Opinion
NO. 2011-CA-002093-MR
07-05-2013
DARLENA MARTIN APPELLANT v. LIBBI HALL, Individually and as Executrix of the ESTATE OF CASSIE MARTIN, Deceased; TOM HALL; ROBIN YABROFF KING; DAVID KING; JENNIFER WALSH; PATRICK WALSH; ANN YABROFF LANE; AND DAVID LANE APPELLEES
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: Larry D. Brown Prestonsburg, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: Daniel P. Stratton Pikeville, Kentucky
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL FROM FLOYD CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DANNY P. CAUDILL, SPECIAL JUDGE
ACTION NO. 08-CI-00776
OPINION
AFFIRMING
BEFORE: CAPERTON, COMBS, AND LAMBERT, JUDGES. COMBS, JUDGE: Darlena Martin (Darlena) appeals from a summary judgment entered in favor of the Appellees. She argues that the Floyd Circuit Court erroneously interpreted a bequest of "land" by Cassie Martin (Cassie) as constituting a bequest of both the surface and the mineral rights that Cassie owned in two tracts and the mineral rights that she owned in a third tract. After reviewing the record, the arguments of the parties, and the relevant law, we affirm.
The basic facts are not in dispute. Noah and Josie Martin were the parents of eight children, Cassie Martin and her seven siblings. The Martins owned a significant amount of real property in eastern Kentucky. Three tracts of that real property are the subject matter of this dispute. The Martins conveyed to Cassie the surface rights to a 50-acre tract on Simpson Martin Branch (referenced in the deeds as the Simpson Martin Branch tract) and a 12-acre tract near Jump, Kentucky, (the Jump tract). They conveyed to all eight of their children in equal proportions the mineral rights to those two tracts and to a separate, 200-acre tract on Simpson Martin Branch ("the 200 acre tract"). The children shared in the proceeds from leases of those mineral rights. Upon the deaths of the children, their respective shares passed either through intestate succession or by will.
Noah and Josie also conveyed surface rights to other tracts of land (not involved in this litigation) to four of Cassie's siblings. However, they conveyed the mineral rights to those tracts to all eight of their children in equal portions.
In 1990, Cassie prepared a holographic will that provided: "All my land located on Simpson Branch of Drift, KY., is to be given to my brother William Martin of Martin, Kentucky. All land which I own at 'Jump' or Drift, Ky. is to go to my sister, Edith M. Hopkins of Minnie, Kentucky." Cassie died on August 9, 1999, and Libbi Hall, daughter of Edith M. Hopkins (Edith), was appointed as Executrix of Cassie's estate. William Martin (William) pre-deceased Cassie, and he left his estate to his daughter Dorothy, who also died, leaving her estate to her daughters Jennifer Walsh, Ann Yabroff Lane, and Robin Yabroff King. At the time of her death, Cassie was survived by her brother James Martin (James). James has since died and is survived by his widow, Darlena, the appellant before us.
Patrick Walsh, David Lane, and David King are married to Jennifer, Ann, and Robin respectively. They were joined in this action because of their marital interest in their wives' estates.
Following a rather tortuous procedural path, this matter reached the circuit court based on Darlena's complaint in which she sought an interpretation of "land" as used in Cassie's will. Darlena argued to the circuit court, as she does here, that Cassie intended to devise only the surface rights of the Jump and Simpson Martin Branch tracts to William and Edith. According to Darlena, Cassie did not intend to devise her share of the mineral rights to those tracts or her share of the mineral rights to the 200-acre tract to William and Edith. Darlena contends that Cassie knew the difference between surface and mineral rights, thus reasoning that Cassie's failure to mention mineral rights in her will indicated that she did not intend to devise those rights to William and Edith. The Appellees argue that the court must look to the statutory definition of land, which includes both surface and mineral rights. After reviewing the parties' arguments, the circuit court held as follows:
The sole issue before the Court is the interpretation of the term "land" as used in the will of Cassie Martin, deceased. The Plaintiff contends that it applies only to the surface deed referenced in Deed Book 172, Page 620, The [sic] Defendants contend that it represents both their surface and mineral interest[s].
In defining land, Black's Law Dictionary notes the word "lands" is synonymous with "real estate" or "real property". Black's Law Dictionary Fourth Edition, Revised 1968, Page 1019. It has long been the law of this state that minerals in place are real estate. Williams Administrator ADM (R) v[.] Union Bank & Trust, 143 S.W.2d 297 (Ky. 1940). Gillis v[.] Yount[,]748 S.W.2d 357 (Ky. 1988).
The Kentucky Legislature has clarified this issue in KRS [Kentucky Revised Statute] 394.340, which provides that "a general devise of land includes all interest therein owned by the testator." (Emphasis added). Therein, it states:
"a devise of land of the Testator, or of the land of the Testator at any place . . . or otherwise described in a general manner . . . shall be construed to include his leasehold estates, or any of them to which the description extends, as well as freehold estates, unless a contrary intention appears in the Will."The Court found no evidence of a contrary intention in the Will. Interpretation of wills if governed by the "Pole Star Rule," i.e., the intention of the testator is controlling in the absence of some illegality. Schieinman v. Markx, 347 S.W.2d 504 (Ky. 1969). As set forth in a [sic] Restatement of Properties, Section 241(2) the intention sought is not the subjective intention of the testator, but what the restatement terms, the "judicial ascertained intent". The real question is not what the testator intended to say, but what is meant by what is said. Alfred v[.] Kentucky Trust Company, 293 S.W.2d 885 (Ky. 1956). The Testator devised "all my land . . . " to
specific siblings. There being no evidence of a contrary intent by the Testator, the statutory presumption set out in KRS 394.340 prevails.
IT IS THE FINDING OF THIS COURT that the term "land" as used in the will of Cassie Martin, deceased, includes both the surface and all mineral interest that she owned at the time of her death, located in Simpson's Branch and Jump at Drift, Kentucky, based on KRS 394.300, and there is no evidence of a contrary intent." (Emphasis added.)
The court determined that Cassie devised: (1) the surface rights and her interest in the mineral rights in the Jump tract to Edith; (2) the surface rights and her interest in the mineral rights in the Simpson Martin Branch tract to William; and (3) her interest in the mineral rights in the 200-acre tract to William. (Ownership in this tract alone was bifurcated -- giving her alone the mineral rights.)
Darlena filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate. She argued that Cassie's will did not include any devise of mineral rights. In the alternative, Darlena argued that if the will were construed to include a devise of mineral rights, it included only the mineral rights associated with the surface rights. The alternative argument would mean that Edith inherited Cassie's surface and mineral rights to the Jump tract and that William inherited Cassie's surface and mineral rights to the Simpson Martin Branch tract. However, Cassie's interest in the mineral rights to the 200-acre tract would become part of the residuary of her estate and would pass by intestate succession. Thus, Darlena, as James's heir, would take James's proportionate share of Cassie's interest in the mineral rights to the 200-acre tract. The Appellees argued that the term land includes all mineral and surface rights -- regardless of whether the mineral rights are associated with or specifically tied to the surface rights. The court denied Darlena's motion and this appeal followed.
We are governed by a strict standard in reviewing a summary judgment:
The proper standard of review on appeal when a trial judge has granted a motion for summary judgment is whether the record, when examined in its entirety, shows there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." CR 56.03. The trial judge must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, resolving all doubts in its favor. Spencer v. Estate of Spencer, 313 S.W.3d 534, 537 (Ky. 2010) (quoting Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476 (Ky. 1991)). Because summary judgment does not require findings of fact but only an examination of the record to determine whether material issues of fact exist, we generally review the grant of summary judgment without deference to either the trial court's assessment of the record or its legal conclusions....Hammons v. Hammons, 327 S.W.3d 444, 448 (Ky. 2010). With the preceding standards in mind, we address the court's interpretation of the word land as used in Cassie's will.
When interpreting the terms of a will, the primary concern of the court is to ascertain the testator's intention. Clarke v. Kirk, 795 S.W.2d 936, 938 (Ky. 1990). "To ascertain the testator's intention, it is necessary to first examine the language of the instrument. If the language used is a reasonably clear expression of intent, then the inquiry need go no further." Id. If the language is not clear, courts may refer to canons of construction to construe the meaning -- but only when doubt or ambiguity exists as to the testator's intent. When a testator employs clear, definite, and unambiguous language, there is no need to resort to principles of construction. Conlee v. Conlee, 300 Ky. 685, 190 S.W.2d 43, 46 (1945).
Darlena and the Appellees both argue that Cassie's will is clear and that it requires no need to resort to canons of construction. According to Darlena, Cassie understood the difference between surface and mineral rights; thus, her failure to make any mention of mineral rights is a clear indication that she only intended to devise surface rights. The Appellees argue that the term land, when used in a will, is defined by statute whose definition prevails. We agree with the Appellees.
KRS 394.340 provides as follows:
A devise of the land of the testator, or of the land of the testator in any place or occupied by any person mentioned in his will or otherwise described in a general manner, and any other general devise which would describe a leasehold estate, if the testator had no freehold estate which could be described by it, shall be construed to include his leasehold estates, or any of them to which the description extends, as well as freehold estates, unless a contrary intention appears in the will.Thus, a devise of land -- unless otherwise indicated -- includes all leasehold and freehold estates owned by the testator. At the time that she made her will and at the time of her death, Cassie held freehold estates in the surface rights to the Jump tract and to the Simpson Martin Branch tract. She also held freehold estates in her proportionate share of the mineral rights to those two tracts -- as well as her mineral rights to the 200-acre tract. Cassie used the term land to describe the particular tracts of real property that she devised, and she owned her interests in those tracts as freehold estates. There is no indication in the will that she meant something less than all of her identified freehold estates. All statutory elements were satisfied, and the circuit court properly applied them in its judgment. We find no error.
We affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
ALL CONCUR. BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: Larry D. Brown
Prestonsburg, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: Daniel P. Stratton
Pikeville, Kentucky