Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in making the following findings: Applying the principles ennunciated in Harris v. Pizza Hut, 455 So.2d 1364 (Supreme Court, 1984) and in Martin v. Piggly Wiggly, 469 So.2d 1057 (2nd Cir. 1985) the court concludes that the defendant Winn-Dixie is negligent under the facts and circumstances of this case. the employees should have paid more attention to the shoplifter and not relaxed their guard as indicated . . . In Martin v. Piggly Wiggly, supra, there was a similar factual situation.
In K-Mart Corp. v. Lentini , the appellate court reversed a jury verdict for the plaintiff because "Kmart's conduct [had not] foreseeably created a broader zone of risk that posed a general threat of harm to others" where the shoplifter, "who until then had been calm and cooperative, suddenly left his chair and ran out of the conference room and through the store, [before] colliding with the plaintiff." 469 So. 2d 1057, 1059 (La. Ct. App. 1985). 225 Minn. 280, 30 N.W.2d 536, 537, 539 (1948).
It further argued that many cases indicate that where a shoplifter has voluntarily agreed to accompany a store employee and has unexpectedly bolted from the store employee, the store is not responsible for the customer's injury. In support of this proposition, it cited Graham v. Great Atlantic Pacific Tea Co., 240 So.2d 157 (Fla.App. 1970); Radloff v. National Food Stores, Inc., 20 Wis.2d 224, 121 N.W.2d 865, rehearing denied, 20 Wis.2d 224, 123 N.W.2d 570 (1963); Knight v. Powers Dry Goods Co., 225 Minn. 280, 30 N.W.2d 536 (1948); and Martin v. Piggly — Wiggly Corp., 469 So.2d 1057 (La.App. 1985). To support its position that its employees did not expect the shoplifter to bolt and injure the appellant, Sears submitted the affidavits of Henry Jones and Michelle Taylor, the loss prevention guards who were escorting the shoplifter.
The court refused to impose that duty, concluding it would be wholly unreasonable to require apprehension before the storekeeper had a stronger basis for believing that the suspect did not intend to pay. There was no evidence of primary negligence in Martin v. Piggly Wiggly Corp., 469 So.2d 1057 (La. App. 1985), where the security officer was pushed to the ground by an accomplice of the suspect while the security officer was attempting to handcuff the suspect. Summary judgment for the defendant was affirmed in Butler v. K-Mart Corp., 432 So.2d 968 (La. App. 1983).
Id. While we have not heretofore had occasion to apply these and related rules in a case involving shoplifting, other courts have done so with varying results. See Annotation, Liability of Storekeeper for Injury to Customer Arising Out of Pursuit of Shoplifter, 14 A.L.R.4th 950 (1982); Martin v. Piggly Wiggly Corp., 469 So.2d 1057 (La.Ct.App. 1985); Jones v. Lyon Stores, 82 N.C. App. 438, 346 S.E.2d 303 (1986); Passovoy v. Nordstrom, Inc., 52 Wn. App. 166, 758 P.2d 524 (1988). Most of these cases involve the issue of whether a storekeeper should have reasonably foreseen that a detained shoplifter would suddenly bolt and flee, injuring a customer in his flight from the store.
The conduct of Dillard's employees in the investigation of this situation was a cause-in-fact of Ms. Manning's injury. Relying upon Martin v. Piggly Wiggly Corp., 469 So.2d 1057 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1985), Dillard's argues that once it called Sergeant Murdock to investigate this suspected credit card fraud, it was absolved of its duty to exercise reasonable care to protect its patrons from an unreasonable risk of harm. Martin cited Rodriguez v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc., 400 So.2d 884 (La. 1981).
Appellant argues no evidence was introduced at trial "to show that the shoplifter would not have knocked down [Mrs. Brock] `but for' the pursuit of the Winn Dixie employees." Citing Martin v. Piggly Wiggly Corp., 469 So.2d 1057 (La.App. 2nd Cir. 1985) and Butler v. K-Mart Corporation, 432 So.2d 968 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1983), Appellant urges the holdings in these cases are dispositive of the "but for" issue now before us. We disagree.
Plaintiffs argue that this case is analogous to Bolden v. Winn Dixie, 513 So.2d 341 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1987), writ denied, 514 So.2d 1177 (La. 1987), where the defendant supermarket was held liable in damages to a store patron who was knocked down by a fleeing shoplifter. While Bolden is arguably analogous to the instant case, it is clearly contrary to Martin v. Piggly Wiggly Corp., 469 So.2d 1057 (La.App. 2d Cir. 1985), where this court found no liability on the part of the supermarket under similar facts. It should be noted, further, that the Bolden court concluded that the negligence of the defendant supermarket was the failure to properly guard the shoplifting suspect.
As a business, its fundamental obligations towards its invites are to exercise reasonable care to protect its customers and to maintain its premises in a reasonably safe condition for use in a manner consistent with the purpose of the premises. Rousseau v. Deramus, 342 So.2d 276 (La.App. 3d Cir. 1977); Martin v. Piggly Wiggly Corp., 469 So.2d 1057 (La.App. 2d Cir. 1985); Gonzales v. Winn Dixie, 326 So.2d 486 (La. 1976); Kavlich v. Kramer, 315 So.2d 282 (La. 1975). Once we have decided the standard, we must determine what it requires in this case.
The following inquiries must be made in order to determine legal responsibility in tort claims: (1) whether the conduct of which the plaintiff complains was a cause-in-fact of the harm; (2) whether there was a duty on the part of the defendant to protect the victim against the risk involved; (3) whether there was a breach of that duty. Hill v. Lundin Assoc., 260 La. 542, 256 So.2d 620 (1972); Dixie Drive It Yourself System v. Am. Beverage Co., 242 La. 471, 137 So.2d 298 (1962); Martin v. Piggly Wiggly Corp., 469 So.2d 1057 (La.App. 2d Cir. 1985). Conduct is a cause-in-fact of harm to another if it was a substantial factor in bringing about that harm.