Opinion
HHBCV196050144S
08-26-2019
Clayton J. MARTIN v. Matthew Christopher ROY et al.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
OPINION
Morgan, J.
This action arises out of a motor vehicle accident that occurred on January 12, 2017. The plaintiff alleges that the accident was caused by the defendants’ negligence and resulted in the plaintiff suffering a diminishment in value to his vehicle along with other related money damages. The defendants asserted twelve special defenses to the plaintiff’s claims, six of which are the subject of the plaintiff’s motion to strike.
A motion to strike is the proper vehicle to challenge the legal sufficiency of a special defense. Practice Book § 10-39(a)(5); Barasso v. Rear Still Hill Road, LLC, 64 Conn.App. 9, 13 (2001). "A motion to strike admits all facts well pleaded; it does not admit legal conclusions or the truth or accuracy of opinions stated in the pleadings." (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Faulkner v. United Technologies Corp., 240 Conn. 576, 588 (1997). Practice Book § 10-50 provides in relevant part: "[f]acts which are consistent with [a plaintiff’s] statements but show, notwithstanding, that the plaintiff has no cause of action, must be specially alleged." "Connecticut is a fact pleading jurisdiction." Somers v. Chan, 110 Conn.App. 511, 528 (2008). See also Practice Book § § 10-1, 10-50 and 10-51.
Seventh Special Defense- Failure to Mitigate
Mitigation of damages need not be specially pleaded to be asserted as a defense at trial. See Wasko v. Farley, 108 Conn.App. 156, 172, cert denied, 289 Conn. 922 (2008). However, if mitigation of damages is pleaded as a special defense, the defense must contain adequate facts which would support the legal conclusion that the plaintiff failed to mitigate damages. See Zmarzlak v. Sanchez, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV-16-6058884-S (June 29, 2017, Krumeich, J.), 2017 WL 3251305, *5, 10-11; Rosario v. Sikorsky Aircraft Corp., Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV-10-6006454-S (December 28, 2010, Dooley, J.) (51 Conn.L.Rptr. 217), 2010 WL 5645886, *2. In their seventh special defense, the defendants merely assert the legal conclusion that the plaintiff "failed to properly mitigate his damages." No supporting facts are alleged. In the absence of any facts that would support the legal conclusion that the plaintiff failed to mitigate his damages, the seventh special defense is legally insufficient.
Eighth and Ninth Special Defenses- Intervening and/or Superseding Cause
In their eighth special defense, the defendants allege that the continued passage of time since the date of the accident is an intervening and/or superseding cause of any loss in value to the plaintiff’s vehicle. In their ninth special defense, the defendants allege that the plaintiff’s continued use of the vehicle is an intervening and/or superseding cause of any loss in value to the plaintiff’s vehicle. The terms intervening cause and superseding cause have been used interchangeably, but the doctrine is properly referred to as superseding cause. Craig v. Driscoll, 262 Conn. 312, 332 n.16 (2003), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in O’Dell v. Kozee, 307 Conn. 231, 265 (2012). In Barry v. Quality Steel Products, Inc., 263 Conn. 424, 436-39 (2003), our Supreme Court abandoned the doctrine of superseding cause except in situations where a defendant claims that an unforeseeable intentional tort, force of nature, or criminal event supersedes its tortious conduct. See also Snell v. Norwalk Yellow Cab, Inc., 332 Conn. 720 (2019). The defendants have alleged no facts in their eighth or ninth special defenses that fit within the narrow exception articulated in Barry. Consequently, the eighth and ninth special defenses are legally insufficient.
Tenth Special Defense- Ripeness
In their tenth special defense, the defendants allege that the plaintiff’s claim is not ripe for adjudication because he has not yet realized any loss to his vehicle. Ripeness is a justiciability doctrine that implicates that court’s subject matter jurisdiction. See Esposito v. Specyalski, 268 Conn. 336, 347-48 (2004). A claim of lack of subject matter jurisdiction is not properly raised by a special defense. Under our rules of practice, the appropriate way for a party to raise a claim of lack of subject matter jurisdiction is through a motion to dismiss. Practice Book § 10-30(a)(1). Accord Boppers Entertainment, LLC v. Hue, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-16-6065674-S (December 12, 2016, Noble, J.) (63 Conn.L.Rptr. 495), 2016 WL 7839231, *1; Romprey v. Mainolfi, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-11-6016848-S (October 11, 2011, Zoarski, J.T.R.), 2011 WL 5223042, *2. Moreover, Connecticut law recognizes that any loss in value to the motor vehicle is incurred at the time of the accident, not at a later date. See Littlejohn v. Elionsky, 130 Conn. 541, 542 (1944) (explaining that the proper measure of physical damage to an automobile following a collision is the difference between the reasonable market value of the vehicle before the collision and the reasonable market value after); Stults v. Palmer, 141 Conn. 709, 712 (1954) (same); Damico v. Dalton, 1 Conn.App. 186, 187 (1984) (measure of damages to the defendant’s automobile was "the difference between its value immediately prior to the collision and its value immediately after"). Consequently, the tenth special defense is legally insufficient.
Eleventh Special Defense- Failure to State a Claim
In their eleventh special defense, the defendants plead: "Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted under applicable state law." This defense is legally insufficient because no facts are alleged to support the legal conclusion asserted. "Mere assertions of legal conclusions unsupported by factual allegations are legally insufficient to plead a special defense ... [T]he defendant’s failure to plead any facts to support its contention that the plaintiff failed to state a claim renders its ... special defense legally insufficient." Samuels v. Dept. of Public Health, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV- 10-6011434-S (December 1, 2010, Wilson, J.), 2010 WL 5188490, *4. Moreover, Connecticut law allows a plaintiff to recover damages for the diminution in value of a motor vehicle involved in an accident. See Stults v. Palmer, supra, 141 Conn. 712.
Twelfth Special Defense- Recovery Barred
In their twelfth special defense, the defendants allege that the plaintiff is barred from recovering any diminishment in value to his motor vehicle because the plaintiff has already covered the cost of repairs. In diminution of value cases such as this, "the measure of damages is the difference between the fair market value of the car before the collision and its fair market value afterwards ... However, if the automobile damage may be repaired and the repairs will restore the car to substantially its former condition, the cost of repair will ordinarily furnish proper proof of the loss." Stults v. Palmer, supra, 141 Conn. 712. Accordingly, if the repairs to the plaintiff’s vehicle substantially restored the vehicle to its former condition, the plaintiff may be barred from recovering damages for any diminishment in value to the vehicle. Construing the allegations of this defense in the manner most favorable to sustaining their legal sufficiency, the court finds that the twelfth special defense alleges sufficient facts to survive a motion to strike.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff’s motion to strike the seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth and eleventh special defenses is GRANTED. The motion to strike the twelfth special defense is DENIED.