Opinion
No. M2002-00711-WC-R3-CV.
Filed May 23, 2003.
Direct Appeal from the Chancery Court for Marion County; No. 6400,; Jeffrey F. Stewart, Chancellor.
Reversed in Part and Remanded
Andrew J. Berke, Berke, Berke Berke, Chattanooga, Tennessee for the appellant, Donald Martin.
Bruce C. Bailey, Chambliss, Bahner Stophel, Chattanooga, Tennessee, for the appellee, Norris Son, Inc.
Joe C. Loser, Jr., delivered the opinion of the court, in which Frank F. Drowota, III, C. J., and James L. Weatherford, Sr. J., joined.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employee insists the trial court erred in denying his motion for summary judgment and in granting summary judgment in favor of the employer. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the trial court erred in summarily dismissing the complaint.
The employee or claimant, Mr. Martin, initiated this civil action to recover workers' compensation benefits for injuries he suffered when he was stabbed by a co-worker in a motel room in South Pittsburg. Both the employee and the employer, Norris Son, Inc., moved for summary judgment. Following oral arguments, the trial court denied the employee's motion and entered summary judgment of dismissal for insufficient proof that the injury arose out of the employment relationship. The claimant has appealed.
Ordinarily, the standard of review in a workers' compensation case is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of correctness of findings of fact, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(2). However; when summary judgment has been granted in workers' compensation cases, review is governed by Tenn. R.Civ.P. 56, which requires the court to review the record without a presumption of correctness to determine whether the absence of genuine issues of material fact entitles the movant to judgment as a matter of law. The standard governing the assessment of evidence in the summary judgment context is well established. Courts must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and must also draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Summary judgment should be granted only when both the facts and the inferences to be drawn from the facts permit a reasonable person to reach only one conclusion. Goodloe v. State, 36 S.W.3d 62, 65 (Tenn. 2001) (citations omitted). Summary judgment is almost never an option in workers' compensation cases. Berry v. Consolidated Systems, Inc., 804 S.W.2d 445 (Tenn. 1991).
The claimant is a journeyman brick mason who lives in Alabama. In 1998, he and two companions, Alton Jones and Gary Adkins, also journeyman brick masons, traveled to Bridgeport, Alabama to work for the employer. They were required to work twelve hours a day, seven days per week. Accordingly, the employer paid them per diem and paid for lodging at a motel in South Pittsburg, near the Alabama border, in addition to wages. They worked from 7:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m.
On October 31, 1998, the three men reported to work, but the foreman sent them home around 11:00 p.m. with full pay because continuation of the project required technical personnel who would not arrive until the next morning. They left the work site in the claimant's truck. On the way to the motel, they stopped at a convenience market and purchased beer. They then returned to the motel room shared by the claimant and Adkins, where they drank beer and talked. Their conversation turned to welfare and its correlation to various ethnic groups, including native Americans. Adkins, a native American, pulled a knife from his pocket and threatened Jones. When the claimant attempted to intervene, Adkins stabbed him in his left side, injuring him. There had never before been any kind of confrontation or altercation between the claimant and Adkins.
The claimant contends the case is controlled by rules applicable to traveling employees. The employer contends it is simply an assault case.
Under the Tennessee Workers' Compensation Act, the right of an employee who suffers a work-related injury to recover compensation benefits from his employer is governed by the statutes in effect at the time of the injury. Nutt v. Champion Intern. Corp., 980 S.W.2d 365, 368 (Tenn. 1998). Such statutes are part of the contract of employment and the rights and responsibilities of such injured employee and his employer can only be ascertained from a consideration of those statutes as construed by the courts. Hudnall v. S. W. Constr. Co. of Tenn., Inc., 60 Tenn. App. 743, 451 S.W.2d 858 (1969). The Act is in the nature of an insurance policy, Hughes v. Elliott, 162 Tenn. 188, 35 S.W.2d 387 (1931), and an action to recover the benefits provided therein is an action on a contract. Woods v. City of LaFollette, 185 Tenn. 655, 207 S.W.2d 572 (1948).
The Act expressly requires that it be given "equitable construction" and declares itself to be a remedial Act. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-116. It must be interpreted in a manner designed to protect workers and their families from the economic devastation that can follow on-the-job injuries. Nance v. State Ind., Inc., 33 S.W.3d 222, 227 (Tenn. 2000).
Under the Act, injuries by accident arising out of and in the course of employment which cause either disablement or death of the employee, are compensable. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-103(a); McCurry v. Container Corp. of America, 982 S.W.2d 841, 843 (Tenn. 1998). "Arising out of" refers to the origin of the injury in terms of causation and "in the course of"relates to time, place and circumstance. Id. Not every injury that occurs in the course of employment also arises out of the employment, but any reasonable doubt as to whether an injury arises out of the employment should be resolved in favor of the employee. Reeser v. Yellow Freight System, Inc., 938 S.W.2d 690, 692 (Tenn. 1997).
For injuries resulting from a willful assault upon an employee, there is no formula from which one can clearly define the line between accidents which arise out of and in the course of employment and those which do not. Bell v. Kelso Oil Co., 597 S.W.2d 731, 734 (Tenn. 1980). Generally, an injury arises out of and in the course of employment if it has a rational causal connection to the work and occurs while the employee is engaged in the duties of his employment; and any reasonable doubt as to whether an injury arose out of the employment should be resolved in favor of the employee. Braden v. Sears, Roebuck Co., 833 S.W.2d 496, 498 (Tenn. 1992).
Traveling employees are generally considered to be in the course of their employment, for purposes of workers' compensation, continuously during the entire trip, except when there is a distinct departure on a personal errand, and injury to or death of such employee while reasonably engaged in a reasonable recreational or social activity arises out of and in the course of the employment. McCann v. Hatchett, 19 S.W.3d 218, 221-22 (Tenn. 2000) (emphasis added). In McCann, a traveling worker drowned in the pool of the hotel in which he had lodged while working at an out-of-state job site. Under such circumstances, this court reversed a trial court's summary dismissal. We hold the McCann rule to be applicable to the facts of the present case. Hence, we cannot say that the facts and inferences to be drawn from those facts would permit a reasonable person to reach only one conclusion.
For the above reasons, the denial of the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is affirmed, but the granting of the defendant's motion for summary judgment is reversed and the case remanded to the Chancery Court for Marion County for proceedings consistent with this opinion. We express no opinion as to the ultimate result to be reached after remand. Costs are taxed to the parties equally.
JUDGMENT
This case is before the Court upon the entire record, including the order of referral to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel, and the Panel's Memorandum Opinion setting forth its findings of fact and conclusions of law, which are incorporated herein by reference.
Whereupon, it appears to the Court that the Memorandum Opinion of the Panel should be accepted and approved; and
It is, therefore, ordered that the Panel's findings of fact and conclusions of law are adopted and affirmed, and the decision of the Panel is made the judgment of the Court.
Costs will be taxed to the parties equally, for which execution may issue if necessary.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
PER CURIAM