Opinion
NO. 3-17-0344WC
05-02-2018
MELANIE MARTIN, Appellant, v. THE ILLINOIS WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION et al. (AT&T a/k/a AT&T Services, Inc., Appellee).
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Peoria County
No. 16MR760
Honorable James Mack, Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Holdridge and Justices Hoffman, Hudson, and Barberis concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: The Commission erred when it found claimant failed to prove she sustained an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of her employment.
¶ 2 On September 17, 2015, claimant, Melanie Martin, filed an application for adjustment of claim pursuant to the Workers' Compensation Act (Act) (820 ILCS 305/1 to 30 (West 2014)), seeking benefits from the employer, AT&T a/k/a AT&T Services Inc. Following a hearing, the arbitrator determined claimant's condition of ill-being did not arise out of and in the course of her employment.
¶ 3 On review, the Illinois Workers' Compensation Commission (Commission) affirmed and adopted the arbitrator's decision. On judicial review, the circuit court of Peoria County confirmed the Commission's decision. Claimant appeals.
¶ 4 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 5 At arbitration, the 61-year-old claimant testified that she worked on the second floor of the employer's credit collection center. Claimant stated that she typically worked from 9:30 a.m. to 6 p.m. On January 6, 2015, claimant logged off of her computer at approximately 6 p.m. Claimant testified she then walked from her desk and down the stairwell. Before exiting the building, she realized that she had left her personal cell phone on her desk. Claimant stated that, as she ascended the stairs to retrieve her cell phone, she fell on a step with a damaged or missing tread and injured her low back. She described the incident as follows:
"[I] realized I had forgotten my cell phone. *** So then I turned around and ascended back up the stairs to go to the second floor to *** get my phone from my desk. *** [M]y boot *** caught on a *** safety strip that had *** a little rolled area.
* * *
I felt myself propel forward, and everything fell out of my arms, and I grabbed the red rail to my right to stop the fall and then I felt the pain in my back. *** I sat down and cried. It was a pretty sharp severe pain *** and I sat there for a couple minutes[.] *** I gathered my stuff off the stairs, turned around and walked up the stairs to the second floor, [and] grabbed my phone."
Claimant testified that she took the elevator back down to the first floor after she retrieved her cell phone. The next day, on January 7, 2015, claimant e-mailed both her supervisor, Dawn
Haynes, and the union representative, Richard Stoneburner, to report the incident.
¶ 6 Claimant described the stairwell where she fell, stating that each step had a "lip or overhang." She testified that there was also "tread" that was approximately "an eighth of an inch." According to claimant, she tripped on the damaged tread, which was "back a bit from the edge of the stair."
¶ 7 Photographs of the stairs were introduced into evidence. Claimant testified that one exhibit, taken approximately two days after the alleged accident, showed "a missing part of the strip" on the step where she fell.
¶ 8 Claimant testified that she attempted self-treatment from January 2015 until July 2015. On July 8, 2015, claimant first sought treatment from a chiropractor, Dr. Michael A. Bruns. Chiropractic records show claimant complained of lumbar pain following an incident "at work in [J]anuary" where she "tripped on loose stair tre[a]d ***."
¶ 9 On August 18, 2015, claimant saw Dr. Robbye O. Bell at the Midwest Orthopedic Center for a lumbar epidural steroid injection. Claimant received additional injections in September and October 2015.
¶ 10 On November 11, 2015, claimant underwent a lumbar spine x-ray. Dr. Bell reviewed claimant's x-ray the next day and noted in his medical records that it revealed localized primary osteoarthritis of lumbar vertebrae and lumbar intervertebral disc disorder with displacement. Dr. Bell recommended that claimant see Dr. O'Leary for a surgical evaluation because claimant "expresses that she is not interested in a short term fix ***."
¶ 11 On November 23, 2015, at the employer's request, Dr. Edward Goldberg performed an independent medical examination (IME) of claimant. Dr. Goldberg's report provides the following history of claimant's alleged accident:
"[Claimant] reports injuring her lumbar spine on 01/06/2015. She states that she was ascending metal stairs going from one floor to another. Strips that are to provide traction were elevated on the stairs. She states she caught her shoe in one of these and fell forward. She did not strike the ground but broke her fall by grabbing the railing with the right hand. She states that she developed low back pain traveling to the right buttock and anterior leg to the level of the knee. She reports she has had chiropractic care with Dr. Bruns [and] has had three lumbar epidural injections. The last provided 85% improvement. She reports that she is presently working eight hours a day at her normal job. She takes only ibuprofen."
Dr. Goldberg further stated in his report that "[t]he diagnosis is that of aggravation of asymptomatic lumbar stenosis at L2-L3 and L3-L4 from the work related accident."
¶ 12 Haynes, claimant's supervisor, testified at arbitration. Haynes explained that her job duties included investigating work-related accidents. She testified that she inspected the area where claimant allegedly fell by "walking up and down the stairwell." Haynes testified that she noticed missing grip tape "on the edges" but it was "[n]ot defective enough for someone to trip on ***." Haynes testified that she did not speak with claimant about the work accident.
¶ 13 On February 25, 2016, the arbitrator issued a decision finding claimant did not suffer an accidental injury that arose out of and in the course of her employment. The arbitrator found it significant that claimant had already "signed out of work" for the day when her alleged accident occurred and her "decision to walk back up the stairs was solely for her own personal benefit." Further, the arbitrator noted that a "picture shows that the strip was not raised or buckled, and in fact even where the piece was missing, the height of the strip was exactly the same as that around the perimeter of the strip, namely 1/8."
¶ 14 On review, the Commission affirmed and adopted the arbitrator's decision. On May 4, 2017, the circuit court confirmed the Commission's decision.
¶ 15 This appeal followed.
¶ 16 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 17 On appeal, claimant argues the Commission erred by finding she failed to prove that she sustained an accidental injury on January 6, 2015, arising out of and in the course of her employment. We agree.
¶ 18 "To obtain compensation under the Act, a claimant bears the burden of showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that [s]he has suffered a disabling injury which arose out of and in the course of h[er] employment." Sisbro Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 207 Ill. 2d 193, 203, 797 N.E.2d 665, 671 (2003). Both elements must be present at the time of claimant's injury in order to justify compensation. Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 131 Ill. 2d 478, 483, 546 N.E.2d 603, 605 (1989).
¶ 19 "In the course of" employment refers to the time, place, and circumstances under which the claimant is injured. Scheffler Greenhouses, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 66 Ill. 2d 361, 366-67, 362 N.E.2d 325, 327 (1977). "A compensable injury occurs 'in the course of employment when it is sustained while a claimant is at work or while [s]he performs reasonable activities in conjunction with h[er] employment." Wise v. Industrial Comm'n, 54 Ill. 2d 138, 142, 295 N.E.2d 459, 461 (1973).
¶ 20 "Arising out of" employment refers to the "origin in some risk connected with, or incidental to, the employment so as to create a causal connection between the employment and the accidental injury." Sisbro, 207 Ill. 2d at 203. "Typically, an injury arises out of one's employment if, at the time of the occurrence, the employee was performing acts [s]he was
instructed to perform by h[er] employer, acts which [s]he had a common law or statutory duty to perform, or acts which the employee might reasonably be expected to perform incident to h[er] assigned duties." Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 129 Ill.2d 52, 58, 541 N.E.2d 665, 667 (1989). "A risk is incidental to the employment where it belongs to or is connected with what an employee has to do in fulfilling h[er] duties." Id.
¶ 21 Generally, whether an employee has suffered a work-related accident is a question of fact for the Commission to determine, and its decision will not be overturned on appeal unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Beattie v. Industrial Comm'n, 276 Ill. App. 3d 446, 449, 657 N.E.2d 1196, 1199 (1995). "In resolving questions of fact, it is within the province of the Commission to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve conflicts in the evidence, assign weight to be accorded the evidence, and draw reasonable inferences from the evidence." Hosteny v. Illinois Workers' Comp. Comm'n, 397 Ill. App. 3d 665, 674, 928 N.E.2d 474, 482 (2009). On review, the "court is not to discard the findings of the Commission merely because different inferences could be drawn from the same evidence." Kishwaukee Community Hospital v. Industrial Comm'n, 356 Ill. App. 3d 915, 920, 828 N.E.2d 283, 289 (2005). "The appropriate test is whether there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the Commission's finding, not whether this court might have reached the same conclusion." Metropolitan Water Reclamation District of Greater Chicago v. Illinois Workers' Compensation Comm'n, 407 Ill. App. 3d 1010, 1013, 944 N.E.2d 800, 803 (2011). "For the Commission's decision to be against the manifest weight of the evidence, the record must disclose that an opposite conclusion clearly was the proper result." Land & Lakes Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 359 Ill. App. 3d 582, 592, 834 N.E.2d 583, 592 (2005). "[D]espite the high hurdle that the manifest weight of the evidence standard presents, it does not relieve us of our obligation to impartially examine the evidence and to
reverse an order that is unsupported by the facts." Kawa v. Illinois Workers' Compensation Comm'n, 2013 IL App (1st) 120469WC, ¶ 79, 991 N.E.2d 430.
¶ 22 In the instant case, the Commission determined that claimant failed to prove that her injury occurred "in the course of" and "arose out of" her employment. In its brief on appeal, the employer argues that the Commission correctly found that claimant was not "in the course of her employment" at the time of the accident, stating as follows: "Since she had clocked out, completed her work for the day and was exiting the building when she decided to go back for her personal cell phone, her injury did not occur within her time of employment." The employer's assertion, which the Commission apparently adopted, that an employee is no longer "in the course of" her employment the moment her work day ends, is simply incorrect.
¶ 23 It is well-settled that "accidental injuries sustained on an employer's premises within a reasonable time before and after work are generally deemed to arise in the course of the employment." (Emphasis added.) Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 129 Ill. 2d 52, 57, 541 N.E.2d 665, 667 (1989); see also M&M Parking Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 55 Ill. 2d 252, 257, 302 N.E.2d 265, 268 (1973) ("It is well settled that an injury accidentally received by an employee on the premises of his employer while going to or from his place of employment by a customary or permitted route, within a reasonable time before or after work, is received in the course of and arises out of his employment."); Chmelik v. Vana, 31 Ill. 2d 272, 278, 201 N.E.2d 434, 438 (1964) ("At the same time, however, due to the fact that employment contemplates an employee's entry upon and departure from the employer's premises as much as it contemplates his working there, employment is not limited to the exact moment when an employee begins or ceases his duties, but necessarily includes a reasonable time before commencing and after concluding actual employment.").
¶ 24 Here, claimant was still on the employer's premises, and had only minutes before concluded her work day. Clearly, she was "in the course of" her employment at the time of her fall. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 129 Ill. 2d at 57.
¶ 25 The employer further argues that claimant's "decision to return for her personal cell phone was personal to her and outside the scope of her employment by the [e]mployer." (Emphasis added.) The quoted language implies that claimant had actually left the employer's premises before she turned around to recover her cell phone. However, the record is clear that claimant never left the employer's premises from the time she logged off of her computer until her fall on the stairs.
¶ 26 In their briefs, the parties discuss the supreme court's decision in Bommarito v. Industrial Comm'n, 82 Ill. 2d 191, 412 N.E.2d 548 (1980). Bommarito involved a fall that occurred off the employer's premises. Id. at 193. Here, claimant's fall clearly occurred on the employer's premises. Thus, Bommarito is inapposite to the "in the course of" inquiry here.
¶ 27 We turn next to the "arising out of" element. As stated above, this inquiry focuses on the type of risk involved in the employee's work activity. There are three categories of risk to which an employee may be exposed: (1) risks distinctly associated with her employment; (2) personal risks; and (3) neutral risks which have no particular employment or personal characteristics. Illinois Institute of Technology Research Institute v. Industrial Comm'n, 314 Ill. App. 3d 149, 162, 731 N.E.2d 795, 806 (2000). "In the context of falls, neutral risks include falls on level ground or while traversing stairs. *** [B]ecause the general public and employees alike are equally exposed to the risks of walking and traversing stairs, injuries resulting from these acts generally do not arise out of employment." Illinois Consolidated Telephone Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 314 Ill. App. 3d 347, 353, 732 N.E.2d 49, 54 (2000) (Rakowski, J., specially
concurring); see also Baldwin v. Illinois Workers' Compensation Comm'n, 409 Ill. App. 3d 472, 478, 949 N.E.2d 1151, 1157 (2011) ("By itself, the act of walking up a staircase does not expose an employee to a risk greater than that faced by the general public.").
¶ 28 As an initial matter, the employer contends that the Commission correctly relied on Martin v. Kralis Poultry Co., Inc., 12 Ill. App. 3d 453, 461, 297 N.E.2d 610, 616 (1973), for the proposition that "even though an accident happens on the employer's premises, if it occurs while the employee is doing something there for his own personal benefit, it does not arise out of his employment." To the extent the Commission relied on this statement from Martin in finding claimant's injury did not arise out of her employment, we find it erred. The facts in this case bear no resemblance to those in Martin.
¶ 29 In Martin, the plaintiff clocked out of work and left the employer's premises to attend a union meeting. Id. at 457. Two hours later, she returned to the workplace to obtain a ride home with her husband, who worked at the same facility. Id. at 461. Upon her return to the plant premises, the plaintiff fell and suffered an injury. Id. On appeal, the employer argued that the plaintiff's injury arose out of and in the course of her employment and therefore her action at law for damages was barred due to the exclusivity of the Act. Id. at 458. The court disagreed, concluding that plaintiff's injury did not arise out of and in the course of her employment and thus was not covered by the Act. Id. at 462.
¶ 30 As noted, in Martin, the plaintiff had finished her work for the day, left the premises, and then returned two hours later, at which time she fell and was injured. Id. at 461. By contrast, in this case, claimant was injured just minutes after she had logged off of her computer and while still inside the building. See e.g., Munie v. Stag Brewery, Division of G. Heileman Brewing Co., 751 F. Supp. 142, 144 (S.D. Ill. 1990) ("The instant case is clearly distinguishable
from [Martin]. In this case, plaintiff was walking from his job site to his car to drive home from work. The injury occurred four minutes after his shift had ended. *** The injury occurred 'in the course of' plaintiff's employment, because of the propinquity in time between plaintiff's clocking out from work and plaintiff's alleged injury."). For the reasons stated, we find that Martin is distinguishable.
¶ 31 In terms of the type of risk relevant to the "arising out of" analysis, we reject the employer's contention that "this case should be analyzed as a neutral risk." It is true, as noted above, that injuries suffered by an employee while traversing stairs are generally non-compensable, having arisen from a neutral risk. See Illinois Consolidated Telephone, 314 Ill. App. 3d at 353. However, "[e]mployment related risks associated with injuries sustained as a consequence of a fall are those to which the general public is not exposed such as the risk of tripping on a defect at the employer's premises ***." (Emphasis added.) First Cash Financial Services v. Industrial Comm'n, 367 Ill. App. 3d 102, 106, 853 N.E.2d 799, 804 (2006). Thus, if an employee falls on stairs and the employer's premises are found to be defective and determined to have contributed to cause the accident, the risk of injury will be considered an employment related risk and not a neutral risk.
¶ 32 On appeal, the employer asserts that "the Commission found that the small missing area of grip tape did not constitute a defect that created an increased risk of injury." This is not entirely correct. While the Commission noted "the strip was not raised or buckled, and in fact even where the piece was missing, the height of the strip was exactly the same as that around the perimeter of the strip, namely 1/8[,]" it did not go on to explain the significance of its finding. It did not conclude that the condition of the step did not contribute to, or cause, claimant's fall. For purposes of determining whether claimant was exposed to an employment
related risk, the Commission here must necessarily decide whether the condition of the step, as described in the record, contributed to her fall. We thus remand the cause for the Commission to determine whether the defect in the step contributed to cause claimant's fall.
¶ 33 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 34 For the reasons stated, we reverse the circuit court's judgment which confirmed the Commission's decision, vacate the Commission's decision, and remand the matter for further proceedings consistent with our decision.
¶ 35 Reversed and remanded.