Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:02-CV-0144-G
March 14, 2003
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Before the court is the motion for summary judgment of the defendant Brown Schools Educational Corporation ("BSEC"). For the reasons stated below, BSEC's motion is granted.
I. BACKGROUND
This is an employment discrimination case brought by Victoria Martin ("Martin") against BSEC, her former employer. Martin is a resident and domiciliary of Texas. Plaintiff, Victoria Martin's, Original Complaint and Jury Demand ("Complaint") ¶ 1. BSEC is a private Delaware corporation that operates a charter school for "at risk" students in Dallas, Texas. See Brief in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Defendant's Motion") at 2; Complaint ¶ 2. BSEC provides educational services for youth ranging in age from ten to seventeen years. Defendant's Motion at 2. In June 1999, BSEC hired Martin to serve as a "site manager" for a BSEC program at the Dallas County Juvenile Detention Center from August 1999 to June 2000. Defendant's Motion at 2-3; Complaint ¶¶ 7-8. BSEC and Martin memorialized the employment agreement in a written contract. Defendant's Motion at 2-3; Complaint 11 7.
Martin's complaint avers that beginning in September 11, 1999, she had several disagreements with her two immediate BSEC supervisors, both of whom allegedly requested that she falsify attendance records. See Complaint ¶¶ 9-11. In response, Martin organized a meeting between the site managers and a site based decision team to discuss these improper requests. Id. ¶¶ 12-13. Martin made the minutes from the meeting available to county personnel, as well as to the two supervisors at issue. Id. ¶ 14. Both supervisors were later terminated. Id. ¶¶ 15, 19.
On January 10, 2000, Martin called Floyd Jackson ("Jackson"), BSEC's director of education, and stated that she was sick and unable to report for work. Defendant's Motion at 3; Complaint ¶ 24. Later that day, according to BSEC, Martin made several "bizarre and disturbing calls" to Jackson, which caused Jackson and Erin Sweeney ("Sweeney"), the facility office manager, to contact the Rowlett police department out of concern for Martin's well being. Defendant's Motion at 3; see also Letter to Charles E. Croft ("Croft Letter") at 2-3, located in Appendix to Brief in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Defendant's Appendix") as Exhibit A. Martin was hospitalized later that evening. Complaint ¶ 27. On January 14, 2000, Martin contacted BSEC and explained that she had been in the hospital for the previous four days, but did not disclose the nature of her hospitalization. Defendant's Motion at 3. On January 18, 2000, Martin faxed Sweeney a letter requesting sick leave, as well as information on the Employee Assistance Program, and indicating that she would contact BSEC as soon as she was able to obtain information concerning her health. Defendant's Motion at 3; Facsimile from Victoria Martin, located in Defendant's Appendix, as Exhibit D.
Martin states in her complaint that the police arrived at her home on January 10, 2000, because BSEC officials "falsely reported to Rowlett [p]olice that [she] [was] at home and suicidal with a gun." Complaint ¶ 25. Martin, however, has offered no evidence that such statements were made to police by any BSEC representative.
On January 19, 2000, Martin returned to work without prior notice to BSEC. Defendant's Motion at 3; Complaint ¶ 29. Upon her return, Sweeney and Vicki Williams ("Williams"), director of the BSEC facility, approached Martin and requested, pursuant to BSEC policy, a statement from her treating physician regarding her absence and her present medical condition. Defendant's Motion at 3; see also The Brown Schools, Inc. Human Resources Policies and Procedures ("BSEC Policies and Procedures") at 2, located in Defendant's Appendix as Exhibit E; Croft Letter at 4-5. Martin then produced a generic one page document entitled "Progress Notes" from a Doctor Borck, which indicated only that she had been hospitalized and could return to work. Defendant's Motion at 3; Defendant's Appendix, Exhibit E The document provided no details as to the reason for Martin's hospitalization or her current physical condition. Id. After reviewing the document, Sweeney informed Martin that she would need to provide her current physician with a job description as well as the details of her job duties so that the physician could properly evaluate her ability to return to work. Defendant's Motion at 3-4. When Martin refused to cooperate in any manner, BSEC put her on administrative suspension. Id. at 4.
BSEC attempted to communicate with Martin for several weeks following the suspension, but the only information Martin provided during this period was a single document, dated February 9, 2000, stating that Doctor Borck was no longer her treating physician and therefore could not evaluate Martin's ability to work at BSEC. Defendant's Motion at 4; Defendant's Appendix, Exhibit H. On February 15, 2000, after failing to attend a meeting with BSEC concerning her ability to return to work, Martin faxed a letter to Williams stating that "due to legal litigation" all further communications should be directed "to my Attorney." Defendant's Motion at 4; Defendant's Appendix, Exhibit I. BSEC terminated Martin's employment on February 22, 2000. Defendant's Motion at 4; Complaint ¶ 32.
On June 26, 2000, Martin sent a demand letter to BSEC and on August 3, 2000, she filed a charge with the Texas Commission on Human Rights ("TCHR"), which was subsequently forwarded to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). Defendant's Motion at 4; Defendant's Appendix, Exhibits J and K. Martin's charge of discrimination alleged only conduct prohibited by the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101-12213. See Defendant's Appendix, Exhibit K. On October 12, 2000, Martin filed a breach of contract claim against BSEC in the District Court of Dallas County, 101st Judicial District. Defendant's Motion at 4; Defendant's Appendix, Exhibit L. Pursuant to a court order, BSEC, Martin, and their respective counsel mediated the matter on November 20, 2001. Defendant's Motion at 5. The mediation resulted in a signed agreement providing for settlement of the state court case, a payment of eighteen thousand dollars to Martin, and a release of claims by Martin in favor of BSEC. Defendant's Motion at 5; Settlement Agreement ¶ 1. The parties presented the settlement agreement to the state court, which dismissed the case with prejudice on February 1, 2002. Defendant's Motion at 5; see also Agreed Order of Dismissal with Prejudice, February 1, 2002, located in Defendant's Appendix as Exhibit P.
Counsel for Martin in the state matter do not represent her in the instant dispute.
The release signed by Martin states, in pertinent part:
Martin does hereby release, discharge, and forever quit-claim [BSEC] and its agents, representatives, predecessors, successors, heirs, executors, administrators, employees and assigns, and each of them, jointly and severally, from any and all of Martin's claims, known or unknown, arising out of or related to Martin's employment with [BSEC] as of the date of this Agreement . . . Martin's release does not include or extend to Martin's claims that she has filed with the EEOC . . .
Compromise Settlement Agreement and Mutual General Release ("Settlement Agreement") ¶ 1, located in Defendant's Appendix as Exhibit M.
On January 22, 2002, Martin filed this case alleging five separate causes of action against BSEC: (1) unlawful employment practices under the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101-12213; (2) wrongful discharge in violation of Texas public policy and the Texas Whistleblower's Act, TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 554.001; (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (4) retaliation due to Martin's alleged opposition to a "discriminatory practice"; and (5) tortious interference with a prospective business relationship. See Complaint ¶¶ 33-42; Docket Sheet. On January 10, 2003, BSEC filed this motion for summary judgment. Martin has not responded to the motion.
On January 14, 2003, the parties attempted to reach a settlement of this case through court-ordered mediation. See Order, October 3, 2002. The mediation, however, was unsuccessful. See Alternative Dispute Resolution Summary, January 14, 2003.
On January 31, 2003, Martin improperly filed a response, which was unfiled the same day and returned with a notice of deficiency for noncompliance with Local Rules 56.5 and 56.6. The time for responding having expired, Martin has apparently elected not to refile her response.
II. ANALYSIS A. Evidentiary Burdens on Motion for Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings and evidence on file show that no genuine issue exists as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c). "[T]he substantive law will identify which facts are material." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A genuine issue of material fact exists "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. The movant makes such a showing by informing the court of the basis of its motion and by identifying the portions of the record which reveal there are no genuine material fact issues. Celotex Corporation v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits, if any, must demonstrate that no genuine issue of material fact exists. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c).Once the movant makes this showing, the nonmovant must then direct the court's attention to evidence in the record sufficient to establish that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24. To carry this burden, the "opponent must do more than simply show . . . some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corporation, 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Instead, the nonmovant must show that the evidence is sufficient to support a resolution of the factual issue in her favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.
All summary judgment evidence must be viewed in a light most favorable to the motion's opponent. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255 (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress . Company, 398 U.S. 144, 158-59 (1970)). However, neither conclusory allegations nor unsubstantiated assertions will satisfy the nonmovant's burden. Little v. Liquid Air Corporation, 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc); Topalian v. Ehrman, 954 F.2d 1125, 1131 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 825 (1992). Summary judgment in favor of the movant is proper if, after adequate time for discovery, the motion's opponent fails to establish the existence of an element essential to her case and as to which she will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23.
While the court may not enter a default summary judgment by virtue of a nonmovant's failure to respond, it may accept as undisputed the facts described in support of the motion. Eversley v. MBank Dallas, 843 F.2d 172, 174 (5th Cir. 1988). Moreover, the failure of a nonmovant to respond means that she has not designated specific facts showing a genuine issue of material fact for trial. "A summary judgment nonmovant who does not respond to the motion is relegated to her unsworn pleadings, which do not constitute summary judgment evidence." Bookman v. Shubzda, 945 F. Supp. 999, 1002 (N.D. Tex. 1996) (Fitzwater, J.) ( citing Solo Serve Corporation v. Westowne Associates, 929 F.2d 160, 165 (5th Cir. 1991)).
B. Martin's Claims Against BSEC
Although Martin has filed a complaint alleging five separate grounds for relief, see Complaint ¶¶ 33-42, BSEC has filed a motion for summary judgment, supported by citations to the record, arguing that there are no genuine issues to support Martin's case. See Defendant's Motion at 1-2. Because Martin has failed to respond to BSEC's request for summary judgment, the court will accept the evidence adduced by BSEC as undisputed. See Eversley, 843 F.2d at 174.
1. Martin's ADA Claim
The ADA prohibits discrimination in employment against qualified persons with a disability. Dupre v. Charter Behavioral Health Systems of Lafayette Inc., 242 F.3d 610, 613 (5th Cir. 2001); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). To establish a prima facie case under the ADA, Martin must prove (1) that she has a disability within the meaning of the ADA; (2) that she was qualified for her job; and, (3) that an adverse employment decision was made solely because of her disability. Zenor v. El Paso Healthcare System, Ltd., 176 F.3d 847, 852-53 (5th Cir. 1999); Hamilton v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Company, 136 F.3d 1047, 1050 (5th Cir. 1998); Turco v. Hoechst Celanese Corporation, 101 F.3d 1090, 1092 (5th Cir. 1996). Such proof may be established either by direct evidence or by indirect evidence using the burden-shifting regimen established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Rizzo v. Children's World Learning Centers, Inc., 84 F.3d 758, 762 (5th Cir. 1996). The ADA defines the term "disability" as: "(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
According to Martin, BSEC officials engaged in intentional discrimination "in connection with the compensation, terms, conditions and privileges of [her] employment" on the basis of a "perceived disability." Complaint ¶¶ 34, 35. She further alleges that while she "does not have a disability, nor a record of a disability," BSEC nevertheless "regarded [her] as having a disability which substantially limits at least one major life activity." Id. ¶ 35 (emphasis added). In order to be "regarded as" disabled under the ADA, Martin must "(1) have a physical or mental impairment that does not substantially limit major life activities, but be treated as such by an employer; (2) have a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities, but only because of the attitudes of others toward the impairment; or (3) have no actual impairment at all, but be treated by an employer as having a substantially limiting impairment." McInnis v. Alamo Community College District, 207 F.3d 276, 281 (5th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(/). Martin must also establish that "the impairment, if it existed as perceived, would be substantially limiting." McInnis, 207 F.3d at 281; see also Dupre, 242 F.3d at 616; Deas v. River West, I.P., 152 F.3d 471, 475-76 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1035 (1999).
BSEC alleges that Martin has simply failed to present sufficient evidence to make out a prima facie case under the ADA. Defendant's Motion at 19. Specifically, BSEC argues that Martin has not shown that she was "regarded as" disabled by BSEC officials and, therefore, cannot establish that she was disabled within the meaning of the ADA. Defendant's Motion at 19-23. The court agrees.
In support of her ADA claim, Martin alleges, at most, that BSEC officials "falsely reported" to police that she was "suicidal with a gun" and that she was subsequently hospitalized, which BSEC became aware of four days later on January 14, 2000. Complaint ¶¶ 25, 27; Defendant's Motion at 3. Martin, however, has presented absolutely no evidence that anyone at BSEC actually thought she was suicidal or treated her as though she were substantially limited in a major life activity. Indeed, Martin fails to even show how being "suicidal" translates into a perceived impairment and to designate any major life activity in which she is substantially limited by the unidentified impairment. Moreover, the summary judgment evidence produced by BSEC shows that, upon Martin's return to work on January 19, 2000, her supervisors merely requested documentation from a treating physician, pursuant to BSEC policy, that discussed her current medical condition and ability to perform work-related tasks. See Defendant's Motion at 3; BSEC Policies and Procedures at 2. Martin was administratively suspended only after she became uncooperative in supplying BSEC with this documentation, and all the remaining evidence of record indicates that BSEC was in fact supportive of Martin's return to work. See Defendant's Motion at 4; Croft Letter at 5-6.
It is noteworthy that Martin apparently never disclosed the actual reason for her hospitalization to BSEC.
Martin's ADA claim, therefore, is based on nothing more than conclusory allegations and pure speculation, which is insufficient to show a genuine issue of material fact for trial. See Byers v. Dallas Morning News, Inc. 209 F.3d 419, 426-27 (5th Cir. 2000); Little, 37 F.3d at 1075; Seawright v. Charter Furniture Rental, Inc., 39 F. Supp.2d 795, 802 (N.D. Tex. 1999); Piper v. Kimberly-Clark Corporation, 970 F. Supp. 566, 572 (E.D. Tex. 1997), aff'd, 157 F.3d 903 (5th Cir. 1998) (table). Consequently, BSEC is entitled to summary judgment on this claim.
2. Martin's Remaining Claims
Under Texas law, absent a showing of fraud, "settlement agreements and releases are a complete bar to any later action based on matters included therein." White v. Grinfas, 809 F.2d 1157, 1160 (5th Cir. 1987); see also Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company v. Toman, 660 S.W.2d 574, 576 (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio 1983, no writ); Tobbon v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 616 S.W.2d 243, 245 (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Any claims not clearly within the subject matter of the release, however, are not discharged. Victoria Bank Trust Company v. Brady, 811 S.W.2d 931, 938 (Tex. 1991). The interpretation of an unambiguous settlement agreement and release is a question of law. See Shelton v. Exxon Corporation, 921 F.2d 595, 602-03 (5th Cir. 1991); Broad v. Rockwell International Corporation, 642 F.2d 929, 948 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 965, 102 (1981). When reviewing any settlement agreement, the court is mindful of the strong policy favoring the resolution of disputes among opposing parties. See W.J. Ferryman Company v. Penn Mutual Fire Insurance Company, 324 F.2d 791, 793 (5th Cir. 1963).BSEC alleges that the remainder of Martin's claims are barred by the November 20, 2001 agreement settling the claims in her state court case. Defendant's Motion at 6. The release contained in that settlement agreement explicitly provides that "Martin does hereby release, discharge, and forever quit-claim [BSEC] and its agents . . . from any and all of [her] claims, known or unknown, arising out of or related to [her] employment with [BSEC] as of the date of this [a]greement." Settlement Agreement ¶ 1 (emphasis added). Only Martin's ADA claim, which she filed with the EEOC prior to the settlement, was expressly exempted from this release. See Defendant's Motion at 6; Settlement Agreement ¶ 1. Neither side has contended that the language of the release is ambiguous.
On February 1, 2002, the state court dismissed Martin's claims with prejudice on the basis that "[Martin] and [BSEC] have entered into an agreement settling on their merits all controversies and disputes in [this] cause." Defendant's Appendix, Exhibit P; see also Defendant's Motion at 6.
In fact, Martin, rather conveniently, fails to make any reference to the prior state court action or the settlement arising therefrom.
A careful review of Martin's complaint reveals that each of her four remaining claims clearly "arise out of" or "relate to" her previous employment with BSEC. The plain language of the November 20, 2001 release, therefore, completely bars Martin from bringing those claims in this or any other later filed action. White, 809 F.2d at 1160; Toman, 660 S.W.2d at 576; see also Shelton, 921 F.2d at 602-03. Martin has offered no evidence to challenge that conclusion. Accordingly, because Martin has failed to designate specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial, summary judgment is proper on all of her remaining claims.
As mentioned above, those claims include: (1) wrongful discharge in violation of Texas public policy and the Texas Whistleblower's Act, TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 554.001; (2) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (3) retaliation due to Martin's alleged opposition to a "discriminatory practice"; and (4) tortious interference with a prospective business relationship. See Complaint H1F 37-42.
The court notes that even if the release had not covered Martin's four remaining claims, BSEC has provided sufficient evidence to warrant summary judgment on each of those claims individually. See Defendant's Motion at 8-17.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, BSEC's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. Judgment will be entered that Martin take nothing from BSEC on her claims in this case.SO ORDERED.
JUDGMENT
This judgment is entered pursuant to F.R. CIV. P. 58 and the memorandum order of this date. For the reasons stated in that memorandum order, it is ORDERED that the plaintiff take nothing from the defendant on her claims in this case and that the defendant recover its costs of court.