In plaintiff's favor, other courts have construed the "other paper" requirement broadly. See Martin v. Mentor Corp., 142 F. Supp. 2d 1346, 1349 (M.D. Fla. 2001) ("Once the [d]efendant is properly before the court . . . and discovers grounds for removal, [d]efendant must remove within thirty days of discovering those grounds, regardless of whether such information is contained in properly served amended pleadings or from some other source . . . ." (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)). Indeed, courts have held that even informal communications may provide notice of a potential basis for removal.
In the Middle District of Florida, whether "to award fees and costs under [ 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (c)] is within the Court's sole discretion." Smith v. Health Ctr. of Lake City, 2003 U.S. Dist. Lexis 3801, *30 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 5, 2003); Martin v. Mentor Corp., 142 F. Supp.2d 1346, 1349 (M.D. Fla. 2001) ("The award of attorney's fees and costs under this section is discretionary with the trial court"). At this juncture, the Court declines to award attorney's fees and costs because the Plaintiff has not obtained relief from the automatic stay imposed under § 362 of the Bankruptcy Code, and this Court questions whether it has the authority to enter a judgment against S.B. Trucking and Jackson for their pre-petition court filings.
Courts have therefore considered the distinction between pre- and post-suit demand letters when determining whether they are “other papers” for the purpose of considering whether an action was timely removed. See United Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. A & E Factory, LLC, 6:14-CV-1987-CEM-TBS, 2015 WL 328223, *2 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 26, 2015); Martin v. Mentor, 142 F.Supp.2d 1346, 1349 (M.D. Fla. 2001); see also Depina v. Iron Mountain Info. Mgmt., Inc., 3:05-CV-219-J-HLA-MMH, 2005 WL 1319231, *1 (M.D. Fla. June 1, 2005).
, ” then attorney's fees should not be granted. Martin v. Mentor Corp., 142 F.Supp.2d 1346, 1349 (M.D. Fla. 2001); see also Ruiz v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 21-22452-CIV, 2021 WL 4991241, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 30, 2021). Given Defendant's attempts to confer with Plaintiff to determine the value of Plaintiff's damages before seeking removal, Defendant appears to have acted reasonably.
“Whether to award fees and costs under this section is within the Court's sole discretion.” Smith v. Health Ctr. of Lake City, Inc., 252 F.Supp.2d 1336, 1346 (M.D. Fla. 2003) (citing Martin v. Mentor Corp., 142 F.Supp.2d 1346, 1349 (M.D. Fla. 2001)). Plaintiffs' motion should be DENIED in this respect because the fee request is conclusory and fails to include any support for a finding that either ISC or T-Mobile lacked a reasonably objective basis for removal.
Once a defendant is properly before a court and discovers grounds that would justify removal, the defendant is required to remove within "thirty days of discovering those grounds, regardless of whether such information is contained in formally served amended pleadings or from some other source." Martin v. Mentor Corp., 142 F. Supp. 2d 1346, 1349 (M.D. Fla. 2001) (citing Trahant v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14870, at *5 (E.D. La. Oct. 3, 2000)). Upon review, the court notes that Plaintiffs refer to the Acceptance of Service in their July 11, 2019 email as "a courtesy draft."
Once a defendant is properly before a court and discovers grounds that would justify removal, the defendant is required to remove within "thirty days of discovering those grounds, regardless of whether such information is contained in formally served amended pleadings or from some other source." Martin v. Mentor Corp., 142 F. Supp. 2d 1346, 1349 (M.D. Fla. 2001) (citing Trahant v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14870, at *5 (E.D. La. Oct. 3, 2000)). Upon review, the court notes that Plaintiffs refer to the Acceptance of Service in their July 11, 2019 email as "a courtesy draft."
A defendant's receipt of a plaintiff's proposal for settlement constitutes legally sufficient notice for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). See, e.g., Martin v. Mentor Corp., 142 F. Supp. 2d 1346, 1349 (M.D. Fla. 2001) ("facsimile receipt of Plaintiffs' Proposal [for Settlement] on December 11, 2000, constituted legally sufficient notice for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) and . . . Defendant . . . waived its right to removal"). Therefore, under Martin, Griffis's motion to remand is due to be granted on these grounds alone.
Indeed, "[w]here there is any doubt concerning jurisdiction of federal court upon removal, the case should be remanded." Martin v. Mentor Corp., 142 F. Supp. 2d 1346, 1347 (M.D. Fla. 2001) (quotation omitted). 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2) provides that "[a] civil action otherwise removable only on the basis of the jurisdiction under section 1332(a) of this title may not be removed if any of the parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought."
Courts throughout this district uniformly hold that a showing of bad faith on the part of the defendant is not a prerequisite to recovery of fees under § 1447(c). See id.; Martin v. Mentor Corp., 142 F. Supp. 2d 1346, 1349 (M.D. Fla. 2001) (noting that "a showing of bad faith is not necessary as a predicate to the award of attorney's fees" under § 1447(c)). Instead, the "intent of [§ 1447(c)] is to reimburse plaintiffs who have incurred expenses in attacking improper removals."