Keeney v. Heath, 57 F.3d 579, 581 (7th Cir.1995). We also addressed a prisoner's right to marry in Martin v. Snyder, 329 F.3d 919 (7th Cir.2003). There, we recognized that qualified immunity was appropriate when a prison official relied on the institution's visitation policy to postpone an inmate's marriage.
As reflected in the undisputed facts above, at the time of the original denial of plaintiff's request to be married, defendants did principally rely on the fact that Rass was not on the visitor list for a minimum of one year. As Williams points out in his response to defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and as this court identified in the screening order, if the only reason for defendants’ marriage denial were Rass not being on the visitation list, then at least arguably under the Seventh Circuit's holding in Riker , this restriction may not be reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest, or at least a reasonable jury could so find. SeeRiker , 798 F.3d at 556-57 (a prison's visitation policy, on its own, does not justify prohibiting an inmate's marriage) (citing Martin v. Snyder , 329 F.3d 919, 922 (7th Cir. 2003) (noting that "[r]estrictions on visitation[ are] not enough to justify prohibiting marriage")). Defendants attempt to distinguish Riker , or otherwise explain why consideration of the visitation policy in reviewing a request to marry is reasonable.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has not addressed the affirmative defense of qualified immunity in this context, but the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals determined in a similar case that prison officials were entitled to qualified immunity for delaying a prisoner's marriage date until after prison officials reinstated his fiancée's visiting privileges. See Martin v. Snyder, 329 F.3d 919 (7th Cir. 2003). In Martin, a state prisoner and his fiancée filed a civil rights action, claiming that prison officials interfered with their right to marry.
The right may be limited for "sound penological reasons," and when the state has imposed only "incidental interference" on an inmate's right to marry, such as controlling the time or the place of the marriage rather than precluding it outright, "the right to marry does not give rise to a constitutional claim, if there is 'some justification' for the interference." Williams v. Wisconsin, 336 F.3d 576, 582 (7th Cir. 2003); see also Martin v. Snyder, 329 F.3d 919, 922 (7th Cir. 2003) (observing that "Turner does not say that every delay [in the ability to marry] violates the Constitution") Here, it must be noted that it was the state judge, not Ponton, who made the final decision about Davis's right to marry Taylor. It is not clear that a cognizable claim could lie against Ponton for merely providing information to the judge in connection with that decision.
Requiring the defendants to grant the plaintiffs’ marriage request at a time when the plaintiffs were engaged in an ongoing pattern of rule-breaking and deception in furtherance of their relationship would eliminate or reduce the "sting" from the Department’s sanction for the plaintiffs’ misconduct. Cf. Martin v. Snyder , 329 F.3d 919, 922 (7th Cir. 2003) ("Restrictions on visitation, though not enough to justify prohibiting marriage, may well justify deferment, so that the sanction for misconduct will have some sting."). Moreover, sanctioning the plaintiffs for misconduct to promote respect for the prison’s rules was not the only reason for denying the marriage request.
Similarly, in Martin v. Snyder, the court found that qualified immunity was appropriate when a prison official delayed an inmate's marriage because his fiancé had been placed on a restricted list, which in turn prevented her from visiting the prison. 329 F.3d 919, 920 (7th Cir. 2003). The Martin opinion reiterated that "[r]estrictions on visitation, though not enough to justify prohibiting marriage, may well justify deferment, so that the sanction for misconduct will have some sting."
Id. "After Turner, a complaint based on prisoners' interest in marriage states a claim; a legitimate penological justification for refusing to allow the marriage is a defense that cannot be adjudicated under Rule 12(b)(6)."Martin v. Snyder, 329 F.3d 919, 921 (7th Cir. 2003). Defendant contends there is no case supporting a constitutional violation for delay of marriage, rather than denial.
The Seventh Circuit, in Martin v. Stolka, addressed the constitutional implications of delaying an inmate's marriage. 329 F.3d 919 (7th Cir. 2003). There, a prison inmate inappropriately touched his girlfriend during a visit, and thus, the girlfriend's visitation rights were restricted for an indefinite duration.
Penological interests include prison security, crime deterrence, rehabilitation, and resource allocation. See, e.g., Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 133-34 (2003) (recognizing interests in security, protecting visitors, crime prevention, and deterring substance use); Van den Bosch v. Raemisch, 658 F.3d 778, 785 (7th Cir. 2011) ("[L]egitimate penological interests might include crime deterrence, prisoner rehabilitation, and protecting the safety of prison guards and inmates."); Martin v. Snyder, 329 F.3d 919, 921 (7th Cir. 2003) (upholding brief delay on right to marry to resolve a security concern); Keeney v. Heath, 57 F.3d 579, 582 (7th Cir. 1995) (upholding rule preventing jail employees from marrying inmates out of security concerns). Kemper's rationale—that he stopped Reed's marriage to a civilian because it may fail—is clearly insufficient under Turner because marital success is not a penological interest.
To the contrary, one Court of Appeals has held that a one-year delay in approving a marriage application following a disciplinary violation did not violate a prisoner's clearly established rights. See Martin v. Snyder, 329 F.3d 919, 921-22 (7th Cir. 2003). As that Court explained, Turner does not address delays and other decisions suggest that certain delays are permissible.