Opinion
Civil Action No. 19-1233
02-02-2021
HASSAN MARTIN, Plaintiff, v. FAYETTE COUNTY PRISON and WARDEN JEFFRY MYERS, Defendants.
District Judge William S. Stickman
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. RECOMMENDATION
It is respectfully recommended that the Complaint filed in the above-captioned case, ECF No. 8, be dismissed for failure to prosecute.
II. REPORT
Plaintiff Hassan Martin ("Plaintiff") brings this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the violation of his due process and Eighth Amendment rights arising from the conditions of his confinement at the Fayette County Prison and an incident involving the alleged excessive use of force. ECF No. 8. Plaintiff names as defendants the Fayette County Prison ("FCP") and Warden Jeffrey Myers ("Warden Myers").
By Order entered April 20, 2020, ECF No. 25, claims against FCP were dismissed with prejudice since a jail is not a proper defendant in an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. --------
On September 4, 2020, this Court issued an Order directing Plaintiff to file a Pre-Trial Statement by November 7, 2020. ECF No. 31. On December 18, 2020, the Court issued an Order requiring Plaintiff to show cause why he failed to comply with the Court's scheduling Order and informing Plaintiff that the failure to respond may result in dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute. ECF No. 40. Plaintiff's response was due January 7, 2021. To date, Plaintiff has failed to respond or give any other indication that he wishes to proceed with this action.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has identified a six-factor balancing test to guide a court in determining whether a case should be dismissed for failure to prosecute. Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 747 F.2d 863 (3d Cir. 1984). The court must consider: 1) the extent of the party's personal responsibility; 2) the prejudice to the adversary caused by the failure to meet scheduling orders and respond to discovery; 3) a history of dilatoriness; 4) whether the conduct of the party or attorney was willful or in bad faith; 5) the effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal, which entails an analysis of alternative sanctions; and 6) the meritoriousness of the claim or defense. Id. at 868. There is no "magic formula" or "mechanical calculation" to determine whether a case should be dismissed for failure to prosecute, Mindek v. Rigatti, 964 F.2d 1369, 1373 (3d Cir. 1992), and not all of the six factors need to weigh in favor of dismissal before dismissal is warranted. Hicks v. Feeney, 850 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1988). Rather, the court must "properly consider and balance" each of the six factors based on the record. See Hildebrand v. Allegheny County, 923 F.3d 128, 132 (3d Cir. 2019) (citing Poulis, 747 F.2d at 868).
"Dismissal with prejudice is an 'extreme' sanction" that should be employed as a "last, not first, resort." Hildebrand, 923 F.3d at 132 (quoting Nat'l Hockey League v. Metro Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 643 (1976), and Poulis, 747 F.2d at 867, 869). A close case should "be resolved in favor of reaching a decision on the merits." Id. (citing Adams v. Trs. of the N.J. Brewery Emps.' Pension Tr. Fund, 29 F.3d 863, 870 (3d Cir. 1994)). Nevertheless, "[d]ismissal is a sanction rightfully in the district courts' toolbox," and the Third Circuit "has not hesitated to affirm the district court's imposition of sanctions, including dismissals in appropriate cases." Id. (citing Poulis, 747 F.2d at 867 n. 1).
The first Poulis factor requires the Court to consider the extent to which the dilatory party is personally responsible for the sanctionable conduct. See Adams, 29 F.3d at 873 ("[I]n determining whether dismissal is appropriate, we look to whether the party bears personal responsibility for the action or inaction which led to the dismissal."). Despite Plaintiff's receipt of a scheduling order requiring him to file a Pre-Trial Statement and this Court's issuance of an Order to Show Cause related thereto, Plaintiff has failed to comply or provide just cause for his failure to do so. Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, he is solely responsible for his own conduct, including his failure to respond to orders from the Court. See, e.g., Colon v. Karnes, 2012 WL 383666, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 6, 2012) ("Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, and thus is responsible for his own actions."). This factor weighs heavily in favor of dismissal.
The second Poulis factor assesses whether the adverse party has suffered prejudice because of the dilatory party's behavior. Relevant concerns include "the irretrievable loss of evidence, the inevitable dimming of witnesses' memories[,] the excessive and possibly irremediable burdens or costs imposed on the opposing party," Adams, 29 F.3d at 874, and "the burden imposed by impeding a party's ability to prepare effectively a full and complete trial strategy." Ware v. Rodale Press, Inc., 322 F.3d 218, 222 (3d Cir. 2003). At this stage of the litigation, this factor weighs heavily against Plaintiff given the necessity for a Pre-Trial Statement to permit Defendants to prepare their trial strategy or to file a Motion for Summary Judgment based upon the evidence identified by Plaintiff for use at trial. The Plaintiff's "continued failure to communicate with the Court and continued inaction [therefore] frustrates and delays resolution of this action." See Mack v. United States, 2019 WL 1302626, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 21, 2019) ("[F]ailure to communicate clearly prejudices the Defendants who seek a timely resolution of the case.").
The third Poulis factor also weighs in favor of dismissal. Plaintiff's failure to adhere to this Court's pre-trial scheduling order and Order to Show Cause is the second instance of unexcused delay. See ECF Nos. 21-23. This conduct is sufficient to establish a history of dilatoriness.
With respect to the fourth Poulis factor, "[w]illfulness involves intentional or self-serving behavior." Adams, 29 F.3d at 874. In this case, there is nothing on the docket to suggest that Plaintiff is not currently receiving the Court's orders, and his failure to comply with the Court's orders therefore appears willful.
The fifth factor address the effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal. Poulis, 747 F.2d at 869. It is well-established that monetary sanctions are ineffective where the Plaintiff is indigent. See, e.g., Brennan v. Clouse, 2012 WL 876228, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 14, 2012) ("Alternative sanctions, such as monetary penalties, are inappropriate as sanctions with indigent pro se parties.") (citing Emerson v. Thiel College, 296 F.3d 184, 191 (3d Cir. 2002)). Moreover, alternative sanctions are unlikely to be effective against a party who refuses to communicate with the Court. Mack, 2019 WL 1302626, at *2 (noting that the court was "incapable of imposing a lesser sanction" on a plaintiff who refused to participate in his own lawsuit). As such, this factor weighs heavily in favor of dismissal.
Finally, the Court must consider the potential merit of Plaintiff's claims. A claim will be deemed meritorious "when the allegations of the pleadings, if established at trial, would support recovery by plaintiff." Poulis, 747 F.2d at 869-70. Here, Plaintiff's remaining claims against Warden Myers require evidence that Plaintiff's confinement in a cell without running water, as well as a corrections officer's use of "oc spray" occurred with Warden Myer's approval and participation, was not rationally related to a legitimate nonpunitive governmental purpose and was excessive in relation to that purpose. In light of the absence of evidence of record, this factor weighs neither against nor in favor of dismissal. Nevertheless, "[n]ot all of these factors need be met for a district court to find dismissal is warranted." Hicks v. Feeney, 850 F.2d 152, 156 (3d Cir. 1988).
On balance, the Court concludes that at least five of the six Poulis factors support dismissal, with the remaining factor (meritoriousness of claim) not weighed against nor in favor of dismissal. While the Court is mindful of the strong policy in favor of deciding cases on the merits, such a resolution is impossible where the plaintiff declines to participate in his own lawsuit. Consequently, the Court concludes that on the record presented here, the extreme sanction of dismissal is supported by the Poulis factors.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, it is respectfully recommended that this action be dismissed due to Plaintiff's failure to prosecute.
In accordance with the Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(b)(1)(B) & (C), and Local Rule 72.D.2, Plaintiff is permitted to file written objections and responses thereto in accordance with the schedule established in the docket entry reflecting the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Objections are to be submitted to the Clerk of Court, United States District Court, 700 Grant Street, Room 3110, Pittsburgh, PA 15219. Failure to timely file objections will constitute a waiver of any appellate rights. Siers v. Morrash, 700 F.3d 113, 116 (3d Cir. 1983). See Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011). Any party opposing objections may file their response to the objections within fourteen (14) days thereafter in accordance with Local Civil Rule 72.D.2. Dated: February 2, 2021
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Maureen P . Kelly
MAUREEN P. KELLY
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE cc: The Honorable William S. Stickman
United States District Judge
Hassan Martin
MW4978
SCI Fayette
50 Overlook Drive
LaBelle, PA 15450
All counsel of record via CM/ECF