices. The trial court asked Martin who had diagnosed him schizophrenic, and Martin said "My doctor here." Martin said the doctor told him the illness was probably brought on by his child's death. Martin testified that he was depressed when he was arrested and looked for a place inside the jail where he could jump off and commit suicide. Martin said one of the other inmates informed a guard and that Martin was "looking suspicious" and the guard stopped him from killing himself. Martin did not have the benefit of a plea bargain when he waived a jury and asked the trial court to sentence him to community supervision and order him to a substance abuse program. He testified that he understood the charges and the range of punishment. He said he knew the State had dropped one of the enhancement paragraphs from the indictments. He testified that he was entering his pleas freely and voluntarily because he was guilty and for no other reason. He testified at length and in detail concerning his criminal history, which included aggravated robbery, terroristic threat, possession of a controlled substance, and family violence assaults; his substance abuse; and his mental illness. He gave responsive answers to all the questions he was asked. When the prosecutor asked whether his girlfriend Sonia was pregnant with his baby at the same time his baby with girlfriend Lisa was one month old, Martin told the prosecutor that the question was "irrelevant." Although Martin said he is schizophrenic and hears voices, he said "the medication they got me on now is helping a whole lot." He told the trial court that he had kids that he wants to see grow up and was admitting that he needed help "because I [have] been in denial for a long time so, yes, I am in need of help." And when the trial court asked Martin who diagnosed him as schizophrenic, Martin was able to answer the question. Martin's lawyer argued in closing that Martin "demonstrated what I would call remarkable insight into his own addiction." Although the parties referred to a "CATS evaluation," it was not offered into evidence. And the prosecutor argued that she did not "really see schizophrenia anywhere in this CATS evaluation. I see that they note that he malingers, enhances his symptoms and conveniently may be doing it to his own benefit." At the end of the evidence and argument, the trial court recessed the hearing and asked to see the attorneys in chambers. When the hearing resumed, the court asked Martin if he had understood everything that had happened so far in his case, and Martin said yes. The court also asked Martin's lawyer if he felt his client was mentally competent, and the lawyer said yes. Martin has not cited to any evidence in the record showing that he was incapable of consulting with his attorney or understanding the proceedings. See Moore, 999 S.W.2d at 395. In fact, his answers to the questions demonstrated sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings against him. The trial court was in a position to observe appellant's behavior at all times during the hearing, and Martin has not cited any record evidence to show that the trial court abused its discretion by not inquiring sua sponte into his mental competence prior to accepting his pleas. We resolve appellant's three issues against him. We affirm the trial court's judgments.
Issue one addresses the conviction in one of the two new assault cases; issue two addresses the other. They are argued together.