The party asserting a modification must prove (1) notice of the change and (2) acceptance of the change. Martin v. Golden Corral Corp., 601 So. 2d 1316, 1317 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)(reversing district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant as a material issue of fact existed concerning whether plaintiff was notified of a modification in compensation agreement). "There is no legal presumption in Florida that an employee acquiesces in a reduction in pay simply by remaining on the job."

Florida courts have held that the mere fact that a contract is terminable at will is not a defense to an action for tortious interference, see Ahern v. Boeing Co., 701 F.2d 142, 145 (11th Cir. 1983); and have stated that, while "a party to a terminable-at-will contract ordinarily has no cause of action for the other party's decision to terminate the employment relationship[,. . . a] cause of action for wrongful discharge may be maintained where the ground for the discharge has been condemned by the legislature." Crawford, 490 So.2d at 996 n. 4. See also Cabanas v. Womack Bass, P.A., 706 So.2d 68 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1998) (referring to at-will employment relationship as "contract for employment"); Recio v. Kent Security Servs., Inc., 727 So.2d 320 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1999) ("Basic contract principles govern modifications to employment-at-will contracts.") (quoting Martin v. Golden Corral Corp., 601 So.2d 1316 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1992)). In sum, we agree with Chief Judge Albritton of our sister court in the Middle District of Alabama, who explained:

So viewed, the principle Ailes established for this jurisdiction is in keeping with the rule adopted by most courts considering the issue that an employer may prospectively modify the terms of at-will employment and that the employee's continued service amounts to acceptance of the modification. See Cotter v. Desert Palace, Inc., 880 F.2d 1142, 1145 (9th Cir. 1989); Martin v. Airborne Express, 16 F.Supp.2d 623, 632 (E.D.N.C. 1996); Martin v. Golden Corral Corp., 601 So.2d 1316, 1317 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1992); Moody v. Bogue, 310 N.W.2d 655, 660-61 (Iowa Ct.App. 1981); Stieber v. Journal Publ'g Co., 120 N.M. 270, 901 P.2d 201, 204 (Ct.App. 1995); Albrant v. Sterling Furniture Co., 85 Or.App. 272, 736 P.2d 201, 203 (1987); In re Dillard Dep't Stores, Inc., 198 S.W.3d 778, 780 (Tex. 2006); Hathaway v. General Mills, Inc., 711 S.W.2d 227, 229 (Tex. 1986); see also Thomas G. Fischer, Sufficiency of Notice of Modification in Terms of Compensation of At-Will Employee Who Continues Performance to Bind Employee, 69 A.L.R.4th 1145, 1147 (1989). These courts hold that the ability to terminate the employment relationship at will necessarily includes the ability to alter its terms, and that permitting such modification avoids the undesirable result of encouraging employers to fire employees who do not expressly agree to new terms.

Simply put, an employer cannot modify a written commission agreement retroactively or without notice to its employees. See, Martin v. Golden Corral Corp., 601 So.2d 1316 (Fla.App. 1992) (reversing and remanding summary judgment to determine if employee had notice and acceptance of modification to at-will employment contract); Hathaway v. General Mills, Inc., 711 S.W.2d 227 (Tex. 1986) (stating that employee must have knowledge and notice of proposed modification when employer modifies at-will employment agreement). See, also, 27 Am. Jur.2d, supra, §§ 23, 26, and 54.

However, if the employer refuses to negotiate or adopt different terms, the employee must quit or accept the employer's terms.{¶ 24} Importantly, continuation of employment after a modification only constitutes assent if the employer notifies the employee of the modification or the employee otherwise knows of it. Hathaway v. Gen. Mills, Inc. (Tex. 1986), 711 S.W.2d 227, 229; Kauffman v. Internatl. Brotherhood of Teamsters (D.C.App. 2008), 950 A.2d 44, 47-48; Martin v. Golden Corral Corp. (Fla.App. 1992), 601 So.2d 1316, 1317. "Without notice of the modified terms, it is impossible for an at-will employee to accept them." Silva v. Md. Screen Printers, Inc. (Oct. 26, 2006), M.D.Pa. No. 1:04-CV-2018.

An employee impliedly accepts such modifications by continuing employment after the modification.’ [Citation.] The foregoing rule in Albrant was adopted by the court in Cotter v. Desert Palace, Inc. (9th Cir. 1989) 880 F.2d 1142, 1145, applying Nevada law; by the Court of Appeals of New Mexico in Stieber v. Journal Publishing Co. (1995) 120 N.M. 270 [901 P.2d 201]; and by the Florida Court of Appeal in Martin v. Golden Corral Corp. (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1992) 601 So.2d 1316, 1317.” (DiGiacinto, supra, 59 Cal.App.4th at p. 636.)

See DeMarco v. Publix Super Mkts., Inc., 384 So.2d 1253 (Fla. 1980); Spanish Broadcasting Sys. of Fla., Inc. v. Alfonso, 689 So.2d 1092 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997); Ross v. Twenty-Four Collection, Inc., 617 So.2d 428 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993); Crawford v. David Shapiro Co., 490 So.2d 993 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986); Mayo v. Highland Park Hosp. Corp., 460 So.2d 571 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984). We do not pass upon any issue relating to the recovery of attorney's fees for conversion under the theft statute, see § 772.11, Fla. Stat. (2004); S. Express Co. v. Van Meter, 17 Fla. 783 (1880); Recio v. Kent Sec. Servs., Inc., 727 So.2d 320 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999); Martin v. Golden Corral Corp., 601 So.2d 1316 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992); Belford Trucking Co. v. Zagar, 243 So.2d 646, 648-49 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970); United States v. Bailey, 419 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir. 2005), or under the wages statute, § 448.08, Fla. Stat. (2004), because, in the absence of an actual award of fees, the matter is not ripe for consideration. See Nye v. HCI Mfg., Inc., 901 So.2d 304 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005); Lydolph v. Davidson, 880 So.2d 817 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004); Mem'l Sloan-Kettering Cancer Ctr. v. Levy, 681 So.2d 842 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996); Winkelman v. Toll, 632 So.2d 130 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994).

We conclude that this is not an expression of a definite term of employment. See Martin v. Golden Corral Corp., 601 So.2d 1316 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992) (employment letter that "established an investment program in which Martin was able to purchase one five percent joint venture interest in certain Golden Corral stores during each of the first two years of employment and two such interests during each subsequent year" did not contain a definite term of employment despite reference to years of employment); see also Murry v. Zynyx Mktg. Communications, Inc., 774 So.2d 714 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) (providing an example of clear language that establishes a definite term of employment — "The initial term of [Murry's] employment by Zynyx shall be for a period of (1) year ("Initial Term") effective March 1, 1994 through March 1, 1995"); Story v. Culverhouse, 727 So.2d 1128 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (providing example of clear language that establishes a definite term of employment — "For a period of one (1) year beginning on the Settlement Closing Date, Stephen F. Story shall continue to fulfill all his duties as manager of the Trust"). The fact that th

The party asserting a modification must prove (1) notice of the change and (2) acceptance of the change." Martin v. Golden Corral Corp., 601 So.2d 1316, 1317 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992). There is no legal presumption in Florida that an employee acquiesces in a reduction in pay simply by remaining on the job. See id. at 1317 n.2. Claimant does not dispute that he was notified at the time of his pay reduction.

" ( Id. at p. 203, fn. omitted; see also Brett v. City of Eugene (1994) 130 Or. App. 53 [ 880 P.2d 937, 939].) The foregoing rule in Albrant was adopted by the court in Cotter v. Desert Palace, Inc. (9th Cir. 1989) 880 F.2d 1142, 1145, applying Nevada law; by the Court of Appeals of New Mexico in Stieber v. Journal Pub. Co. (1995) 120 N.M. 270 [ 901 P.2d 201]; and by the Florida Court of Appeal in Martin v. Golden Corral Corp. (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) 601 So.2d 1316, 1317. Other courts have reached conclusions consistent with that in Albrant but have applied different reasoning.