Opinion
NO. 14-17-00346-CR
05-03-2018
CHARLES RAY MARTIN, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 10th District Court Galveston County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 15CR2431
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The complainant told her grandmother that she was touched inappropriately by appellant, a congregant in the grandmother's church. The grandmother notified the church, which then notified police, who eventually arrested appellant for indecency with a child. Appellant was convicted of that offense in a nonjury trial, and now, in a single issue, appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction.
Our standard of review is well-established. When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence in appeals from both jury and nonjury trials, we examine all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Robinson v. State, 466 S.W.3d 166, 172 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015).
The charged offense has the following essential elements: (1) the defendant engaged in sexual contact with a child, and (2) the child was younger than seventeen years of age. See Tex. Penal Code § 21.11(a)(1). Regarding the first of these elements, the phrase "sexual contact" includes any touching of the breast of a child, including touching through clothing, if committed with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person. Id. § 21.11(c)(1).
The evidence established that appellant approached the complainant, a fifteen-year-old girl, when she was alone in a kitchen on the church campus. The complainant testified that appellant gave her a side hug and grabbed her breast through her clothing. The complainant said that she pulled away from appellant, suspecting that the grab may have been a "mistouching." But when the complainant attempted to leave the kitchen, appellant hugged her and grabbed her breast a second time. He also said, "Don't tell anybody or we'll both get in trouble."
Based on the complainant's testimony alone, the trial court could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant touched the breast of a child younger than seventeen years of age, through the clothing of the child. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 38.07 (the complainant's uncorroborated testimony is sufficient by itself to support the conviction). The trial court could have also inferred that appellant committed this touching with the intent to satisfy or gratify his own sexual desires because he touched the child a second time, after she had already pulled away from him, and because he told the child not to say anything about the touching, which demonstrates an awareness of guilt. See Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 396 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) ("That appellant instructed both children not to reveal the event to anyone shows a consciousness of wrongdoing which in turn leads to an inference that when he touched the children as he did, appellant harbored a specific intent to arouse and gratify his own sexual desires.").
Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient because the complainant gave earlier statements where she indicated that appellant may have hugged her only once and that his touching of her breast may have been accidental rather than intentional. Appellant argues that these earlier statements negate the essential element that he committed a touching with the intent to engage in sexual contact. This argument merely highlights a conflict in the evidence, which we, as the reviewing court, presume the factfinder resolved in favor of the verdict. See Wesbrook v. State, 29 S.W.3d 103, 11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
Based on the evidence as a whole, the trial court was free to determine that appellant touched the breast of the complainant through her clothing with the intent to arouse or gratify his sexual desires. We therefore conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction.
The trial court's judgment is affirmed.
/s/ Tracy Christopher
Justice Panel consists of Chief Justice Frost and Justices Christopher and Jamison.
Do Not Publish — Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).