Opinion
24A-CC-74
05-21-2024
Kevin Martin, Appellant v. Robinson, et al., Appellees
APPELLANT PRO SE Kevin Martin Pendleton, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Abigail R. Recker Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Sullivan Circuit Court The Honorable Robert A. Pell, Special Judge Trial Court Cause No. 77C01-2006-CC-258
APPELLANT PRO SE
Kevin Martin Pendleton, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES
Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana
Abigail R. Recker Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
BROWN, JUDGE
[¶1] Kevin Martin, an inmate at the Wabash Correctional Facility ("WCF"), filed a complaint in the Sullivan Circuit Court alleging multiple claims against thirteen Indiana Department of Correction ("DOC") officials and employees. The defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings, which the trial court granted, dismissing Martin's complaint. Martin now appeals pro se asserting the trial court erred. We affirm.
Martin is no longer an inmate at WCF and is currently an inmate at the Pendleton Correctional Facility.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶2] On June 10, 2020, Martin filed a complaint against DOC employees T. Stevenson, H. Mills, J. Seprodi, E. Mefford, E. Drada, F. McDonald, A. Ledford, M. Ellis, J. Snyder, A. Chambers, T. Wellington, L. Wadhwan, and F. Littlejohn (collectively "the Defendants"). He alleged claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. He sought injunctive relief and compensatory and punitive damages.
Martin did not provide first names for the Defendants. He also named "Robinson" as defendant number "9" in his complaint. See Appellees' Appendix Volume 2 at 3. However, it is unclear from the record who Robinson is, and the Attorney General's Office indicates that it "did not appear for Robinson below or in this appeal." Appellees' Brief at 5, n.1.
[¶3] The facts alleged in Martin's complaint indicate that he was incarcerated at WCF between March 3 and May 29, 2020. While incarcerated there, he expressed concerns regarding his confinement to Defendants Snyder, Ellis, McDonald, Wellington, and Littlejohn. Specifically, he reported the conduct of Defendant Ledford. Thereafter, Martin began receiving "negative attention" which included the "retaliatory action" of Defendant Ledford providing "Sonny Davis" a telephone and Martin's family's telephone number. Appellees' Appendix Volume II at 5. Davis then made threatening telephone calls to Martin's family. Defendant Ledford also "filed a threatening charge" conduct report against Martin under prison disciplinary case WVS 20-04-0023. Id. Martin reported these "retaliation" acts to Defendants Mefford and Wadhwan but they failed to respond to his allegations in accordance with DOC policy No. 02-03-114. Id.
[¶4] At some point, Martin was moved from cell 607 to cell 603, and then was placed in a "camera cell" and had his television confiscated. Id. at 6. Martin believes this move was "for no reason," although Defendants Ellis, Snyder, Wellington, and Littlejohn told him he was moved because of his past "extensive history of battery on staff member[s] with bodily waste[.]" Id. But other prisoners that have been charged with battery of staff members were not placed in a camera cell.
[¶5] On May 29, 2020, Martin requested to speak to Defendant Chambers about Defendant Ledford "provid[ing] Sonny Davis with drugs." Id. at 7. Defendants Drada, Mefford, Seprodi, Robinson, Mills, Stevenson, Wellington, and Wadhwan did not report "about the drugs problem" allegedly because" a lot of them [are] behind this problem." Id. Finally, Defendants Wellington and Littlejohn miscalculated Martin's time in restrictive housing (90 days instead of 30) in violation of DOC policy No. 00-02-301.
[¶6] After this complaint was filed, the Defendants answered, some discovery was completed, and the Defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings. The trial court granted judgment in favor of the Defendants and dismissed Martin's complaint.
The Defendants state on appeal that although they "titled their motion as a motion for summary judgment and set forth the summary judgment standard, the motion was really a motion for judgment on the pleadings because [the Defendants] did not rely on matters outside the pleadings and took Martin's factual allegations as true. See Ind. Trial Rule 12(C)." Appellees' Brief at 11.
Discussion
[¶7] We begin by noting that Martin proceeds pro se. It is well established that pro se litigants are held to the same standards as a trained attorney and are afforded no inherent leniency simply by virtue of being self-represented. Zavodnik v. Harper, 17 N.E.3d 259, 266 (Ind. 2014). As this is far from Martin's first appellate rodeo, we remind him that to the extent he does not present cogent argument, the issues or assertions he attempts to present will be deemed waived. See Martin v. Hunt, 130 N.E.3d 135, 137 (Ind.Ct.App. 2019) (finding waiver of issues because Martin did not provide cogent argument, citation to relevant legal precedent, citation to pages in record, or sufficient facts or procedural history; brief was handwritten and barely legible; arguments did not focus on trial court's order; and he relied primarily on irrelevant facts not in the record and failed to cogently explain relevance of cases).
[¶8] The issue is whether the court erred in granting the Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings. We review de novo a trial court's ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Murray v. City of Lawrenceburg, 925 N.E.2d 728, 731 (Ind. 2010). We accept as true the well-pleaded material facts alleged in the complaint and base our ruling solely on the pleadings. Id. A Rule 12(C) motion for judgment on the pleadings is to be granted "only when it is clear from the face of the pleadings that the plaintiff cannot in any way succeed under the operative facts and allegations made therein." Bayer Corp. v. Leach, 147 N.E.3d 313, 315 (Ind. 2020). When, as here, a 12(C) motion essentially argues the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, we treat it as a 12(B)(6) motion. KS&E Sports v. Runnels, 72 N.E.3d 892, 898 (Ind. 2017).
[¶9] Martin first contends the trial court erred because he alleged sufficient facts to support his claim that Defendant Ledford retaliated against him in violation of the First Amendment. It is well settled that a prisoner may sue prison officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when they are alleged to have retaliated against a prisoner's exercise of First Amendment rights. Medley v. Lemmon, 994 N.E.2d 1177, 1189 (Ind.Ct.App. 2013), trans. denied. To prevail on a First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff must show that: "(1) he engaged in activity protected by the First Amendment; (2) he suffered a deprivation that would likely deter First Amendment activity in the future; and (3) the First Amendment activity was 'at least a motivating factor' in the Defendants' decision to take the retaliatory action." Whitfield v. Spiller, 76 F.4th 698, 707-708 (7th Cir. 2023) (cleaned up).
[¶10] The Defendants concede that "submitting a [prison] grievance is a protected First Amendment activity." Appellees' Brief at 13 (citing Douglas v. Reeves, 964 F.3d 643, 656 (7th Cir. 2020) and Medley, 994 N.E.2d at 1190). The Defendants also do not appear to dispute that Martin pleaded sufficient facts that he suffered a deprivation that would likely deter him from submitting grievances in the future. The Defendants focus on the third element of a First Amendment retaliation claim and argue that judgment on the pleadings was appropriate because the record is "devoid of any factual allegation connecting the grievance Martin allegedly submitted against Defendant Ledford to Defendant Ledford then allegedly providing Mr. Davis with a telephone to make threatening phone calls to Martin's family." Id. at 14; see Medley, 994 N.E.2d at 1190 (third element implies there must be a causal connection between the protected activity and the deprivation or "adverse action" taken by prison official).
As noted by the Defendants, Martin alleges in his complaint that Defendant Ledford also filed a disciplinary charge/conduct report against him in retaliation for him submitting a grievance. On appeal, Martin merely mentions the alleged "false conduct report" in a single sentence in his brief and he develops no further argument. Appellant's Br. at 12. Accordingly, the issue is waived. See Martin, 130 N.E.3d at 137.
[¶11] Martin's complaint is wrought with conclusory statements and allegations, but devoid of operative facts to support his retaliation claim. He argues that he pleaded sufficient facts to connect his submitting a grievance with Defendant Ledford's motivation for her alleged retaliatory action because he attached the affidavits of offender Charles Chatman to his complaint and Chatman stated that he overheard Defendant Ledford "speaking to Davis and they plan to do harm to Kevin Martin." Appellant's Brief at 12. However, a review of Chatman's affidavits reveals only that he allegedly overheard Defendant Ledford speaking to other inmates that she planned to "do harm" to Martin by not giving him his "legal mail" on time or that she planned to make "deliberate mistakes" by placing Martin's mail in the "wrong mailbag." Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 78-79. This affidavit contains no facts that Martin's alleged First Amendment activity was at least a motivating factor in Defendant Ledford's decision to take the retaliatory action alleged in the complaint, which according to Martin, was providing Davis with "drugs and [a] cellphone" in order to threaten Martin. Appellant's Brief at 12. In sum, Martin has pled insufficient operative facts such that it is clear from the face of the pleadings that he cannot succeed on a claim that the Defendants violated his rights under the First Amendment.
[¶12] As for the trial court's entry of judgment on the pleadings and dismissal of his claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, we agree with the Defendants that Martin has waived appellate review. Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a) requires that the argument section of a brief "contain the contentions of the appellant on the issues presented, supported by cogent reasoning." In his handwritten appellate brief which is often unintelligible, under a heading that includes the term "Equal Protection Claim," he makes arguments wholly unrelated to the Fourteenth Amendment or any constitutional claim, he repeats no factual allegations from his complaint, and he baldly asserts without any relevant context or explanation of legal authority that he is simply entitled to reversal because he was "target[ed]" due to his "different race." Appellant's Brief at 16. It is Martin's burden to establish trial court error, and we will not step in the shoes of the advocate and fashion arguments on his behalf or address arguments that are improperly expressed or too poorly developed or expressed to be understood. Miller v. Patel, 212 N.E.3d 639, 657 (Ind. 2023) (citations omitted). The issue is waived.
[¶13] We reach a similar conclusion regarding additional issues Martin attempts to raise in his appellate brief and we decline to address them as, like his Equal Protection claim, his arguments are unintelligible and we are unable to discern what he is arguing or the legal authority upon which he relies due to the lack of cogency. While we prefer to decide cases on their merits, alleged errors are waived when an appellant's noncompliance with the Indiana Rules of Appellate Procedure is so substantial it impedes our consideration of the errors. Perry v. Anonymous Physician 1, 25 N.E.3d 103, 105 n.1 (Ind.Ct.App. 2014), trans. denied. The issues are waived. See, e.g., Martin, 130 N.E.3d at 138 (issues waived for violations of Indiana Appellate Rules to the extent that we were unable to ascertain Martin's arguments).
[¶14] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
[¶15] Affirmed.
Riley, J., and Foley, J., concur.