Opinion
No. 352210
05-20-2021
TAMMY LEE MARTIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JEFFREY ALLAN MARTIN, Defendant-Appellee.
If this opinion indicates that it is "FOR PUBLICATION," it is subject to revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports. UNPUBLISHED Ottawa Circuit Court
LC No. 10-068039-DM Before: SAWYER, P.J., and STEPHENS and RICK, JJ. PER CURIAM.
In this domestic relations case, plaintiff-mother, Tammy Lee Martin, appeals by right the trial court's opinion and order modifying spousal support and setting the amount of attorney fees that she was ordered to pay to defendant-father, Jeffrey Allan Martin. These sums were imposed by the trial court as a sanction for plaintiff violating the parenting-time order. We affirm and remand to the trial court to allow it to correct the amount of attorney fees awarded.
I. BASIC FACTS
This case arises from a high-conflict and complicated divorce and child custody battle. The original custody orders governed custody and parenting time for the parties' three children. However, by the time at issue in this appeal, the only child still subject to a custody order was the parties' daughter, AM. The lower court record includes substantial evidence that over time, plaintiff engaged in a concerted effort to alienate the children from defendant. In an attempt to preserve defendant's eroding relationship with AM, the trial court entered an opinion and order awarding defendant sole legal and physical custody of AM in May 2019. The court also ordered plaintiff to pay defendant's reasonable attorney fees arising from her violation of court orders, but reserved setting the amount of the award. Plaintiff appealed the trial court's opinion and order changing custody to this Court and we affirmed. See Martin v Martin, 331 Mich App 224, 227-234; 952 NW2d 530 (2020).
In August 2019, defendant moved for an order setting the amount of attorney fees. He asked the trial court to offset the amount against his remaining spousal support obligation. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing over two days to take evidence concerning the amount of defendant's reasonable attorney fees and to consider whether to modify defendant's obligation to pay spousal support.
The trial court entered its opinion and order resolving the dispute on December 26, 2019. The trial court found that defendant's reasonable attorney fees arising from plaintiff's violations amounted to $37,828. Turning to the issue of spousal support, the trial court found that defendant had the ability to pay spousal support, but that plaintiff had caused defendant to incur thousands of dollars in legal fees and counseling fees as a result of her efforts to alienate the children. Further, it found that defendant had hundreds of thousands of dollars in expenses associated with the post-judgment litigation. The court also found that both parties contributed to the breakdown of the marriage, but that plaintiff had "been primarily responsible for the post-judgment conflict of the past few years." Finally, the trial court determined that general principles of equity favored an offset of spousal support:
Plaintiff bears the primary responsibility for the failure of the father-children reconciliation efforts that were made prior to the parties' sons reaching adulthood. Reconciliation efforts between father and daughter subsequently showed progress, but when plaintiff's parenting time was restored, that progress was lost. With plaintiff's parenting time restricted to therapy sessions only (which have not been occurring), the father-daughter relationship has again been improving. In the past three years, plaintiff's implacable hostility and deliberate undermining of any reconciliation efforts have been the primary factors in this high-conflict saga. Despite plaintiff's financial need, she has not shown a deserving basis for ongoing spousal support, and it is entirely appropriate that spousal support be used as the means for her contribution to defendant's attorney fees and costs caused by her undermining of the Court's orders and defendant's efforts to reconcile his relationship with his children.
On the basis of these findings, the trial court required plaintiff to use $500 of the $1,700 in monthly spousal support paid to plaintiff by defendant to compensate defendant for the attorney-fee award. The court indicated that the new support order of $1,200 would begin January 1, 2020. The court further ordered that the $500 a month reduction in spousal support would constitute a credit against the award of attorney fees.
Plaintiff now appeals in this Court.
II. FEE AWARD AND SPOUSAL SUPPORT
A. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Plaintiff argues on several grounds that the trial court did not have the authority to enter the order compelling her to pay defendant's attorney fees. She also claims generally that the trial court erred when it ordered her to pay defendant's attorney fees and modified defendant's spousal support on that basis.
A trial court's award of attorney fees and costs are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Colen v Colen, 331 Mich App 295, 300; 952 NW2d 558 (2020). A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision falls outside the range of principled outcomes. Richards v Richards, 310 Mich App 683, 699; 874 NW2d 704 (2015). "The trial court's factual findings underlying an award of attorney fees are reviewed for clear error." Colen, 331 Mich App at 300. A finding is clearly erroneous if this Court is "left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." Id. (cleaned up). Questions of law are reviewed de novo. Id.
B. JURISDICTION AND SCOPE OF THE APPEAL
We note at the outset that plaintiff argues matters that are beyond the scope of whether the trial court erred when it ordered her to pay defendant's reasonable attorney fees. For example, she claims that the trial court should have ordered defendant to pay a percentage of his bonuses to her, as required under the judgment of divorce, and suggests that the trial court erred to the extent that it did not find defendant in contempt. Plaintiff appealed the trial court's order regarding the amount of attorney fees awarded to defendant, which was a final order appealable by right. See MCR 7.202(6)(a)(iv); MCR 7.203(A)(1). However, this Court does not have jurisdiction to consider any claims that may involve different final orders. See Mossing v Demlow Prod, Inc, 287 Mich App 87, 91-94; 782 NW2d 780 (2010). Accordingly, we limit our analysis to those claims of error that plaintiff has asserted concerning the final order at issue in this case.
C. THE ORDER TO PAY ATTORNEY FEES
On appeal, plaintiff raises several claims challenging the trial court's decision to order her to pay defendant's reasonable attorney fees arising from her refusal to comply with the court's parenting-time order. The trial court came to its decision after defendant moved to show cause arising from plaintiff's continued interference with his parenting time.
In December 2018, both defendant and plaintiff moved to show cause why the other should not be held in contempt for violating the trial court's orders. Defendant filed an additional motion to show cause after the hearings, but before the trial court entered its opinion and order in May 2019. In that motion, defendant alleged that plaintiff violated the court's orders by contacting AM during his parenting time and encouraging her to be disruptive. The trial court addressed these motions in its custody opinion.
The trial court found that both parties acted in contempt of its orders. However, it singled out plaintiff's conduct as particularly egregious. The court opined that the violations actually raised in the contempt motions were "minor"—at least by comparison to the "horrific alienation" that was ongoing in the case. It cited incidents when plaintiff confronted defendant in a parking lot and plaintiff's efforts to encourage AM to spy on defendant during his parenting time. The court found that these incidents involved "clear violations" of its April 2018 order. The court further found that plaintiff's "explanations and attempted excuses for these behaviors [were] simply not credible." The court did not find plaintiff in contempt of court for these additional violations. However, it concluded that plaintiff's behavior demonstrated that she acted in "bad faith" within the meaning of MCL 552.644(6) and ordered plaintiff to pay $250 as a sanction. It also ordered plaintiff to pay defendant's "reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred in the prosecution of [his] motion for order to show cause." The trial court later clarified that it awarded the attorney fees under MCR 3.206(D)(2)(b).
Under MCR 3.206(D)(1), "[a] party may, at any time, request that the court order the other party to pay all or part of the attorney fees and expenses related to the action or a specific proceeding, including a post-judgment proceeding." The rules further state that the party requesting the fees "must allege facts sufficient to show that":
(a) the party is unable to bear the expense of the action, including the expense of engaging in discovery appropriate for the matter, and that the other party is able to pay, or
(b) the attorney fees and expenses were incurred because the other party refused to comply with a previous court order, despite having the ability to comply, or engaged in discovery practices in violation of these rules. [MCR 3.206(D)(2).]
Contrary to plaintiff's claim on appeal, defendant did not have to present evidence that he was unable to pay for his own attorney fees before the trial court could order plaintiff to pay defendant's attorney fees arising from her wrongful conduct. Citing what is now MCR 3.206(D), this Court held that the rule "provides two independent bases for awarding attorney fees and expenses" in a domestic relations action. See Richards, 310 Mich App at 700. A court may order an award of attorney fees when necessary to enable a party to prosecute or defend a suit or it may order an award of attorney fees—in relevant part—when the requesting party has been forced to incur the fees as a result of the other party's refusal to comply with the trial court's previous order despite having the ability to do so. See MCR 3.206(D)(2). As such, an award of fees under MCR 3.206(D)(2)(b) does not depend on any one party's ability or inability to pay. Rather, in determining whether to award fees under MCR 3.206(D)(2)(b), the trial court must consider only the offending party's behavior. See Richards, 310 Mich App at 701. This is because the rule, as this Court has observed, was intended to reduce the incidents of vindictive and wrongful behavior by the parties to domestic relations cases and to shift the costs associated with such behavior to the party engaging in the wrongful behavior. See id. Consequently, the proper inquiry was whether plaintiff engaged in behavior which would justify an award under MCR 3.206(D)(2)(b). Therefore, plaintiff's argument that the trial court should not have ordered the sanction on the ground that she could not afford to pay the sanction is inapposite.
The trial court in this case found that plaintiff had violated its previous orders and that she had done so in bad faith—that is, it found that she engaged in the very type of behavior for which the court rule was intended to provide a remedy. See Richards, 310 Mich App at 701. For that reason, it determined that it was appropriate to sanction plaintiff by ordering her to pay defendant's reasonable attorney fees arising from her wrongful conduct. It relied on MCR 3.206(D)(2)(b) for authority to order the award. Because the trial court relied on MCR 3.206(D)(2)(b), it did not err when it determined that defendant did not have to establish that he was unable to bear the expense as required for an award under MCR 3.206(D)(2)(a).
When a party to a parenting time dispute has committed contempt and has done so in "bad faith," the trial court must order that party to pay a sanction of not more than $250. See MCL 552.644(6). The trial court ordered plaintiff to pay a sanction of $250 for her contemptuous conduct, which it found was done in bad faith. Even though the trial court ordered a sanction consistent with MCL 552.644(6), it was not precluded from ordering a sanction under MCR 3.206(D)(2)(b) for the same conduct.
Similarly, the trial court did not have to find that plaintiff was malicious or find that she filed a frivolous motion. MCR 3.206(D)(2)(b) applies when a party has refused to comply with the court's order and had the ability to do so. The court rule does not require evidence that a party's refusal to comply was malicious or evidence of frivolous filings. See MCR 3.206(D)(2)(b); cf. MCR 1.109(E)(6) and (7); MCR 2.625(A). At the hearing, plaintiff did not show that she was incapable of complying with the court's orders and the trial court specifically found that plaintiff's excuses for her behaviors were not credible. Because the trial court was in a superior position to judge the weight and credibility of the testimony, this Court defers to the trial court's resolution of the credibility dispute. MCR 2.613(C); see Berger v Berger, 277 Mich App 700, 703; 747 NW2d 336 (2008). The record amply supported that plaintiff refused to comply with the court's orders despite having the ability to comply, which was sanctionable under MCR 3.206(D)(2)(b).
Plaintiff's argument that the trial court lacked the authority to sanction her for filing a frivolous appeal is also misplaced. Contrary to plaintiff's contention, the record clearly indicates that the trial court sanctioned her for refusing to comply with its orders governing parenting time under MCR 3.206(D)(2). It did not sanction her filing an appeal of the order changing custody.
Plaintiff also asserts that the trial court failed to adequately explain the basis of its decision to award attorney fees. The trial court was required to "find the facts specially, state separately its conclusions of law, and direct entry" of an appropriate order. MCR 2.517(A)(1). The trial court did just that. It noted plaintiff's ongoing efforts to sabotage defendant's parenting time and cause AM to alienate from her father, which it characterized as "horrific." It also identified the specific acts that violated the court's orders—namely, plaintiff's parking lot confrontation with defendant and her encouragement of AM to spy on defendant during his parenting time. The court found that those acts demonstrated that plaintiff acted in bad faith. The trial court was not required to elaborate further. See MCR 2.517(A)(2). The court's findings and conclusions were sufficient to establish grounds for an award under MCR 3.206(D)(2)(b). Further, plaintiff has not identified any basis for concluding that the trial court clearly erred in its factual findings.
Plaintiff also argues that the trial court lacked the authority to order the award of attorney fees because defendant did not file his motion for an award under MCR 3.206(D)(2)(b) within the 21-day time limit that the trial court set. In its opinion and order of May 2019, the trial court ordered plaintiff to pay defendant's reasonable attorney fees arising from her refusal to comply with the court's orders. However, the court reserved its determination of the amount to be paid for a later time and stated that defendant "may file a motion to determine fees and costs within twenty-one days after the date of this Opinion and Order, and attach an itemized statement of such fees and costs."
MCR 3.206(D)(1) provides that a party may file a motion for attorney fees at any time. Nevertheless, this Court has held that a trial court may—in its discretion—bar a claim for attorney fees under that rule as untimely. See Colen, 331 Mich App at 304 (concluding that "a motion for attorney fees under MCR 3.206(D) must be brought within a reasonable time after the fees sought were incurred and that what constitutes a reasonable time depends on the particular facts and circumstances of each case."). Notably, the trial court did not provide in its order that a motion for attorney fees was required to be made within 21 days or the request would be deemed untimely. The trial court already ordered plaintiff to pay defendant's reasonable attorney fees as a sanction. Therefore, the only remaining matter involved the determination of the amount of the sanction.
The language on which plaintiff relies as an absolute bar to the trial court's authority did not explicitly provide a procedural bar to the imposition of a sanction. The trial court merely stated that defendant "may" file a motion to set that amount of the fees within 21 days. Nothing about the trial court's order suggested that defendant would waive the right to the fees if he did not file his motion within the 21-day period. The trial court also later stated that it did not intend to erect such a procedural barrier when it authorized defendant to file the motion and explained that it would never do so by implication. Rather, the court stated that it would have made such a limitation explicit. The trial court's interpretation is consistent with the language of the order. Therefore, the trial court did not misapply the order. See Silberstein v Pro-Golf of America, Inc, 278 Mich App 446, 460; 750 NW2d 615 (2008) (stating that this Court reviews de novo whether the trial court properly interpreted its own orders). On this record, the trial court's decision to entertain Defendant's motion after the 21-day period did not fall outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes. See Richards, 310 Mich App at 699.
Finally, plaintiff suggests that her wrongful conduct should be excused because she believed that she was acting to protect AM, among other things. However, plaintiff was not in a position to elect whether and to what extent she would follow the court's orders. Plaintiff was required to follow the trial court orders, even if the orders were "clearly incorrect." Schoensee v Bennett, 228 Mich App 305, 317; 577 NW2d 915 (1998). Accordingly, plaintiff's beliefs about the propriety of her actions cannot excuse her refusal to comply with the orders governing parenting time.
D. REASONABLENESS OF FEES
Plaintiff also argues that the trial court erred when it set the amount of defendant's reasonable fees. She claims that there was no way that defendant actually incurred the fees, no way that that amount could be associated just with defendant's lawyer's work on the show cause motion and hearing, and that the fees were generally unreasonable.
When determining the reasonableness of the fee award, the trial court had to engage in three steps. The trial court first had to determine "the reasonable hourly rate customarily charged in the locality for similar services." See Pirgu v United Servs Auto Ass'n, 499 Mich 269, 281; 884 NW2d 257 (2016). Next, it had to multiply that rate by the number of hours that the lawyer reasonably expended on the matter at issue to derive a baseline figure. Id. Finally, the trial court had to consider whether to adjust the baseline figure after reviewing the following eight factors:
(1) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services,
(2) the difficulty of the case, i.e., the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly,
(3) the amount in question and the results obtained,
(4) the expenses incurred,
(5) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client,
(6) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer,
(7) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances, and
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent. [Id. at 282.]
The trial court had before it an affidavit filed by defendant's lawyer, Connie Thacker, Thacker's curriculum vitae, and an economics survey from the State Bar of Michigan. The trial court examined the survey and compared it to Thacker's skill and experience. The court recognized that Thacker had 25 years of experience and was widely recognized as "skilled and experienced in the field of family law." On the basis of her skill and experience, the trial court determined that Thacker's $400 to $410 per hour rate was consistent with the rates reported in the State Bar of Michigan's survey for practitioners with comparable skill and experience. Accordingly, it found that Thacker's hourly rate was reasonable. Plaintiff has not challenged that finding on appeal.
The trial court also heard testimony and had evidence concerning the number of hours that Thacker expended on the show cause hearing. It had evidence that defendant had in fact been paying his bills. Defendant testified, for example, that he had over $100,000 in credit card debt that was mostly attorney fees. Defendant identified the invoices that he had received and stated that the billings from those invoices reflected the hours that Thacker spent on the show cause hearing. Thacker also averred that the hours itemized on the invoices reflected her work on the show cause matter alone. Although plaintiff suggests that Thacker could not have spent so many hours on the matter and believes that Thacker would not have actually billed defendant for those hours, plaintiff has not identified any grounds for disregarding the invoices or the evidence that defendant was legally obligated to pay the fees. The trial court examined each invoice and noted what was transpiring during the relevant period. The trial court apparently accepted that the invoices accurately reflected investigation into the underlying wrongful conduct, research, and appearances at the evidentiary hearings. Consequently, plaintiff has not shown that the trial court clearly erred when it relied on the invoices to calculate the total number of hours expended.
After calculating the hourly rate and total number of hours, the trial court considered the eight factors and commented on each. On the basis of its evaluation of these factors, the court reduced the total number of hours expended by 12 hours and subtracted $4,920 from the total $42,748 in legal fees. The court explained that those expenses would have been otherwise incurred by defendant and concluded that the attorney fees totaled "$37,898". The trial court also refused to allow billings for work done by legal assistants and paralegals because the record did not establish whether those persons met the criteria stated under MCR 2.626. We conclude that the trial court correctly followed all the procedures required for a determination of the reasonableness of the fee award. See Pirgu, 499 Mich at 281-282. The trial court indicated that the total "net" legal fees amounted to $37,989 and, based on the record, there are no other facts that support an increase of attorney fees by $1,000. Because the trial court ordered plaintiff to pay $38,989 in defendant's attorney fees without explanation as to the $1,000 discrepancy between its findings of fact and the total amount awarded, we conclude that the trial court inadvertently miscalculated and found that the total fees amounted to $38,989 instead of $37,989. Accordingly, we remand for the trial court to correct the clerical error in tabulating the sum amount of the attorney fee award.
E. MODIFICATION TO SPOUSAL SUPPORT
Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by modifying her spousal support because there was no triggering event, such as death or remarriage, that justified modification. She also claims that the $500 a month reduction in spousal support impoverished her.
The trial court had the authority to modify an order of spousal support unless the parties themselves expressly waived their statutory right to modification. See Staple v Staple, 241 Mich App 562, 565, 568-569; 616 NW2d 219 (2000); MCL 552.28. The trial court's authority to modify the support order also did not depend on the occurrence of an event such as death or remarriage. The original judgment of divorce did provide that the award of spousal support was "modifiable, terminable upon the death of either party, plaintiff's remarriage or cohabitation, or upon the expiration of ten (10) years," but that did not make the award unmodifiable absent a triggering event such as death or remarriage. "The trial court has continuing jurisdiction to modify a spousal support order, even without 'triggering language' in the judgment of divorce." Elahham v Al-Jabban, 319 Mich App 112, 132; 899 NW2d 768 (2017) (cleaned up). Although it could have been better stated, the judgment provided that the award was modifiable in general and terminable upon the happening of a listed event. See, e.g., Bonfiglio v Pring, 202 Mich App 61, 63-65; 507 NW2d 759 (1993); see also MCL 552.13(2). Therefore, the trial court had the discretion to modify its award of spousal support upon an adequate showing of new facts or changed circumstances. See Thornton v Thornton, 277 Mich App 453, 459; 746 NW2d 627 (2007) ("An alimony award can be modified on the basis of a showing of new facts or changed circumstances.").
Defendant moved for an award of attorney fees and an offset to his support obligation. He argued that plaintiff's bankruptcy, which discharged her debts, and the change in AM's custody constituted circumstances that warranted revisiting the support order. The trial court agreed that defendant had established a sufficient change in circumstances to warrant a review of the support order. Plaintiff has not challenged whether those events constituted an adequate change in circumstances to warrant a review of the support order. Additionally, the changed circumstances appear sufficient to review the order. See, e.g., Smith v Smith, 328 Mich App 279, 286-287; 936 NW2d 716 (2019) (noting that a change in wages occasioned by retirement is a changed circumstance that would warrant revisiting a support order).
The purpose of spousal support is "to balance the incomes and needs of the parties in a way that will not impoverish either," and an award of spousal support should be made on the basis of "what is just and reasonable under the circumstances of the case." Id. at 286 (cleaned up). In evaluating whether to modify a support order, the trial court had to consider all the circumstances to reach an equitable decision. See Andrusz v Andrusz, 320 Mich App 445, 459; 904 NW2d 636 (2017). Some factors to consider are:
(1) the past relations and conduct of the parties, (2) the length of the marriage, (3) the abilities of the parties to work, (4) the source and amount of
property awarded to the parties, (5) the parties' ages, (6) the abilities of the parties to pay alimony, (7) the present situation of the parties, (8) the needs of the parties, (9) the parties' health, (10) the prior standard of living of the parties and whether either is responsible for the support of others, (11) contributions of the parties to the joint estate, (12) a party's fault in causing the divorce, (13) the effect of cohabitation on a party's financial status, and (14) general principles of equity. [Olson v Olson, 256 Mich App 619, 631; 671 NW2d 64 (2003).]
In the instant case, the trial court took testimony about both parties' financial condition and was well aware of the nature of the underlying litigation. The court further addressed each of the factors identified in Olson when determining whether it would be equitable to modify the support order. In analyzing the evidence, the court found that defendant continued to have substantially more income than plaintiff. However, it also found that defendant had been forced to pay over $300,000 in attorney fees over the past 10 years of litigation. It noted that the evidence showed that defendant had been paying the majority of the counseling expenses associated with the custody dispute. The court also stated that plaintiff was "underemployed" because she chose not to work full-time throughout summer breaks from teaching. The court further found that plaintiff had wrongfully caused a portion of the expenses arising from the custody dispute:
Defendant earns an income of $236,703 per year, and is capable of paying spousal support, but in recent years has spent tens of thousands of dollars annually on legal fees and counseling expenses for himself and his children in an attempt to restore a father-child relationship which was badly damaged during the breakdown of the marriage and the high-conflict divorce which followed it. The Court has determined that a portion of those attorney fees and costs were the result of plaintiff's alienation and undermining of the Court's orders which were intended to support reunification of the father-child relationship.
The trial court concluded that plaintiff "bore primary responsibility for the failure of the father-children reconciliation," which it stated was the primary cause of the high-conflict divorce. It concluded that, despite plaintiff's continued financial need, she "had not shown a deserving basis for ongoing spousal support." From that, the trial court determined that it would be equitable for plaintiff to contribute $500 each month from her $1,700 monthly spousal support to the payment of the attorney fees that she owed to defendant as a sanction for her wrongful conduct. Accordingly, the trial court ordered defendant's support obligation to be reduced to $1,200 a month with plaintiff receiving a $500 credit each month against her obligation to repay defendant for the attorney fees that he incurred as a result of plaintiff's wrongful conduct.
This Court must affirm a trial court's decision regarding spousal support "unless we are firmly convinced that it was inequitable." Gates v Gates, 256 Mich App 420, 433; 664 NW2d 231 (2003). The evidence supports the trial court's findings that plaintiff's misconduct damaged defendant's relationships with his children and has forced him to spend a significant portion of his income in the attempt to preserve his relationships with them. There was also evidence that plaintiff's base monthly expenses were approximately $2,550 and that her two adult sons each contributed approximately $300 to $400 a month while living with her. When considered with the revised support order of $1,200 a month and the contributions from her sons, plaintiff's income appears adequate to ensure that she will not be impoverished. Additionally, the court's order— although reducing the amount of support—also provided plaintiff with a credit for the reduction. As such, she still has the benefit of a $1,700 a month support order even if she cannot use the full amount for her personal expenses. Given the evidence concerning the financial situation of both parties and plaintiff's misconduct that caused defendant substantial emotional and financial harm, it does not appear that the trial court's decision to modify defendant's support obligation was inequitable under the totality of the circumstances. See id.
Affirmed but remanded for purposes of allowing the trial court to correct the amount of the attorney fee award. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Cynthia Diane Stephens
/s/ Michelle M. Rick