( Viles v. State of California (1967) 66 Cal.2d 24, 29 [ 56 Cal.Rptr. 666, 423 P.2d 818].) Appellate courts will not interfere with the decision of the trial judge in relieving a party of default except for clear abuse of discretion ( Martin v. City ofMadera (1968) 265 Cal.App.2d 76, 79 [ 70 Cal.Rptr. 908].) See Viles v. State of California (1967) 66 Cal.2d 24, 29 [ 56 Cal.Rptr. 666, 423 P.2d 818]; Shaddox v. Melcher (1969) 270 Cal.App.2d 598, 601 [ 76 Cal.Rptr. 80]; Martin v. City of Madera (1968) 265 Cal.App.2d 76, 79 [ 70 Cal.Rptr. 908] .

(5) In arriving at our decision we are not unmindful of the principles collected in Black v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 12 Cal.App.3d 670, 674: "It is well established that the decision whether a petitioner will be relieved of his default lies within the discretion of the trial judge and appellate courts will not interfere except for an abuse of discretion. ( Martin v. City of Madera, 265 Cal.App.2d 76, 79 [ 70 Cal.Rptr. 908].) We are not unaware that this rule, as pointed out in Viles v. State of California, 66 Cal.2d 24 [ 56 Cal.Rptr. 666, 423 P.2d 818], at pages 28-29, `does not preclude reversal of an order denying relief where adequate cause for such relief is shown by uncontradicted evidence or affidavits of the petitioner, nor should it be employed to defeat the liberal policies of remedial statutes designed for that purpose.

(2) It is well established that the decision whether a petitioner will be relieved of his default lies within the discretion of the trial judge and appellate courts will not interfere except for an abuse of discretion. ( Martin v. City of Madera, 265 Cal.App.2d 76, 79 [ 70 Cal.Rptr. 908].) We are not unaware that this rule, as pointed out in Viles v. State of California, 66 Cal.2d 24 [ 56 Cal.Rptr. 666, 423 P.2d 818], at pages 28-29, "does not preclude reversal of an order denying relief where adequate cause for such relief is shown by uncontradicted evidence or affidavits of the petitioner, nor should it be employed to defeat the liberal policies of remedial statutes designed for that purpose.

Yet we cannot arbitrarily substitute our judgment for that of the trial court. This is demonstrated by Martin v. City of Madera, 265 Cal.App.2d 76 [ 70 Cal.Rptr. 908]. (2b) There, in a case which in some respects was similar to our own, the court affirmed a denial of relief, although it conceded that had relief been granted "it is unlikely that we would have distributed the trial judge's discretion. . . .

(5) Generally, the mere ignorance of the time limitation for filing against a public entity is not a sufficient ground for allowing a late claim. ( Martin v. City of Madera (1968) 265 Cal.App.2d 76, 79 [ 70 Cal.Rptr. 908].) Moreover, ignorance of the possible cause of action against the public entity is insufficient to constitute excusable neglect.

Moreover, a mere lack of knowledge of the claim-filing requirements and its time limitation is insufficient. ( Tammen v. County of San Diego, supra, 66 Cal.2d at p. 475; Baker v. Beech Aircraft Corp. (1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 315, 321 [ 114 Cal.Rptr. 171, 91 A.L.R.3d 981]; Martin v. City of Madera (1968) 265 Cal.App.2d 76, 80-81 [ 70 Cal.Rptr. 908]; see Transit Ads, Inc. v. Tanner Motor Livery, Ltd. (1969) 270 Cal.App.2d 275, 281 [ 75 Cal.Rptr. 848].) Thus, the trial court had no evidentiary basis upon which to base its grant of the judicial relief requested.

However, a reporter's transcript of the hearing on the petition has been made part of the record; such transcript discloses that defendant municipality argued the applicability of Black v. County of Los Angeles, 12 Cal.App.3d 670 [ 91 Cal.Rptr. 104], decided by this court, and upon denial of the petition the trial court stated, "I think that the Black case is probably controlling." This statement becomes significantly important since Black discusses all the decisions bearing upon the instant problem, including Martin v. City of Madera, 265 Cal.App.2d 76 [ 70 Cal.Rptr. 908]. In Martin v. City of Madera, supra, 265 Cal.App.2d 76, the trial court expressly found that neither of the two Tammen hurdles was overcome, and the reviewing court affirmed.

The California cases hold uniformly that the determination of whether delay in filing is excusable rests in the discretion of the trial judge. Viles v. California, 66 Cal.2d 24, 56 Cal.Rptr. 666, 423 P.2d 818 (Sup.Ct. 1967); Martin v. City of Madera, 265 Cal.App.2d 76, 70 Cal.Rptr. 908 (D. Ct. App. 1968); Clark v. City of Compton, 22 Cal.App.3d 522, 99 Cal.Rptr. 613 (Ct.App. 1971); Black v. County of Los Angeles, 12 Cal.App.3d 670, 91 Cal.Rptr. 104 (Ct.App. 1970). Plaintiff relies on the case of Viles v. California, supra, in support of his argument that because of excusable neglect he should now be permitted to file this late claim.

A trial court need not rely on such a declaration. ( Tammen v. County of San Diego (1967) 66 Cal.2d 468, 477 [ 58 Cal.Rptr. 249, 426 P.2d 753]; Martin v. City of Madera (1968) 265 Cal.App.2d 76, 81-82 [ 70 Cal.Rptr. 908].) The only way the lead opinion can reach its result is to substitute its judgment for that of the trial court.

Rather, as in previous cases granting relief on the basis of excusable neglect, Ms. Ebersol acted diligently to retain legal counsel within the 100-day limitation period. See, e.g., Rivera v. City of Carson, supra, 117 Cal.App.3d 718 (relief denied where injured plaintiff made deliberate decision not to comply with the claim requirement pending outcome of criminal proceedings against him); Bennett v. City of LosAngeles (1970) 12 Cal.App.3d 116 [ 90 Cal.Rptr. 479] (relief denied where parents of minor child killed by collapsing cement wall owned by the city did not consult an attorney until 119 days after the accrual of their cause of action); Martin v. City ofMadera (1968) 265 Cal.App.2d 76 [ 70 Cal.Rptr. 908] (relief denied where plaintiff, a businessman presumably accustomed to dealing with legal matters, alleged he became ill after drinking contaminated city water but did not file a claim until 11 months later). See, e.g., Leake v. Wu (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 668 [ 134 Cal.Rptr. 616] (relief denied where plaintiff's counsel, retained within three weeks of the accrual of the cause of action, did not make any inquiry to determine that the defendant named in plaintiff's complaint was a public employee); Hasty v. County of Los Angeles (1976) 61 Cal.App.3d 623 [ 131 Cal.Rptr. 347] (relief denied where plaintiff's counsel delayed two months after completion of his investigation in filing an application for leave to file a late claim); Black v. County of LosAngeles (1970) 12 Cal.App.3d 670 [ 91 Cal.Rptr. 104] (relief denied where plaintiff's counsel, retained 10 days after the accrual of the cause of action, failed to obtain a California Highway Patrol report of the accident in