Opinion
Record No. 2069-92-4
September 28, 1993
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY QUINLAN H. HANCOCK, JUDGE.
Stephen L. Lauer (Shoun, Smith Bach, P.C., on briefs), for appellant.
Robert J. Cunningham, Jr. (Whitestone, Brent, Young Merril, P.C., on brief), for appellee.
Present: Judges Barrow, Coleman and Koontz.
Argued at Alexandria, Virginia.
Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not designated for publication.
Alice Holcomb Martin (wife) appeals the circuit court's dismissal of her appeal of a child support modification order from the juvenile and domestic relations district court. The circuit judge held that the case originated in the Fairfax County Family Court and, therefore, the wife should have appealed to the Court of Appeals, pursuant to Code § 20-96.1. We hold that the case did not originate in the family court, but rather originated in the Fairfax County Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court, and that the wife properly appealed the child support modification order to the circuit court. Accordingly, we reverse the dismissal order and remand the matter for trial de novo in the circuit court.
This case originated as a divorce case in the Fairfax County Circuit Court before the General Assembly provided for experimental family courts. Code § 20-96.1. On September 2, 1982, the Fairfax County Circuit Court entered a decree of divorce and awarded custody of the parties' two children to the wife. The judge entered a child support order requiring Rodney Glen Holcomb (husband) to pay the wife $300 per month. Pursuant to Code § 20-79(c), the decree referred "any other matters pertaining to [child support] . . . to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court of Fairfax County, Virginia." The Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court of Fairfax County thereafter was designated as an experimental family court by the Judicial Council of Virginia, pursuant to Code § 20-96.1, effective January 1, 1990.
On August 7, 1991, the wife filed a petition in the Family Court of Fairfax County, requesting an increase in child support. The matter remained before the family court after December 31, 1991, when its designation as a family court expired. See Code § 20-96.1(F). On January 27, 1992, the trial judge entered an order reducing the child support obligation from $300 per month to $150 per month. The wife noted her appeal to the Circuit Court of Fairfax County. The circuit judge dismissed the appeal on the ground that the circuit court did not have jurisdiction to hear an appeal of a final order from the family court. The judge ruled that, under Code § 20-96.1(E), an order from the family court is appealable to the Court of Appeals.
Not all final judgments and orders from the family court are appealed directly to the Court of Appeals. See Code § 20-96.1(E); see also Loudoun County Department of Social Services v. Etzold, 245 Va. 80, 85, 425 S.E.2d 800, 802 (1993). Code § 20-96.1(E) provides that family court orders
shall be taken to either the Court of Appeals as provided in §§ 17-116.05 and 17-116.05:5, or, if not appealable in the Court of Appeals, to the appropriate circuit court as an appeal from a juvenile and domestic relations district court.
(emphasis added); see also Code § 16.1-296.1.
"Appeals from those juvenile and domestic relations district courts designated as experimental family courts by the Judicial Council of Virginia shall be to the Virginia Court of Appeals as provided in Code § 17-116.5:5. . . ."
The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals for matters arising in the experimental family courts is set forth in Code § 17-116.05:5. Pertinent to this case is the provision that any final judgment or order from an experimental family court that involves the custody, visitation or civil support of a child is appealable directly to the Court of Appeals if the case originated in the family court. Code § 17-116.05:5(1)(b);see also Etzold, 245 Va. at 85, 425 S.E.2d at 802. In addition, final judgments or orders from the family court may be appealed to the Court of Appeals in cases where jurisdiction for enforcement and modification of a decree have been transferred to the family court pursuant to Code § 20-79(c). Code § 17-116.05:5(1)(c). Neither of those provisions apply to this case.
Code § 17-116.05:5 provides, in pertinent part, that:
Any aggrieved party may appeal to the Court of Appeals from:
1. Any final judgment, order, or decree of an experimental family court . . . involving:
a. Suits for annulling or affirming marriage and for divorce that are referred by the designated circuit courts;
b. Cases originating in the experimental family courts involving the custody, visitation or civil support of a child, or spousal support, or involving the termination of residual parental rights and responsibilities . . .;
c. Cases in which jurisdiction for enforcement and modification of a decree has been transferred to the experimental family court by a circuit court pursuant to subsection (c) of § 20-79. . . .
The "case" involving the "child support" order being appealed did not originate in the family court, nor was it transferred to the family court from the circuit court under Code § 20-79(c). The term "originate" is given its plain meaning of "begin, to start, to arise," and, therefore, a case is deemed to have "originated" in the first court where pleadings initiating the case were filed. Etzold, 245 Va. at 85, 425 S.E.2d at 802. Under the holding in Etzold, this case originated in the Circuit Court of Fairfax County, and the first child custody and support order was entered there in 1982. Thus, the case did not "originate" in the experimental family court and is not appealable to the Court of Appeals under the provisions of Code § 17-116.05:5(1)(b).
Furthermore, the circuit court did not transfer this case to the experimental family court pursuant to Code § 20-79(c). The case was referred to the juvenile and domestic relations district court in 1982, before the court was designated an experimental family court. A final judgment from a juvenile and domestic relations district court involving a case that was transferred to it from the circuit court is appealable to the circuit court. Code §§ 20-79(c) and 16.1-296. Thus, the case is not one "transferred to the experimental family court" and appealable to the Court of Appeals, pursuant to Code § 17-116.05:5(1)(c).
"In any case which has been referred from a circuit court to a juvenile court and an appeal is taken from an order or judgment of the juvenile court, the appeal shall be taken to the circuit court which had original jurisdiction of the case." Code § 16.1-296.
Because the "case" involving child support "originated" in the circuit court and was transferred to the juvenile court pursuant to the provisions of Code § 20-79(c) before its designation as a family court, the child support modification order was properly appealed to the circuit court and not the Court of Appeals. Code § 20-79(c) specifically provides that appeals from matters referred to the juvenile and domestic relations district court shall be to the circuit court. Accordingly, we reverse the trial judge's decision to dismiss the appeal and remand for further proceedings in the circuit court.
Reversed and remanded.