1. On appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress, we construe the evidence favorably to the trial court's findings and judgment. Martin v. State, 291 Ga. App. 363 (1) ( 662 SE2d 185) (2008). We accept the trial court's factual determinations if they are supported by any evidence, and we will not overturn its credibility findings absent clear error.
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Martin v. State , 291 Ga. App. 363, 367 (2) (b) 662 S.E.2d 185 (2008). In this case, the indictment alleged that Tisdale "knowingly and willfully obstruct[ed] and hinder[ed] [the captain] in the lawful discharge of his official duties by refusing to leave ... Burt's Pumpkin Farm when asked to do so by [the captain], who was an authorized representative of the property owner in making that request.
Clark v. State, 243 Ga.App. 362, 365(1), 532 S.E.2d 481 (2000) (where officer had reasonable suspicion driver was driving with expired tag, court found one may commit obstruction when hindering an officer in investigating an offense committed by another).Martin v. State, 291 Ga.App. 363, 367(2)(b), 662 S.E.2d 185 (2008). 2.
" (citation and punctuation omitted)); Clark v. State, 169 Ga. App. 535, 536 (3) ( 313 SE2d 748) (1984) ("Whether an act is performed in a `public place' is a jury question." (citation omitted)); see also United States v. Floyd, 281 F3d 1346, 1349 (III) (A) (2002) (public intoxication); Martin v. State, 291 Ga. App. 363, 366 (1) (b) ( 662 SE2d 185) (2008) (same); Ridley v. State, 176 Ga. App. 669, 670 ( 337 SE2d 382) (1985) (same). Cf. People v. Giacinti, 44 Ill. App. 3d 699, 702 ( 358 NE2d 934) (Ill. App. 3d 1974) (noting, in context of public-indecency statute that used a similar definition for "public place," that "when imprisoned, the prisoner is deprived of his private life" and "[h]is entire existence becomes public, open to the view of other prisoners, as well as prison officials").
And we cannot say it was clear error for the trial court to believe Floyd's testimony. See Martin v. State, 291 Ga. App. 363 (1) ( 662 SE2d 185) (2008) (this Court accepts trial court's factual determinations if they are supported by any evidence and will not overturn its credibility findings absent clear error). Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's order granting Floyd's motion to suppress.
Ryan v. State, 277 Ga. App. 490, 492 (1) ( 627 SE2d 128) (2006).Martin v. State, 291 Ga. App. 363, 368-369 (4) ( 662 SE2d 185) (2008). 3. McGhee contends that the trial court erred in admitting statements he made while in police custody.
(Citation and footnote omitted.) Martin v. State, 291 Ga. App. 363, 365 (1) (b) ( 662 SE2d 185) (2008). The officer's inability to verify the driver's suspension with dispatch should not render the officer "powerless to arrest."
Rather, we must look to the totality of the circumstances to determine if his arrest was authorized. Martin v. State, 291 Ga. App. 363, 365 (1) (b) ( 662 SE2d 185) (2008). "An arrest for a crime may be made by a law enforcement officer . . . without a warrant if the offense is committed in such officer's presence or within such officer's immediate knowledge. . . ."
Prior to this, the officer was engaged in a first-tier stop of Steillman. The evidence was that Steillman voluntarily approached the officer and the officer asked him questions about where he lived, where he was going and what he was doing. See Martin v. State, 291 Ga. App. 363, 365 ( 662 SE2d 185) (2008) (actions of an officer requesting to see a driver's license, and inquiring about possible criminal or suspicious activity clearly fall within the realm of the first type of police-citizen encounter and do not amount to a stop). OCGA ยง 16-11-39 provides in pertinent part that
(Footnote omitted.) Martin v. State, 291 Ga. App. 363, 364 (1) (a) ( 662 SE2d 185) (2008). In a first-tier encounter, police may approach citizens, ask for identification, ask for consent to search, and otherwise freely question the citizen without any basis or belief of criminal activity so long as a reasonable person would feel free to decline the officers' request or otherwise terminate the encounter.