Opinion
Civil Action No. 4:01-CV-452-A
February 5, 2002
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE AND NOTICE AND ORDER
This cause of action was referred to the United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 of the United States Code, § 636(b), as implemented by an order of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas. The Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge are as follows:
I. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS A. NATURE OF THE CASE
Martin's petition does not specifically refer to § 2241 or § 2254 as the basis of this court's jurisdiction. This court will construe Martin's pro se petition as seeking relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. E.g., Brown v. Smith, 828 F.2d 1493, 1495 (10th Cir. 1987); Fisher v. Rose, 757 F.2d 789, 792 n. 2 (6th Cir. 1985).
B. PARTIES
Petitioner Jerrell Lynn Martin, TDCJ-ID #673212, is incarcerated in the Wynne Unit of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division in Huntsville, Texas.
Respondent Janie Cockrell is the Director of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division.
C. PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL HISTORY
On May 16, 1991, Martin pleaded guilty to robbery by threats, and the trial court sentenced Martin to 15 years' confinement. (Resp't Answer at Ex. A.) On June 3, 1993, Martin was sentenced to another 15-year term after pleading guilty to burglary of a habitation. ( Id.) Both conviction occurred in Tarrant County.
Thus, this court has jurisdiction over Martin's petition. Wadsworth v. Johnson, 235 F.3d 959, 961-62 (5th Cir. 2000).
While incarcerated pursuant to these convictions at the Dalhart Unit, which is located within the jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, Amarillo Division, Martin was charged by a June 20, 2000 offense report with the institutional offense of possession of tobacco products. ( Id. at Ex. B p. 3.) Martin received a copy of the incident report on June 22, 2000 at 10:40 a.m. ( Id. at Ex. B p. 2.) That same day, he spoke with his assigned counsel who explained his rights in the disciplinary process. ( Id. at Ex. B pp. 7-8.) Martin stated he was guilty, but claimed that he had been set up and that the tobacco was not his. He requested no witnesses or other evidence during his meeting with counsel. ( Id.) Because he waived 24-hour notice, the disciplinary hearing was held on June 22, 2000. ( Id. at Ex. B pp. 2, 6.) Martin pleaded guilty and stated that he was merely picking up the tobacco for another inmate. ( Id.) A photograph of the tobacco was admitted into evidence. ( Id. at Ex. B. p. 5.) After considering the guilty plea, the offense report, and the photograph, the hearing officer found Martin guilty of the charge and assessed punishment at a reduction in line class from S2 to L1, the loss of 700 days' good-time credit, 30 days' cell restriction, and 45 days' loss of commissary and recreation privileges. ( Id. at Ex. B. pp. 2, 6.)
Martin then pursued his administrative remedies, essentially challenging the disciplinary proceeding on the grounds raised in this federal petition, as well as others. His "Step 1" grievance was denied because "there is no valid reason to warrant overturning this case." ( Id. at Ex. C pp. 2-3.) He then filed a "Step 2" grievance with the Unit Grievance Investigator, who also decided no corrective action should be taken. ( Id. at Ex. C pp. 5-6.) On January 29, 2001, Martin filed the instant habeas corpus petition in this court. Cockrell has filed an answer with attached affidavits and documentary exhibits.
Although Martin initially filed his federal petition in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, Amarillo Division, that court correctly transferred the petition to this court. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (d); Wadsworth, 235 F.3d at 961-62.
D. ISSUES
Martin challenges the prison disciplinary proceeding as violative of his constitutional rights on the following grounds:
1. He was denied his right to call requested witnesses.
2. At the time of the institutional offense, he was coerced with deadly force into confessing.
E. DISCUSSION
An inmate charged with an offense that would deprive him of good-conduct time credit is entitled to those minimum procedures appropriate under the circumstances and required by the Due Process Clause to ensure that his rights are not arbitrarily abrogated. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974). While it is settled that minimal due process requirements must be met in prison disciplinary proceedings, the law does not afford a prisoner at a disciplinary hearing the full panoply of rights that constitute due process for a criminal trial. Id. Moreover, in cases where there is an actual loss of good-time credits as a result of the disciplinary proceeding, federal courts will not review the sufficiency of the evidence at a disciplinary hearing; a finding of guilt requires only the support of some facts or any evidence at all to support the action taken by prison officials. Superintendent, Mass. Corn Inst., Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985); Stewart v. Thigpen, 730 F.2d 1002, 1005-06 (5th Cir. 1984); Smith v. Rabalais, 659 F.2d 539, 542 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 992 (1982). In sum, the disciplinary determination must not be arbitrary or capricious, but a reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for that of prison authorities. Stewart, 730 F.2d at 1005; Smith, 659 F.2d at 545.The record reveals that Martin received written notice before the disciplinary hearing of the charges against him. Martin was assisted by counsel at the hearing, but refused the opportunity to call witnesses and present documentary evidence. The record includes a written statement of the hearing officer's findings, which shows that the fact-finder relied on the photograph of the tobacco, the offense report, and Martin's admission of guilt in reaching the conclusion that Martin committed the offense of possession of contraband. Martin, therefore, received all the procedural due process to which he was entitled.
Moreover, the record demonstrates that the fact-finder's conclusion was neither arbitrary nor capricious and there were at least some facts and evidence to support the finding of guilt and resultant loss of good-conduct time. As indicated, the hearing officer's decision was based upon the reporting officer's report, indicating that Martin possessed tobacco. The decision was further based upon Martin's own admission of guilt. Thus, the discipline hearing officer found Martin's explanation of the event, i.e., that he was picking up the tobacco for another inmate, additional evidence of his guilt, rather than inculpatory as intended by Martin. The disciplinary hearing officer is entitled to make such determinations regarding the credibility and reliability of the evidence presented. Smith, 659 F.2d at 545-46. Thus, the hearing officer's finding that Martin was guilty did not constitute an arbitrary and capricious exercise of his discretionary disciplinary function sufficient to give rise to a claim by Martin of a constitutional violation. Id. at 546. Further, there is sufficient evidence to support the finding of guilt. Hill, 472 U.S. at 455. In conclusion, the disciplinary action comported with due process and did not offend the constitution. Moreover, the sanctions imposed for violation of the institutional rule were proper under the circumstances. (Resp't Answer at Ex. C p. 3.)
Martin's claim that he was coerced into confessing by deadly force is, likewise, meritless. During the grievance process, Martin raised this claim. It was determined that because the officer denied that Martin was threatened with a gun at the time of the offense, there was no evidence to support his allegation. ( Id. at Ex. C pp. 3, 6.) Because this constitutes some evidence to support the conclusion of the disciplinary body that Martin's confession was not unconstitutionally coerced, its determination will be upheld. Hill, 472 U.S. at 454; Stewart, 730 F.2d at 1005-06; Adams, 729 F.2d at 370; Smith, 659 F.2d at 542.
II. RECOMMENDATION
Martin's petition should be construed as a petition for habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and should be denied.
IV. ORDER
Under 28 U.S.C. § 636, it is hereby ORDERED that each party is granted until February 26, 2002 to serve and file, not merely place in the mail, written objections to the United States Magistrate Judge's proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendations. It is further ORDERED that if objections are filed and the opposing party chooses to file a response, a response shall be filed within seven (7) days of the filing date of the objections. It is further ORDERED that the above-styled and numbered action, previously referred to the United States Magistrate Judge for findings, conclusions, and recommendations, be and hereby is returned to the docket of the United States District Judge.