Opinion
No. HHB-CV-4016668-S
January 2, 2009
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
This case is an administrative appeal from the January 11, 2008, decision of a Department of Children and Families (DCF) hearing officer dismissing plaintiff's efforts to appeal a denial of her request for services for her autistic son under DCF's voluntary services program. The hearing officer concluded that dismissal was mandatory under regulations that were interpreted as prohibiting voluntary services if a neglect petition was pending. For the following reasons, the court concludes that the regulations are not so inflexible. Accordingly, the appeal is sustained.
I
Appeals from the decisions of DCF hearing officers concerning the voluntary services program are available pursuant to the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act (UAPA). General Statutes § 17a-11(f). In a UAPA appeal, it is not the function of the court to retry the case. The facts before the court are ordinarily confined to those that were in the record of proceedings before the agency. General Statutes § 4-183(I). The court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact, and it is required to affirm the decision of the agency unless the court finds that substantial rights of the person appealing have been prejudiced under certain well-defined criteria. General Statutes § 4-183(j). Where the main issue turns not so much on the agency's findings of fact, but on its interpretation of the legal requirements under the pertinent statutes and regulations, deference to the agency's interpretation is also merited sometimes. "[C]ourts should accord great deference to the construction given the statute [and regulation] by the agency charged with its enforcement. [W]here the governmental agency's time-tested interpretation is reasonable, it should be accorded great weight by the courts." (Internal quotation marks omitted; citations omitted) Anderson v. Ludgin, 175 Conn. 545, 555-56, 400 A.2d 712 (1978); accord, Longley v. State Employees Retirement Comm., 284 Conn. 149, 162-67, 931 A.2d 890 (2007). However, where an agency's determination of a question of law has not previously been subject to judicial scrutiny, is not so time-tested, and where the case presents a pure question of law, a broader standard of review applies. See, e.g., Autotote Enterprises, Inc. v. State. Div. of Special Revenue, 278 Conn. 150, 154, 898 A.2d 141 (2006); Plastic Distributors, Inc. v. Burns, 5 Conn.App. 219, 225, 497 A.2d 1005 (1985), citing Wilson v. Freedom of Information Commission, 181 Conn. 324, 342-43, 435 A.2d 353 (1980). This case involves questions of law concerning relatively new regulations that have not received judicial review previously. See, e.g., In Re Shawn S., 262 Conn. 155, 810 A.2d 799 (2002) (similar issues not reached). The court's review is, therefore, plenary. Autotote Enterprises, Inc. v. State Div. of Special Revenue, supra, 278 Conn. 155.
II
The facts are as follows: The plaintiff is a single mother of two children: a son, Juan R.; and a daughter, Kiara R. Juan was born on August 22, 2000. He is severely autistic and mentally retarded. That he would be difficult to manage for the best of parents, even if he was the only child, is well documented. His challenging behaviors have been chronicled elsewhere. That the plaintiff is a marginal caretaker is also well documented. Her challenges are also chronicled elsewhere. DCF investigated six reports of neglect at the home between 2002 and 2005, but none were substantiated. An investigation on another report was commenced in April 2006, with respect to Kiara. Recognizing that Kiara was not getting adequate supervision due, in part, to the time and energy that plaintiff was required to spend on Juan, and recognizing that the plaintiff needed help, a Department of Developmental Services worker suggested that plaintiff apply for the DCF voluntary services program for Juan. She did so on April 18, 2006. That program permits DCF to arrange for services to families without the need to have the child committed to the custody of DCF with concomitant termination of parental rights. General Statutes §§ 17a-11; 17a-129. After receiving plaintiff's application, however, DCF substantiated neglect, filed a neglect petition seeking protective supervision in Juvenile Court in Willimantic for both children, and closed the intake for voluntary services pursuant to DCF policy and voluntary services program regulations that provide:
The court in In re Juan R., 2007 Conn.Super. LEXIS 3487, 2007 WL 4801440 (Dec. 28, 2007, Foley, J.) found as follows:
The record reflects that Juan R. was born on August 22, 2000. He was diagnosed with autism, chromosomal abnormalities, and mental retardation. Juan's ". . . impairment spans all of the core domains of functioning affected by autism (i.e., deficits in communication and socialization, as well as restricted and repetitive behavior and interests), as well as a number of associated features (e.g., inattention, over activity, abnormalities in sensory function). Such a profile is consistent with the domain of the most severe presentation of this clinical disorder." (Mayville evaluation, Respondent's Exhibit #2, at p. 6.) Juan received early intervention services from Birth-to-Three, a program administered through the Department of Mental Retardation (hereinafter referred to as the Department of Developmental Services, or DDS). He was assigned a DDS case manager, Keith Taylor, as well as a DDS educational consultant, Ann Tetreault. (Petitioner's Exhibit B, at 11; testimony, DCF social worker Fecto-Smith.) DDS provided Juan with some limited respite services, as well as annual cash assistance of $1,000.00 to assist his mother in providing for his specialized needs. Juan received special education services through Plainfield Public Schools in a program at Sterling Memorial School in Sterling, Connecticut. Juan achieved only "limited progress" in his Individualized Education Plan goals since 2003; he has not mastered even the most basic skills repeated over several years. (Respondent's Ex. 2 at 2.) He "possesses very few skills to facilitate acquiring basic learning repertoires." (Respondent's Ex. 2 at p. 6), or to stay safe (Mayville, testimony October 23, 2007).
DCF was aware of the severity of Juan's autism as early as January 2002 (Oral Stipulation by DCF at reasonable efforts hearing, 12.14.07). On November 6, 2005, DCF initiated an investigation after receiving a call reporting that Juan had "escaped" from his mother's apartment. During this investigation, the DCF worker observed "the apartment to be messy and disorganized." The report notes, "[m]other reported to SW that she couldn't help it because she is only one person with two young children one with special needs and in need of 24 hours attention . . . Mother stated that she does not sleep in her bedroom because she sleeps in the living room so that she can intercept Juan if he tries to escape. (Respondent's Ex 22, p. 6 of 11.)
During the course of this investigation, the DCF social worker contacted Keith Taylor, Juan's DDS case manager, who reported that Juan ". . . suffers from the worst case of autism he has ever seen." (Respondent's Ex 22, p. 7 of 11.) The DCF worker also phoned Dr. Lieberman, Director of Special Education in Sterling, CT, who "reported that Juan is classified as `classic autistic and the worst case of autism that he has seen in the many years of service.' Dr. Lieberman reported that mother has been appropriately requesting support from the school." Id. The social worker also faxed a questionnaire to Juan's school, in which the teacher reported that "Juan engages in very loud tantrums while at school — an average of 2 hours per day. Child also engages in long periods of noncompliance where he will refuse to sit in his seat to work. Child mouths and bites books and toys in the room and on numerous occasions have tried to leave the room (sic)." The DCF worker also noted, during a home visit on November 10, 2005, that he observed Juan "did not stop jumping in place and constantly took off his diaper," but noted that the children "appeared well care for and content. (sic)." Despite being apprized of the foregoing information, and despite its recognition that there had been five other unsubstantiated reports of neglect in the years between 2002 and 2004, DCF concluded its investigation by noting that Juan's needs for safety, well-being and permanency are "presently being met in the home." There were no services offered to prevent out-of-home placement. The disposition of the case was "close, no further contact."
On November 16, 2005, Juan escaped from his home a second time after his sister Kiara had come inside after playing outdoors and left the front door ajar. In response, DCF suggested that Darlene contact Systems of Care to help her with Juan, and the DCF social worker agreed to make a referral for respite services through United Community Family Services. The DCF report noted, "[a]lthough mother appears to be overwhelmed with her current situation, it does not seem to have negatively impacted the children in any way." It does not appear that DCF provided any additional services to Darlene.
On April 7, 2006, DCF investigated a report that Juan's sister, Kiara, was left outside unsupervised in her neighborhood. During the investigation, the DCF social worker called Juan's DMR case manager, Keith Taylor. Mr. Taylor informed the DCF worker assigned to Juan's case that Juan "rates "high" on the scale for autism; that, under the best circumstances it would be difficult to care for Juan.
"The thrust of reports from school and service providers is that Darlene and the children lived in chaotic and disorganized circumstances. The apartment is at times in great disarray. Juan presents as a twenty-four-hour a day control problem. He is seven years old with little if any language skills, no bowel control, leaves his soiled diapers about, is in almost constant motion, flapping his arms, running around, engaged in the purposeless stimming, twirling "shaking a [nonexistent] swing," and other rapid behaviors that are at most ceaseless according to observers. He does not sleep through the night. He requires constant vigilance which, according to Robin Grant Hall, Ph.D., would present enormous difficulties for even a stellar parent.
Darlene is, at best, a very marginal caretaker. Darlene struggles with her own mental health issues and depression. Her cognitive skills are limited. Service providers and in-home mentors report little or no progress in teaching Darlene parenting skills. The psychologist, Dr. Grant-Hall, describes mother as having other significant cognitive and behavioral issues. She has testified that Darlene is completely over-whelmed by these two needy children and is not able to care for both children together at this time."
In re Juan R., supra.
The following cases shall not be accepted under the voluntary services program unless the provisions of this section are waived by the commissioner or designee pursuant to section 17a-11-11 of these regulations:
* * * * *
(b) The child or youth is the subject of a pending petition alleging that he is neglected, abused or uncared for;
Reg., Conn. State Agencies, § 17a-11-8(b).
The plaintiff never received notification that her application had been denied, nor was she informed of her right to a hearing to contest the denial, as required by Reg., Conn. State Agencies, §§ 17a-11-11(e) and (g). On January 17, 2007, with the assistance of counsel, plaintiff pled nolo contendere to the neglect charges, and a period of protective supervision was ordered by the court (Boland, J.). Subsequently, plaintiff obtained new counsel, and began looking for more services for Juan at his school system and at DCF. On April 27, 2007, with the help of her new attorney, plaintiff filed a second request for Voluntary Services with DCF. A DCF official promptly responded with a telephone message to plaintiff's counsel stating that plaintiff was ineligible for voluntary services in light of the fact that DCF had a protective supervision case open with respect to Juan. No written notification that her second application had been denied was provided, nor was plaintiff informed of her right to a hearing to contest the denial, as required by Reg. §§ 17a-11-11(e) and (g). Nevertheless, on May 2, 2007, plaintiff, through her counsel, requested an administrative hearing at DCF pursuant to Reg. § 17a-11-17(a). After several continuances requested by plaintiff, a hearing was scheduled for October 17, 2007, at DCF. In the meantime, DCF filed a motion in Juvenile Court to have the protective supervision order changed to a commitment for Kiara, which would result in plaintiff losing guardianship over Kiara. Plaintiff moved the Juvenile Court for voluntary services. Those matters were scheduled for October 23, 2007, in Juvenile Court. In the matter pending before the DCF hearing officer, DCF moved to dismiss the hearing on the grounds, inter alia, that the regulations and policies prohibited action while a petition was pending in Juvenile Court alleging that the subject was neglected, abused or uncared for. On October 23, 2007, the judge in the Juvenile Court proceeding ordered the commitment of Juan, not Kiara. In re Juan R., 2007 Conn.Super. LEXIS 3487, 2007 WL 4801440 (Dec. 28, 2007, Foley, J.), footnotes 1 and 2, supra. Plaintiff lost guardianship over Juan. At DCF, the Hearing Officer rendered his decision on January 11, 2008. The Hearing Officer ruled, in pertinent part, as follows:
Regulations § 17a-11-8 proscribes voluntary services when certain criteria are met. For example, if the child or youth is the subject of a pending petition alleging that he is neglected, abused or uncared for, he shall not be eligible for voluntary services. Regulations of State Agencies § 17a-11-8(b). Additionally, DCF Policy 37-3 outlines the requirements for eligibility for the Voluntary Services Program. The policy clearly states that "[c]ases shall not be accepted under the Voluntary Services Program if the child/youth or the parent/guardian is the subject of a pending petition alleging neglect, abused or uncared for [and/or] requires child protective services." DCF Policy 37-3.
The evidence in the record shows that the Appellant had ongoing child protection issues pending in the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters and that in fact, on January 17, 2007 the Court adjudicated Juan R. And Kiara R. neglected. Additionally, the Court ordered a period of protective supervision of both children. Currently, the Department is moving for commitment of the children.
Finally, the Appellant's attorney represented at the hearing on voluntary services that another hearing was pending in Superior Court because the Appellant filed a Motion to Open and Modify Disposition. The Appellant is moving to have the Court modify its disposition of protective supervision and order the Department to provide voluntary services. However, pursuant to the Department's regulations and policies, a request for voluntary services hearing shall be dismissed by the administrative hearings unit if court proceedings are pending in any court which may address the issue of services to be provided to the child or youth. Therefore, the Department's motion to dismiss also is granted because there already is a hearing scheduled in the Superior Court to address the provision of Voluntary Services. Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies § 17a-11-18(e).
Hearing Office Decision, p. 2.
The plaintiff has not appealed from the decisions of the Juvenile Court concerning her children, but, in the instant case, she appeals from the above quoted January 11, 2008, decision of the DCF hearing officer. She has launched a multi-pronged constitutional challenge to the DCF regulations that, as interpreted by DCF, prevented her from receiving voluntary services while neglect proceedings were pending. The gravamen of her complaint is that if she had received the help she requested when she requested it, she and her children would have been spared the neglect charges and loss of guardianship. She alleges that the DCF regulations, as interpreted and applied by DCF that bar DCF from even listening to her: (1) violate her procedural due process right to DCF services without having to have her children committed; (2) violate her procedural due process right to a hearing; (3) violate her procedural due process right to a fundamentally fair hearing, (4) violate her procedural due process right to notice (5) violate her procedural due process right to be free from regulations that create an irrebuttable presumption that she is unfit; (6) violate her procedural due process right to be free from arbitrary and capricious decisions and (7) violates her substantive due process rights to be free from unequal treatment.
Prior to this matter being heard by this court, defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss in this case arguing, essentially, that the matter is moot because plaintiff is already receiving the services for Juan she seeks in this case, now that Juan has been committed by order of the Juvenile Court. Although the commitment procedure resulted in her loss of guardianship, she cannot complain about that now, DCF argued, because she could have, but did not, appeal from that Juvenile Court decision. The Motion to Dismiss was granted in part and denied in part on June 17, 2008 (Cohn, J.). Judge Cohn agreed that plaintiff was barred from challenging the issue of Juan's commitment on the grounds of mootness, but he found that the remaining issues were not moot. That decision is the law of the case. Cf. Lewis v. Gaming Policy Board, 224 Conn. 693, 697, 620 A.2d 780 (1993) (law of the case doctrine). There was no request made or reason given to revisit the issue.
Inasmuch as plaintiff's application for services was denied, the court finds that the plaintiff is aggrieved for purposes of standing to appeal. Cf. Old Rock Road Corp. v. Comm'n on Special Revenue, 173 Conn. 384, 386, 377 A.2d 1119 (1977).
III
That voluntary services for children like Juan R. with extreme autism can be made available through DCF in appropriate cases is not disputed. That DCF cannot make the availability of such voluntary services contingent on commitment is also not disputed. Indeed, the statute expressly prohibits DCF from imposing any such blanket requirement:
Admission is discretionary:
The commissioner may, in the commissioner's discretion, admit to the department on a voluntary basis any child or youth who, in the commissioner's opinion, could benefit from any of the services offered or administered by, or under contact with, or otherwise available to, the department.
General Statues § 17a-11(a).
There shall be no requirement for the Department of Children and Families to seek custody of any child or youth with mental illness, emotional disturbance, a behavioral disorder or developmental or physical disability if such child is voluntarily placed with the department by a parent or guardian of the child for the purpose of accessing an out-of-home placement or intensive outpatient service, including, but not limited to, residential treatment programs, therapeutic foster care programs and extended day treatment foster care programs and extended day treatment programs, except as permitted pursuant to sections 17a-101g [cases of need for emergency police or agency removal of the child for 96 hours due to imminent risk] and 46b-129 [cases of need for ex-parte court order of temporary custody of the child because of immediate danger]. Commitment to or protective supervision or protection by the department shall not be a condition for receipt of services or benefits delivered or funded by the department.
General Statutes § 17a-129
The dispute is whether, under the facts in this case, the DCF's denial of voluntary services violated plaintiffs alleged due process rights to those services, or at least to a hearing on her application. Plaintiff alleges that the regulations in this case were employed to deprived her of applying for the services, and prevented the hearing officer from listening to her case. Any plaintiff waging such a constitutional challenge against a government rule established by statute or regulation has a difficult burden of proof . . . As to statues, "[I]t is . . . a well settled principle of judicial construction, that before an act of the legislature ought to be declared unconstitutional, its repugnance to the provisions or necessary implications of the constitution should be manifest and free from all reasonable doubt. If its character in this regard be questionable, then comity, and a proper respect for a co-ordinate branch of the government, should determine the matter in favor of the action of the latter . . . Thus, in light of the established presumption in favor of a statute's constitutionality, any person attacking the validity of a lawfully enacted statute bears the heavy burden of proving its unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt." (Internal quotation marks omitted; citations omitted.) Moore v. Ganim, 233 Conn. 557, 572, 660 A.2d 742 (1995). The same cautions apply to regulations because they also pass through the legislative approval process — the Legislative Regulation Review Committee — providing some assurance that they comport with legislative intent, and because regulations have the same force and effect as statutes. See Vitti v. Allstate Insurance Co., 245 Conn. 169, 183, 713 A.2d 1269 (1998); Elf v. Dept. of Public Health, 66 Conn.App. 410, 427, 784 A.2d 979 (2001).
Moreover, Connecticut precedent limits a court's authority to even address constitutional issues. As our Supreme Court has recently and repeatedly stated, "[w]e do not take lightly our responsibility to act as the final arbiter in resolving issues relating to our constitution . . . We also, however, do not engage in addressing constitutional questions unless their resolution is unavoidable . . . Ordinarily, constitutional issues are not considered unless absolutely necessary to the decision of a case . . . This court has a basic judicial duty to avoid deciding a constitutional issue if a nonconstitutional ground exists that will dispose of the case." (Internal quotation marks omitted; citations omitted.) Kinsey v. Pacific Employers Insurance Co., 277 Conn. 398, 421, 891 A.2d 959 (2006); accord, Sullivan v. McDonald, 281 Conn. 122, 127, 913 A.2d 403 (2007); Carrano v. Yale-New Haven Hospital, 279 Conn. 622, 635 n. 15, 904 A.2d 149 (2006).
A non-constitutional ground that will dispose of the case exists in the instant matter. Although DCF takes the position that their regulations, by their plain language, require denial of an application for voluntary services if a neglect petition is pending, and prohibit a hearing officer from hearing the matter when a case affecting services is pending in Juvenile Court, this court does not agree, and finds that the rules of statutory construction demonstrate that the subject regulations are not so inflexible.
A
First, with regard to the regulation that requires denial of an application if a neglect petition is pending, the court finds that the applicable regulation — Reg. § 17a-11-8(b) — does not require denial without exception. The rule provides for waiver "by the commissioner or designee pursuant to section 17a-11-11 of these regulations." Reg. § 17a-11-8. Section 11 provides:
(f) The commissioner or designee may waive the admission requirements or restrictions of the voluntary services program in the case of unusual circumstances. The burden of proof to show the unusual circumstances shall be upon the parent or guardian of a child under fourteen years of age or by such person himself if he is a child fourteen years of age or older or a youth.
Reg. Sec. 17-11-11(f)
In the instant case, there was no indication in the record that anyone considered waiving the subject restriction due to the circumstances. Moreover, the plaintiff was not notified of the decision, or notified of her right to a hearing. Reg. §§ 17-11-11(e) and (g). An administrative body is a tribunal of limited jurisdiction and must act strictly within its statutory authority, within constitutional limitations and in a lawful manner, or its decisions will be reversed. Hall v. Gilbert and Bennett Mfg. Co., Inc., 241 Conn. 282, 291, 695 A.2d 1051 (1997). The agency did not follow its own regulations in this instance. This resulted in prejudice to the substantial rights of the plaintiff. She and her son lost a chance to apply for help in obtaining services without paying the heavy price of loss of guardianship and commitment. General Statutes § 17a-129 was designed to offer that chance. "Parents have a constitutionally protected right to raise and care for their own children." (Internal quotation marks omitted; citations omitted.) In re Justice V., 111 Conn.App. 500, 507 (2008). The plaintiffs appeal, therefore, should be sustained.
B
Nevertheless, DCF argues that the agency decision must stand because the hearing officer has no authority to overrule a commissioner's discretionary decision to deny voluntary services. The court is not persuaded. The subject regulation defining the scope of issues before the hearing officer at the hearing provides:
The defendant argues that this appeal should be dismissed because this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this case because there is no statutory or regulatory right to a hearing involved, and, therefore, no "contested case" required for a UAPA appeal. Defendant's Brief, p. 9-10. It is correct that a UAPA appeal is available only where a hearing is required by statute or regulation or where a hearing is in fact held. General Statutes § 4-166(2); Ferguson Mechanical Co. v. Dept. of Public Works, 282 Conn. 764, 924 A.2d 846 (2007). In the instant case, a hearing is required by statute, General Statutes § 17a-11(f), by regulation, Reg. § 17a-11-17, and a hearing was held. See Record, Transcript of October 17, 2007. Therefore, there is no justification for the dismissal request on this point.
"(c) The issue at the voluntary services hearing shall be whether the department properly applied the admissions criteria set forth in section 17a-11-7, the admission restrictions set forth in section 17a-11-8 or the provisions for termination of services set forth in section 17a-11-12 of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies.
Reg. § 17a-11-17(c)
Under this regulation, the hearing officer had express authority to review the denial of plaintiff's voluntary services application, including application of restrictions due to pending neglect proceedings, in issue in the instant case. The hearing officer was not constrained in the manner advocated by the defendant.
C
Finally, DCF argues that the regulations specifically prohibited the hearing officer from hearing this matter because there was a court commitment proceeding pending which could result in Juan receiving the same services. The hearing officer agreed. Hearing Officer Decision, p. 2, supra. The hearing officer cited, for authority, Reg. § 17a-11-18(e), which provides:
(e) A request for a Voluntary Services Hearing shall be stayed, denied or dismissed by the administrative hearings unit if court proceedings are pending in any court which may address the issue of services to be provided to the child or youth.
Reg. § 17a-11-18(e)
The court does not agree that this rule necessarily prohibited consideration of plaintiff's application in this case. It is true that DCF was seeking a change from protective supervision to commitment in Juvenile Court at the time of the DCF hearing, and that the matter could have affected services. However, DCF was seeking the commitment of Kiara, not Juan. Moreover, the inflexible application of the above rule by DCF and the hearing officer was unnecessary. The word "shall" ordinarily connotes a mandatory, rather than a directory, requirement. Lostritto v. Community Action Agency of New Haven, 269 Conn. 10, 20, 848 A.2d 418 (2004). But, that is not invariably the outcome. In fact, as against the government, the word is often construed as "may," particularly when necessary to accomplish the purpose which was clearly intended by the regulation. Daley v. Warden of State Prison, 20 Conn.Sup. 384, 390, 136 A.2d 504 (1957). The factors to be considered in deciding whether a rule is mandatory or directory are well settled. "While we generally will not look for interpretative guidance beyond the language of the statute when the words of that statute are plain and unambiguous . . . our past decisions have indicated that the use of the word shall, though significant, does not invariably create a mandatory duty . . . In order to determine whether a statute's provisions are mandatory we have traditionally looked beyond the use of the word shall and examined the statute's essential purpose . . . The test to be applied in determining whether a statute is mandatory or directory is whether the prescribed mode of action is the essence of the thing to be accomplished, or in other words, whether it relates to a matter of substance or a matter of convenience . . . If it is a matter of substance, the statutory provision is mandatory. If, however, the legislative provision is designed to secure order, system and dispatch in the proceedings, it is generally held to be directory, especially where the requirement is stated in affirmative terms unaccompanied by negative words . . . A statutory provision of this type directs what is to be done but does not invalidate any action taken for failure to comply . . . Furthermore, if there is no language that expressly invalidates any action taken after noncompliance with the statutory provisions, the statute should be construed as directory." (Internal quotation marks omitted; citations omitted.) Kindal v. Dept. of Social Services, 69 Conn.App. 563, 568, 795 A.2d 622 (2002); see also Teresa T. v. Ragaglia, 272 Conn. 734, 744, 865 A.2d 734 (2005).
In the instant case, Reg. § 17a-11-18(e) is clearly designed to secure order, system and dispatch in proceedings. It is an aid to avoiding duplication of efforts and inconsistent results when there are matters pending simultaneously in several forums. It is always within the discretion of an administrative agency to relax its application "when in a given case the ends of justice require it." (Internal quotation marks omitted; citations omitted.) State v. Tedesco, 175 Conn. 279, 285, 397 A.2d 1352 (1978). Such procedure rules "are a means to justice, not an end in themselves." (Internal quotation marks omitted; citations omitted.) Giblen v. Ghociuawala, 111 Conn.App. 493, 498 (2008). The hearing officer's decision in the instant case erroneously expressed an inflexibility in the instant case. This resulted in substantial prejudice to the plaintiff. She and her son lost a chance to apply for help in obtaining services without paying the heavy price of commitment and loss of guardianship. For this additional reason, the plaintiff's appeal should be sustained.
D
Whether the plaintiff and her son are appropriate candidates for voluntary services, and whether voluntary services are an appropriate substitute for services under commitment remains to be seen. DCF's inflexible application of its regulations precluded evaluation of the merits of the plaintiff's application. For all of the foregoing reasons, that inflexibility was error.
Having sustained the plaintiff's appeal on non-constitutional grounds, it is unnecessary to resolve the constitutional issues.
IV
For all of the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff's appeal is sustained, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this decision.