MARTIN v. CLUM

3 Citing cases

  1. Herrod v. Schimmelfing

    264 So. 2d 458 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972)

    But such proviso has been generally construed by the Florida Courts to be applicable only "in doubtful cases" or where the existence of the cause of action under the guest statute "is a close one on which honest men could differ", and is in fact merely "surplusage". Cormier v. Williams, 1941, 148 Fla. 201, 4 So.2d 525; Revell v. Carraway, supra; Martin v. Clum, Fla.App. 1962, 142 So.2d 149; Lockridge v. Dial, Fla.App. 1968, 208 So.2d 662; Koger v. Hollahan, 1940, 144 Fla. 787, 198 So. 685, 131 A.L.R. 886; Cobb v. Lawrence, 54 Cal.App.2d 630, 129 P.2d 462; Bell v. Gray, Fla.App. 1969, 220 So.2d 446. The judgment of dismissal, in my opinion, should be —

  2. Tuz v. Burmeister

    254 So. 2d 569 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971)   Cited 8 times
    In Tuz, the petitioner Tuz was a party to the original suit filed in the trial court, while in Youngblood the appellant was not a party to the original suit filed in the trial court.

    In doubtful cases where the evidence is close, and honest men could differ as to the conclusion to be reached, the question of whether the driver's negligence was ordinary or gross is one which should be submitted to the jury under appropriate instructions. Lockridge v. Dial, 208 So.2d 662 (Fla.App. 4th, 1968); Martin v. Clum, 142 So.2d 149 (Fla.App. 3rd, 1962); Carraway v. Revell, 116 So.2d 16 (Fla. 1959). We are of the opinion that the evidence adduced during the trial of this cause with regard to the speed in which the Tuz vehicle was traveling at nighttime, the condition of the roads in question, and the road signs indicating the necessary turn was sufficient to demonstrate gross negligence on the part of the driver Tuz. As stated in Hall v. Hughey, 104 So.2d 849, 851 (Fla.App. 2d 1958):

  3. Frank v. Lurie

    157 So. 2d 431 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963)   Cited 8 times

    In affirming summary judgment for the defendant the court observed that, although the driver's actions were imprudent, they did not constitute gross negligence or wilful and wanton misconduct. Martin v. Clum, Fla.App. 1962, 142 So.2d 149, cited by the plaintiff, has no application here. In that case the defendant knew that the car brakes were wet and wholly inoperable and the defendant should have known that driving at an excessive speed under the known circumstances would probably cause injury to persons or property.