If the Court finds otherwise, Geico suggests that it would not only contravene the intent of the parties, but that it would also lead to an absurd and overly broad interpretation of an unambiguous set of terms. As support, Geico relies primarily on the Second District's opinion in Martin v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 235 So.2d 14, 16 (Fla. 2d DCA 1970), where an insured had an automobile insurance policy that provided coverage for “owned automobiles, ” defined, in part, as a private passenger, farm or utility automobile. Id. at 15.

In Martin v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Company, Florida's Second District Court of Appeal interpreted a liability insurance policy with similar definitions for the terms "private passenger automobile," "farm automobile," and "utility automobile." 235 So.2d 14, 16-17 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970). The court explained that those definitions revealed a common- "albeit implicit"-element: all had "as an inherent design characteristic the capacity to be driven legally and safely on public highways."

Ward v. Florida Farm Bureau Cas. Ins., supra. For example, a jeep, not operable on the highway due to a lack of rear brakes and other major deficiencies, and intended by its owner to be used only on farmland, was held not an automobile within the automatic coverage clause. Martin v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 235 So.2d 14 (Fla. 2d DCA 1970). Other cases have also recognized that vehicles needing major repairs are not automobiles within the terms of policy.

In Florida, a contract of insurance should be read to give effect to the intention of the contracting parties. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Imperial Cas. Indem. Co., 168 So.2d 688 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964). Courts should construe contracts of insurance to achieve a construction that is practical and reasonable as well as just. Martin v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 235 So.2d 14 (Fla. 2d DCA 1970). The finding that the language here is ambiguous is consistent with the intent of the parties.

Because an insurance policy is a contract, a court construes it in accordance with the rules of interpretation and construction applicable to ordinary contracts. See Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y v. Pinon, 344 So.2d 880, 882 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 354 So.2d 984 (Fla. 1977); Martin v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 235 So.2d 14, 16 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1970). Parties to an insurance contract may fix terms as they desire, and a court will not rewrite those terms unless they are ambiguous.

in the policy by insurer have either been invalidated as contrary to statutory policy or strictly construed against insurer. Zeagler v. Commercial Insurance Co. of Baltimore, Md., Fla.App. 1964, 166 So.2d 616; Davis v. United States Fidelity Guaranty, Fla.App. 1965, 172 So.2d 485; Sellers v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., Fla. 1966, 185 So.2d 689; Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Powell, Fla.App. 1968, 206 So.2d 244; Butts v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., Fla.App. 1968, 207 So.2d 73; National Service Fire Insurance Co. v. Mikell, Fla.App. 1967, 204 So.2d 343; Forbes v. Allstate Insurance Company, Fla.App. 1968, 210 So.2d 244; Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v. Mason, Fla.App. 1968, 210 So.2d 474; American Fire Casualty Co. v. Williams, Fla.App. 1969, 226 So.2d 141; Valdes v. Prudence Mutual Casualty Co., Fla.App. 1968, 207 So.2d 312; Prudential Life Insurance Co. v. Boyce, Fla.App. 1970, 234 So.2d 704; and Martin v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., Fla.App. 1970, 235 So.2d 14. Lumbermen's Mutual Ins. Co. v. Seaton, (Fla.App.) 207 So.2d 733. The District Court states, and we agree from our inspection, that there is no definition in the policy of the term "automobile.

2. provided that no insurance shall be applicable to such newly acquired automobile unless as a condition precedent the named insured within 30 days following such delivery date applies to the company for insurance on such newly acquired automobile.See Silverstein v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 505 F.2d 158 (5th Cir. 1974); Southern Ins. Co. v. Charlotte Storage and Warehouse, Inc., 251 So.2d 725 (Fla. 2d DCA 1971); Martin v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 235 So.2d 14 (Fla. 2d DCA 1970). The record reflects that Lockley filed a claim with State Farm on August 16, 1976, two days after the accident.

We therefore conclude that the vehicle involved here was covered by Stevens' policy. Economy has cited and relied upon the Florida case of Martin v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Co. (Fla. App. 1970), 235 So.2d 14. It must be conceded that the vehicle and insurance policy provisions involved in that case are very similar to those of this case. Nevertheless, we believe the result we have reached to be the proper one, and we therefore respectfully decline to follow the Martin case.

from another insurer to cover negligent operation of Randle Eastern's vehicles and which policy, in fact, covered the accident in which Mr. Merrill was injured) did not, due to a clause excluding coverage for bodily injury arising out of the operation of any automobile operated by Randle Eastern, provide coverage to the Merrills; and (2) an ambulance, being, inter alia, a self-propelled wheeled vehicle designed for the transportation of persons on streets and roadways, see Loftus v. Pennsylvania Life Insurance Company, 314 So.2d 159 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975); Seaford v. Nationwide Mutual InsuranceCompany, 253 N.C. 719, 117 S.E.2d 733 (1961); Annot., Accident Insurance "Automobile" — "Car," 38 A.L.R.2d 867 (1954); see also Annot., Uninsured Motorist Provision — "Automobile," 65 A.L.R.3d 851 (1975), unambiguously falls within the generic and ordinary meaning of the term automobile absent record evidence that the ambulance was designed to be used, and used, other than as an automobile, compare Martin v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Company, 235 So.2d 14 (Fla. 2d DCA 1970) (a "jeep," hand-built by the insured for use in roaming the pasture lands of a farm, but without the capacity to be legally and safely driven on public highways, is not an automobile) or absent other policy definitions which mandate a contrary conclusion, compare Hodges v. National Union Indemnity Company, 249 So.2d 679 (Fla. 1971) (a Chevrolet El Camino, indisputably used to haul business-related materials, as "truck type not used in business or for commercial purposes"). Affirmed.

See Bank of Commerce v. Occidental Fire Casualty Co., Fla.App. 1972, 264 So.2d 101. The Second District Court of Appeal in Martin v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Co., Fla.App. 1970, 235 So.2d 14, considered the purposes underlying "automatic insurance" provisions in automobile liability insurance contracts. The court said: