Martin v. City of Annapolis

5 Citing cases

  1. Martin and Burch v. Annapolis

    237 A.2d 728 (Md. 1968)   Cited 4 times
    In Martin and Burch, we distinguished our decision in Norwood Heights Imp. Ass'n, Inc. v. Mayor City Council of Baltimore, 191 Md. 155, 60 A.2d 192 (1948), relied on by the appellants.

    BARNES, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The three appeals and cross-appeals, Nos. 64, 65 and 66, September Term, 1967, consolidated for briefing pursuant to the order of the Court, and argued together, represent the three last legal battles in a campaign by various property owners and of Historic Annapolis to prevent the construction by Hospitality House of Annapolis, Inc. (Hospitality House), one of the appellees, of a hotel with restaurant and parking facilities on waterfront land on Annapolis harbor on the east side of Compromise Street at the foot of St. Mary's Street. Another aspect of the controversy was before us in Martin v. Mayor and Aldermen of Annapolis, 240 Md. 579, 214 A.2d 800 (1965). For convenience, we will refer to No. 66 as the "Zoning Appeal Case," to No. 64 as the "Height Case" and to No. 65 as the "Hotel Case."

  2. Schiller v. Lefkowitz

    219 A.2d 378 (Md. 1966)   Cited 21 times
    In Schiller v. Lefkowitz, 242 Md. 461, 219 A.2d 378 (1966), the Court was faced with the question of whether its decision in Schowgurow v. State, 240 Md. 121, 213 A.2d 475 (1965), holding that a jury composed of persons who were required to swear to their belief in God as a condition of service was not properly constituted should be retrospectively applied in a civil case where the point had not been raised.

    We have consistently held that we will not consider or pass upon a question which was not raised in or passed upon by the court below. Maryland Rule 885; Martin v. Mayor and Aldermen of Annapolis, 240 Md. 579, 590, 214 A.2d 800 (1965). The question of the constitutionality of Rule 501(a) was not raised below.

  3. Owen v. Hubbard

    260 Md. 146 (Md. 1970)   Cited 22 times
    In Owen v. Hubbard, supra, 260 Md. 146, 271 A.2d 672, the Court acknowledged the rule in McMurray, stating that it "decided the city's right to construct a wharf at the end of a dedicated public street although the adjoining owner might still retain the underlying fee."

    To preserve the point for appeal the appellants should have requested some relief. Since no such request was made and the trial judge did everything the appellant asked him to do, there is nothing before us to consider. Rule 885; Schiller v. Lefkowitz, 242 Md. 461, 476, 219 A.2d 378, cert. denied 385 U.S. 947 (1966); Martin v. City of Annapolis, 240 Md. 579, 589-90, 214 A.2d 800 (1965). We note, however, that Judge Mace's view of the premises does not appear to have been improper.

  4. Connor v. Celanese Fibers Co.

    40 Md. App. 452 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1978)   Cited 3 times

    In the absence of an abuse of that discretion, there is no review of the act of the trial judge. See Greenstein v. Meister, 279 Md. 275, 368 A.2d 451 (1977); Martin v. City of Annapolis, 240 Md. 579, 214 A.2d 800 (1965); Hughes v. Averza, 223 Md. 12, 161 A.2d 671 (1960). The sole remaining issue is whether the appellant is entitled to a jury trial as against either the employer-insurer or, in the event of a bifurcated trial, in the claim against the Subsequent Injury Fund.

  5. Green v. Director

    3 Md. App. 1 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1968)   Cited 5 times
    In Green v. Director, 3 Md. App. 1, 237 A.2d 163, this Court considered and denied an application for leave to appeal from a redetermination of defective delinquency.

    " The granting of a continuance or postponement of a civil action is within the discretion of the court. Md. Rule 527 (a). It is well established that unless the judge acts arbitrarily or prejudicially in exercising that discretion, his decision will not be changed on appeal. State Roads Commission v. Wyvill, 244 Md. 163; Brooks v. Bast, 242 Md. 350; Martin v. Mayor and Alderman of Annapolis, 240 Md. 579; Hughes v. Averza, 223 Md. 12. On the basis of the record in the instant case, we cannot say that the lower court abused its discretion in refusing a postponement.